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Too often we neglect the past. Even more than other domains of
law, the intricacies and peculiarities of Indian law deman[d] an
appreciation of history.'
[Gireat nations, like great men, should keep their word.2
[T]he demands of justice do not cease simply because a wronged
people grow less distinctive, or because the rights of innocent third
parties must be taken into account in fashioning a remedy .... From any
perspective, there is little to be proud of here.3
I. INTRODUCTION
For over twenty years, Harry Blackmun wrote Indian law opinions
as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. His opinions during this
period touched on virtually every principal area of Indian law and
included some of the most important Indian law opinions of the Court.
His dissenting opinions in more recent years revealed a continuing
sensitivity toward the .problems facing Indian tribes and continuing
support for tribal sovereignty, as a majority of the Court showed
increasing willingness to curtail tribal sovereignty and other tribal rights.
Although Justice Blackmun did not support the position of Indian
litigants in all cases in which he wrote an opinion, he often stood as one
of the strongest supporters of Indian rights on the Court, particularly
following the retirement of Justices Thurgood Marshall and William
Brennan.4
1. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 511 (1986) (quoting Felix
Frankfurter, Foreword to a Jurisprudential Symposium in Memory of Felix S. Cohen, 9 RUTGERS L.
REv. 355, 356 (1954)) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 528-29.
3. Id.
4. Justice Brennan retired from the Court during the summer of 1990. See The Chief Justice
Comments on the Retirement of Justice Brennan, 111 S. Ct. 248 (1990). Justice Marshall retired from
the Court during the summer of 1991. See The Chief Justice Comments on the Retirement of Justice
Marshall, 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991). For discussions of Justice Marshall's Indian law jurisprudence, see
Tassie Hanna & Robert Laurence, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Problem of Indian Treaty
Abrogation, 40 ARK. L. REV. 797 (1987); Robert Laurence, Thurgood Marshall's Indian Law Opinions,
27 How. L.J. 3 (1984); Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights, and the Sacred Text: The
Legacy of Justice Thurgood Marshall's Indian Law Opinions, 26 ARIz. ST. L.J. 495 (1994).
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Given Justice Blackmun's recent retirement, 5 this is a particularly
appropriate time to focus on his contributions while on the Court.
Focusing on his contributions in the area of Indian law in particular is
interesting because of the importance, for the development of Indian law,
of the cases decided, and the size of the Court's Indian law caseload,
during Justice Blackmun's years on the Court. Because Justice
Blackmun's opinions covered such a broad range of Indian law issues,
examining his opinions affords an opportunity to study some of the
principal developments in Indian law over the last two decades.
Moreover, examining Justice Blackmun's Indian law opinions is helpful
to understanding his broader legacy, because many of his Indian law
opinions demonstrated the ability and willingness to look behind sterile
legal issues to focus on the people who will be affected by the law which,
as some commentators have noted, characterized Justice Blackmun's
approach as a Supreme Court Justice. 6 Examining Justice Blackmun's
Indian law opinions thus may shed light on his views of the law in
general. To paraphrase the words of Felix S. Cohen, "'Like the miner's
canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our
political atmosphere; and . . . [a Justice's] treatment of Indians . . .
reflects the rise and fall in . . . [his] democratic faith.' 7
Part II of this article analyzes each of the Indian law cases in which
Justice Blackmun wrote an opinion, and assesses his contributions to the
development of Indian law. The opinions are grouped into the
following subject-matter areas: reservations, allotment, and termination;
Indian land claims; constitutional issues; criminal jurisdiction; civil
5. Justice Blackmun retired from the Court during the summer of 1994. He announced his
retirement from the Court on April 6, 1994. Linda Greenhouse, Justice Blackmun's Journey: From
Moderate to Liberal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at Al. At a speech at New England School of Law's
annual Law Day celebration in Boston in March of 1993, Justice Blackmun noted that he did not
"intend to stay ... [on the Court] very much longer and... [he did not] want to be asked to retire."
Betsy Q.M. Tong, Justice Blackmun Hints at Upcoming Retirement, BosroN GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1993, at
18.
6. For example, Professor Chai Feldblum of Georgetown University Law School, who clerked
for Justice Blackmun in the 1980's, has commented that "while Justice Blackmun's 'ability and desire
to look behind the law and see the people is not the classic way to do law,' it shaped his approach to
his work on the Court and defines his legacy there." Greenhouse, supra note 2, at A7. See also
Richard C. Reuben, Justice Defined, 80 A.B.A. J., July 1994, at 46, 48 ("Blackmun also placed great
emphasis on the factual, legal and social context of a case. Compassion was another factor in his
judicial equation.") For an example of Justice Blackmun's focus on the effects of the Court's
decisions on people, see infra note 526 and accompanying text.
7. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OFFEDERAL INDIANLAw v (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982)
(quoting Felix S. Cohen) [hereinafter CoHmE's HANDBOOK]. The original quotation reads as follows:
"Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our political
atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects
the rise and fall in our democratic faith." Id. This article will use the term "Indian" when referring
in general to the indigenous peoples of North America, despite the shortcomings of this term. See
Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-based and Membership-based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty:
The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PrrT. L. REv. 1,3 n.6 (1993).
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jurisdiction; regulatory authority; and taxation. This method of
organization makes it easier to assess Justice Blackmun's contributions to
the development of Indian law in each of these areas. Part III identifies
and discusses some of the themes and patterns that emerge from the
analysis of Justice Blackmun's opinions in Part II. Finally, the
Conclusion offers some closing thoughts on Justice Blackmun's views of,
and contributions to the development of, Indian law.
II. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S INDIAN LAW OPINIONS
A. RESERVATIONS, ALLOTMENT, AND TERMINATION
1. Analysis of the Opinions
a. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States
Justice Blackmun wrote his first Indian law opinion for the Court in
1972, two years after his appointment to the Court.8 In Affiliated Ute
Citizens of Utah v. United States,9 the Court examined two actions
brought by mixed-blood Indians arising from the Ute Indian
Supervision Termination Act (the Ute Act), one of a series of federal
statutes enacted during the 1950's to terminate the special relationship
between the federal government and the tribes covered by the statutes.10
Under the terms of the Ute Act, the assets of the Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation in Utah were to be divided among mixed-
blood and full-blood members of the tribe; the mixed-blood Utes' share
was to be distributed to individual mixed-blood Utes; and those tribal
assets which could not be divided were to be jointly managed by
representatives of the two groups."l The mixed-blood Utes organized an
unincorporated association, the Affiliated Ute Citizens (AUC), to act as
their representative. 12 AUC in turn incorporated the Ute Distribution
8. Justice Blackmun was appointed by President Nixon, and joined the Court on June 9, 1970. 90
S. Ct. 11 (1970).
9. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
10. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 ,133 n.1 (1972) (examining the
effects of the Ute Indian Supervision Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 677 (1982) (codified as amended))
[hereinafter Affiliated Ute Citizens]. For a discussion of the termination acts, see COHEN'S HANDBOOK,
supra note 4, at 152-80. For additional analysis of the termination era, see ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 155-58 (3d ed. 1991); DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL.,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw CASES AND MATERIALS 229-51 (3d. ed. 1993).
11. 406 U.S. at 134-35. After each mixed-blood individual had received a distribution, federal
restrictions on the distributed property were to be removed, except as to the undivided tribal assets,
and the federal trust relationship with the individuals would be terminated. Id. at 135.
12. Id. at 135-36.
1995]
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Corporation (UDC), and delegated to UDC authority to manage the
undivided tribal assets on AUC's behalf.13
Affiliated Ute Citizens involved two actions brought by mixed-blood
Utes. In the first action, AUC sued the United States, seeking pro rata
distribution of a portion of the mineral estate underlying the
reservation. 14 In the second action, a group of individual mixed-blood
Utes sued the United States, the bank at which UDC stock certificates
owned by mixed-blood Utes had been deposited for safekeeping, and
two bank employees, charging violations of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act) in connection with sales of UDC stock to non-
Utes.15
Justice Blackmun began his opinion for the Court by noting the
"long-established principle" that the "[tihe United States, of course,
may not be sued without its consent." 16 He then quickly dismissed
several statutory provisions which, AUC argued, demonstrated federal
consent to be sued, most notably a provision which provided that all
Indians who are entitled to an allotment of land or who claim to have
been unlawfully excluded from an allotment may commence an action
in federal district court against the United States.17  Justice Blackmun
distinguished this provision as pertaining only to allotments, allotment
being "a term of art in Indian law" meaning "a selection of specific
land awarded to an individual allottee from a common holding." 18 The
interest in the mineral estate that AUC sought to have conveyed was
neither the subject of an allotment nor appurtenant to an allotment, but
rather related to tribal land of the reservation and remained tribal
13. Id. at 136-37. UDC issued ten shares of stock to each of the mixed-blood Utes. For ten years
from the date of the Act, the UDC stock could not be sold unless it was first offered to members of the
tribe. Id.
14. Id. at 139. The complaint was dismissed by the district court for want of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Id. at 139-40.
15. Id. at 140. The district court held the bank and the employees liable for damages, and also
ruled that the United States was liable for damages for its failure to fulfill a duty to prevent sales of the
stock. Id. The Tenth Circuit reversed. Id. at 140-41. AUC also sought a determination that AUC,
rather than UDC, was entitled to manage the mineral estate jointly with the tribal business committee,
which was representing the full-blood Utes. Id. at 140.
16. Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 141.
17. Id. at 142 n.1l.
A@"All persons who are in whole or in part of Indian blood or descent who are entitled to
an allotment of land ... or who claim to have been unlawfully denied or excluded from
any allotment ... may commence and prosecute ... any action ... in relation to their
right thereto in the proper district court in the United States; and said district courts are
given jurisdiction to try and determine any action ... involving the right of any person, in
whole or in part of Indian blood or descent, to any allotment of land under any law or
treaty (and in said suit the parties thereto shall be the claimant as plaintiff and the United
States as party defendant) ......
Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 345 (1982)).
18. Id. at 142.
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property. 19 He concluded that, in the absence of federal consent to be
sued, the AUC action against the United States was properly dismissed. 20
Justice Blackmun himself did not question the much-criticized
termination policy, 21 which was repudiated by the federal government
subsequent to the Ute Act. 22 He did note in a footnote, however, after
listing other examples of termination statutes, that "[tihe termination
policy exemplified by these acts is not without its criticism." 23
Furthermore, he did not consider the implications of the federal trust
responsibility 24 or apply any of the canons of construction, based on the
federal trust responsibility, which the Court has developed to analyze
congressional action relating to Indians.25
Similarly, in his examination of the suit against the United States for
its failure to restrain UDC stock sales which were made in violation of the
19. Id. at 143.
20. Id.
21. For a description of some of the adverse effects of the termination policy, see GETCHES ET
AL., supra note 10, at 234-39.
22. For a discussion of the repudiation of the termination policy and the development of the
policy of greater self-determination for the tribes, see COHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 180-88.
23. 406 U.S. at 134 n.l.
24. For a discussion of the federal trust responsibility, see CLINTON ET AL., supra note 10, at 15-
18; and CotEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 220-28. The federal trust responsibility, an important
concept in Indian law, evolved from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
in which he characterized the relationship between Indian tribes and the United States as
"resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17
(1831). This basic concept of guardianship, or trusteeship, has been applied in specific situations to
protect Indian rights. As Felix Cohen's Handbook describes,
Trust obligations define the required standard of conduct for federal officials and
Congress. Fiduciary duties form the substantive basis for various claims against the
federal government. Even more broadly, federal action toward Indians as expressed in
treaties, agreements, statutes, executive orders, and administrative regulations is
construed in light of the trust responsibility.
COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 220-21. The trust responsibility can, however, be a double-edged
sword from the Indian viewpoint. In the late nineteenth century, in United States v. Kagama, the
Supreme Court relied on the trust responsibility as an independent basis for federal power over
Indians. 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
25. The canons of construction were originally developed in the area of treaty interpretation.
Felix Cohen's Handbook summarizes the canons as follows: "In construing Indian treaties, the courts
have required that treaties be liberally construed to favor Indians, that ambiguous expressions in
treaties must be resolved in favor of the Indians, and that treaties should be construed as the Indians
would have understood them." COHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 222 (footnotes omitted). See id. at
221-25 (discussing the canons). See also infra notes 549-67 and accompanying text (discussing
Blackmun's incorporation of the canons into the judiciary's opinion). The canons of construction
were examined in Justice Douglas's opinion in Affiliated Ute Citizens. Justice Douglas dissented from
the Court's judgment that the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity and concurred in the
judgment as to the bank and its employees. 406 U.S. at 157 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Douglas noted that: "[wie owe to the Indians a beneficent interpretation of
remedial legislation designed to right past wrongs" and that "'doubtful expressions, instead of being
resolved in favor of the United States, are to be resolved in favor of a weak and defenseless people,
who are wards of the nation, and dependent wholly upon its protection and good faith."' 406 U.S. at
161 (quoting Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912)). In light of these principles, Justice Douglas
concluded that the United States had waived its sovereign immunity. Id. at 162.
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Exchange Act, Justice Blackmun found the federal trust responsibility to
be irrelevant. He argued that although the undivided tribal assets
managed by UDC and the tribal business committee were still subject to
restrictions on alienation, the UDC stock itself was free of any federal
restrictions on alienation and was not subject to governmental authority,
and that consequently there could be no federal liability for failure to
restrain sales.26 He apparently did not consider important the fact that,
as Justice Douglas's opinion pointed out, the federal government
continued to have significant responsibilities and duties with regard to
the group interests in the mineral rights. 27 Justice Blackmun's first
Indian law opinion thus did not show the same solicitude for Indian
rights which his later opinions showed.
b. Mattz v. Arnett
In 1973, in his second Indian law opinion for the Court, Justice
Blackmun addressed an issue arising from another federal statute dealing
with the status of Indian lands and the relationship of Indian tribes with
the federal government. In Mattz v. Arnett 2 8 the Court had to determine
whether the Klamath River Reservation in California was terminated by
an 1892 federal statute (1892 Act) which opened the reservation for
settlement.29 The California Department of Fish and Game argued that
the 1892 Act terminated the reservation 30 so that the state could impose
its prohibition on the use of gill nets on Mattz, a Yurok Indian whose gill
nets had been seized by a state game warden. Mattz argued that the
reservation had not been terminated and the nets had therefore been
seized within "Indian country," which was not subject to the state
statute. 31 "Indian country," an Indian law term of art, is defined in a
federal criminal law statute, 32 but the Supreme Court has applied the
26. 406 U.S. at 150. The Court also concluded that the plaintiffs in the securities law suit were
entitled to recover damages from the bank and its employees for violations of the Exchange Act. Id.
at 152-54.
27. Id. at 159 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28. 412 U.S. 481 (1973). Where a case could be categorized in more than one of the subject-
matter areas considered in Part II, it has been included in the category which best reflects the Court's
focus in the case. Consequently, Maiz has been included with the cases addressing reservations,
allotment, and termination, rather than with the cases addressing regulatory authority.
29. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,485 (1973).
30. Id. at 495. See also supra note 10 (discussing the effects of the termination acts).
31. Matz, 412 U.S. at 484.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1969). "Indian country" is defined as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-
way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the
borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian
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definition to civil jurisdiction issues as well. 33 Within Indian country,
Indians have historically been governed primarily by federal and tribal
law rather than by state law.34
Justice Blackmun began his opinion for the Court with a description
of the history of the Yurok Indians and the Klamath River Reservation,
including lengthy quotes from nineteenth century and early twentieth
century sources. The fact that much of the quoted material included by
Justice Blackmun was largely irrelevant to resolving the legal issue seems
to indicate Justice Blackmun's own interest in the Yurok Indians and
their history- apparently he found the material to be very interesting,
and felt compelled to include it in his opinion.35 The material also
documented the selfish motives of the white men with whom the Yuroks
had to deal.36
In concluding that the Klamath River Reservation was not
terminated by the 1892 Act and the land within the reservation
boundaries was still Indian country, 37 Justice Blackmun evaluated the
meaning of the allotment provisions of the 1892 Act in light of the
policy of the General Allotment Act of 1887, commonly known as the
Dawes Act. The Dawes Act "continue[d] the reservation system and the
trust status of Indian lands, but ... allotted lands to individual Indians
for agriculture and grazing." 38 The allotment provisions of the 1892
Act did not differ materially from the Dawes Act provisions and did not,
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through the same.
Id.
33. See, e.g., DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,427 n.2 (1975).
34. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 28. For a general discussion of state jurisdiction on
Indian reservations, see CoHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 349-80.
35. See Mattz, 412 U.S. at 488-89. For example, Justice Blackmun quoted at length from a letter
dealing with a dispute over the Yurok population in 1852. See id. at 489 n.7.
'I have waded too many rivers and climbed too many mountains to abate one jot of my
opinions or beliefs for any carpet-knight who yields a compiling-pen in the office of
the- or -. If any critic, sitting in his comfortable parlor in New York, and reading
about the sparse aboriginal populations of the cold forests of the Atlantic States, can
overthrow any of my conclusions with the dash of his pen, what is the use of the book at
all? As Luther said, at the Diet of Worms, 'Here I stand; I cannot do otherwise.'
Id. (quoting STEPHEN POWERS, TRIBES OF CALIFORNIA, published as 3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO NORTH
AMMICAN ETmHoLooY 2-3 (1877) (reprinting a response to criticism of Yurok population estimates)).
36. See, e.g., id. at 487 n.6. "'No possessions of the Government can be better spared to them.
No territory offers more to these Indians and very litle territory offers less to the white man .' Id. at
487 n.6 (quoting 1856 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 266) (emphasis added)).
37. Id. at 506. The Court remanded the case for determination of issues relating to the existence
of Mattz's fishing rights and the applicability of state law despite reservation status. Id. at 485. On
remand, the California Court of Appeals expressed doubt that California could regulate on-reservation
fishing, but did not decide the issue because the Indians' fishing was determined not to be a sufficient
threat to state conservation efforts to justify state regulation. Arnett v. Five Gill Nets, 48 Cal. App. 3d
454,463-64 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
38. Mattz, 412 U.S. at 496. For a discussion of the Dawes Act and the allotment era, see CIr-OnN
ET AL., supra note 10, at 147-52; CoHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 127-43; GETCHES ET AL., supra
note 10, at 190-99.
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in Justice Blackmun's estimation, "recite or even suggest that Congress
intended thereby to terminate the Klamath River Reservation ...
Rather, allotment under the 1892 Act is completely consistent with
continued reservation status." 39  Justice Blackmun rejected the
Department of Fish and Game's argument that the reference in the 1892
Act to the Klamath River Reservation in the past tense indicated
congressional intent to terminate the reservation. 40 He concluded that
the legislative history of the 1892 Act indicated that, although there had
been efforts to terminate the reservation, they were unsuccessful. 4 1
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun reiterated the principle, established in
earlier Supreme Court cases, that a congressional determination to
terminate a reservation must be apparent on the face of a statute or
otherwise clear from the legislative history and surrounding
circumstances; 42 otherwise, as indicated in the definition of Indian
country, allotted land remains part of the reservation. 43 Finally, Justice
Blackmun noted that both the Department of the Interior and Congress
had continued to recognize the reservation status of the land at issue
despite the 1892 Act.44
The Court's decision in Mattz protected the Klamath Reservation
from the threat of implied termination. Justice Blackmun's opinion
reaffirmed the principle that the intent of Congress to terminate a
reservation must be clearly expressed-a principle which is important in
preserving reservation boundaries, and tribal authority within those
boundaries. Although he did not state his own views on the continuing
vitality of Indian reservations and the concept of tribal sovereignty which
is inextricably bound up with them, Justice Blackmun's extensive
discussion of the Yurok Indians and the history of the Klamath River
Reservation is consistent with the concern for tribal survival made
explicit in some of his later opinions.
39. 412 U.S. at 497 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 498-99.
41. Id. at 504.
42. Id. at 504-05 (citing Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); United States v. Nice,
241 U.S. 591 (1916)).
43. The definition of Indian country includes land "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent."
18 U.S.C. § 1151. Justice Blackmun also relied on the statement in a 1909 case that "'when Congress
has once established a reservation all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until
separated therefrom by Congress."' 412 U.S. at 504-05 (quoting United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S.
278, 285 (1909)). See also supra note 32.
44. 412 U.S. at 505.
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c. Morton v. Ruiz
In 1974, in Morton v. Ruiz, 45 the Court considered the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (B.I.A.) general assistance benefits eligibility of Indians
who lived near, but not on, a reservation, and maintained close ties with
the reservation. 46 It thus dealt with the important issue of the status of
Indians who are forced by economic considerations, such as high
reservation unemployment rates, 47 to live off their native reservation, but
who still have close ties with it.
Ramon and Anita Ruiz were Papago Indians who left the Papago
Reservation in Arizona to seek employment at copper mines located
fifteen miles from the reservation. 48 They lived in a community located
near the mines, within the borders of the Papagos' aboriginal tribal land,
which was populated almost entirely by Papagos. 49 They spoke very
little English and regularly visited the reservation, where they still
maintained a home.50 As the trial record described, "The siren song of
the reservation . . . prevent[ed] the complete severance of the umbilical
cord to the homeland of these people." 51 After a strike shut down the
mine at which Ramon Ruiz worked, he applied for B.I.A. general
assistance benefits, which were denied because he resided outside the
boundaries of the Papago Reservation. 52 Following two unsuccessful
appeals of the benefits denial, the Ruizes instituted a class action against
the Secretary of the Interior, claiming that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, they were entitled to the benefits which had been denied.53
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun thoroughly reviewed
the language of the Snyder Act, which provided general authority for
most of the B.I.A.'s activities, the language of the appropriation
legislation for the Snyder Act, the language of the B.I.A.'s budget
requests, and testimony at congressional hearings on the B.I.A. budget
45. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
46. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
47. See, e.g., Bill Richardson, More Power to the Tribes, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1993, at A15
("Unemployment on reservations has always exceeded 50 percent nationally and sometimes reaches
more than 80 percent.").
48. 415 U.S. at 202.
49. Id. at 202 & n.2.
50. Id. at 203 n.3.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 204-05.
53. Ruiz, 415 U.S. at 205. The District Court for the District of Arizona granted a summary
judgment for the Secretary of the Interior, which was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. Id. The Ruizes also alleged that the eligibility provision violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 8 of the
Constitution. Id. The Court did not reach the constitutional arguments. Id. at 238.
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requests. He concluded that Congress did not intend to exclude from
the assistance program individuals like the Ruizes - individuals who are
"full-blooded, unassimilated Indians living in an Indian community
near their native reservation, and who maintain close economic and
social ties with that reservation." 54  Although there were some
indications in the legislative history and the budget requests that
eligibility was defined in terms of Indians residing "on reservations,"
the B.I.A., "not infrequently," equated living "on or near" a
reservation with living "on" a reservation. 55 Thus Congress could have
been led to believe that "there are only two relevant classes of Indians so
far as non-land-related BIA services are concerned, those living 'off the
reservation and those living 'on or near."' 56 Because the appropriation
was for Indians "'on or near the reservation,"' the Court held that it was
broad enough to include the Ruizes. 57
Justice Blackmun's opinion also relied on the federal government's
trust responsibility. In discussing the failure of the B.I.A. to publish its
eligibility requirements, he noted the "overriding duty of our Federal
Government to deal fairly with Indians wherever located" and stated that
"[t]he denial of benefits to these respondents . . . is inconsistent with
'the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its
dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people."'"s At
the same time, however, the Court was careful to limit the result to
Indians like the Ruizes, rather than all Indians.59
Ruiz prompted the B.I.A. to adopt eligibility regulations which dealt
specifically with the situation of Indians living near, but not on, a
reservation. Current B.I.A. regulations make services generally available
to Indians who reside "on a reservation" or "near reservation." The
"near reservation" definition specifically provides for social, cultural,
and economic affiliations with a reservation to be considered in
designating an area as being "near reservation," 60 in keeping with the
54. Id. at 212.
55. Id. at 214.
56. Id. at 221.
57. Id. at 238.
58. Ruiz, 415 U.S. at 236 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942)).
See also supra note 24.
59. Id. at 211.
60. 25 C.F.R. § 20.20(a) (1994). "Indian" means "any person who is a member, or a one-fourth
degree or more blood quantum descendant of a member of any Indian tribe." 25 C.F.R. § 20.1(n)
(1994). "Near reservation" is defined as follows:
"Near reservation" means those areas or communities adjacent or contiguous to
reservations which are designated by. the Commissioner [of Indian Affairs] upon
recommendation of the local Bureau Superintendent, which recommendation shall be
based upon consultation with the tribal governing body of those reservations, as locales
appropriate for the extension of financial assistance and/or social services, on the basis
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references to economic and social ties to the reservation which are in
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Ruiz.
d. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast
In 1976, in Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast,61 Justice
Blackmun contributed a one-paragraph concurring opinion.
Hollowbreast involved the interpretation of the Northern Cheyenne
Allotment Act of 1926 (the 1926 Act), which provided for the allotment
of reservation land to individual tribal members.62 The Act provided
that the mineral deposits on the reservation were reserved for the benefit
of the tribe, but also provided that "at the expiration of fifty years from
the date of approval of this Act the coal or other minerals . . . of said
allotments shall become the property of the respective allottees or their
heirs." 63 In 1968, Congress amended the 1926 Act, terminating the
grant of mineral rights to the allottees and reserving the mineral rights in
perpetuity for the tribe's benefit.64 The tribe argued that the "plain
meaning" of the 1926 Act indicated that the allottees were granted only
an expectancy as to the minerals, while the allottees argued that they
were granted a vested future interest, 65 entitling them to just
compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
66
Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority stated that both the tribe's
and the allottees' interpretations were plausible under the wording of the
1926 Act, necessitating a look at legislative history and the principles
relating to congressional power to alter allotment plans in order to
determine Congress's intent.67 Justice Brennan examined the legislative
history of the 1926 Act and invoked the canon of construction that
allotment statutes are to be read to reserve Congress's wideranging
powers with respect to allotment plans in the absence of a clear contrary
of such general criteria as: (1) Number of Indian people native to the reservation
residing in the area, (2) a written designation by the tribal governing body that members
of their tribe and family members who are Indian residing in the area, are socially,
culturally and economically affiliated with their tribe and reservation, (3) geographical
proximity of the area to the reservation, and (4) administrative feasibility of providing an
adequate level of services to the area. The Commissioner shall designate each area and
publish the designations in the FEDERAL REoisTER.
25 C.FR. § 20.1(r) (1994).
61. 425 U.S. 649 (1976).
62. 425 U.S. 649, 650-51 (1976).
63. Id. at 651 (quoting Northern Cheyenne Allotment Act of 1926, § 3, 44 Stat. 691.
64. Id. at 652. Congress conditioned the termination of the grant to the allottees upon a prior
judicial determination that the allottees did not have a vested interest in the minerals under the 1926
Act. Id. at 652-53. The tribe was authorized by the amendment to sue the allottees in the District
Court for Montana in order to receive a judicial determination on the issue. Id. at 653.
65. Id. at 654.
66. Id. at 652-53.
67. Hollowbreast. 425 U.S. at 654-55.
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expression. 68 He concluded that the allottees had not acquired vested
interests under the 1926 Act. 69
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion noted that "this case is
much closer and the legislative history much less clear than the Court's
opinion makes them out to be," but he felt that the tribe still had the
stronger case, and therefore joined in the Court's opinion and
judgment. 70 The opinion thus adds little to an understanding of Justice
Blackmun's Indian law jurisprudence.
e. United States v. Clarke
In 1980, in United States v. Clarke ,Tl the Court considered another
issue relating to allotments. A 1901 federal statute provided that "lands
allotted in severalty to Indians may be condemned for any public
purpose under the laws of the State or Territory where located in the
same manner as land owned in fee may be condemned, and the money
awarded as damages shall be paid to the allottee." 7 2 In Clarke, the
United States, as fee owner of a plot of land in Alaska held in trust for an
individual Indian, Bertha Mae Tabbytite, sued to recover damages and to
enjoin the use of a road which had been constructed across the trust
property by Glen Clarke, a non-Indian adjoining landowner.73 The issue
in Clarke was whether the statute authorized a state or local government
to acquire Indian trust lands by physical occupation, sometimes referred
to as "inverse" or "reverse" condemnation, rather than by a formal
condemnation proceeding. 74 The United States and Tabbytite argued
that the statute did not authorize inverse condemnation. 75 The Court,
relying on the "plain meaning" of the statute's language, held that the
statute authorized only formal condemnation proceedings, not
proceedings by a landowner to recover compensation for a taking by
physical occupation.76
68. Id. at 656.
69. Id. at 658-60.
70. Id. at 660-61 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
71. 445 U.S. 253 (1980).
72. United States v. Clarke, 455 U.S. 253,254 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 357).
73. Id. at 259-60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 254-55.
75. Id. at 260-61.
76. Id. at 258. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court also noted the practical differences
between condemnation proceedings and inverse condemnation, and the different monetary
consequences: in inverse condemnation, the property is valued at the time of the physical occupation,
while in formal condemnation proceedings, the property is usually valued during the course of the
proceedings and is therefore based on a relatively current valuation. Id. at 257-58. Justice Blackmun
also addressed this difference in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 262.
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In his dissenting opinion, joined by Justice White, Justice Blackmun
described the case's factual background, noting that "[s]ince the Court's
opinion sets forth none of the facts of the case, it may be well to mention
at least a few."77 Tabbytite had originally sought unrestricted fee title to
the plot in question under the homestead laws rather than a restricted
trust patent as an Indian allottee, but her efforts were successfully
opposed by Clarke, who obtained a patent to a plot adjoining Tabbytite's
allotment and constructed the road in question across her plot without
obtaining an easement.78 Although Clarke's hostile actions were not
strictly relevant to determining the meaning of the statutory language,
Justice Blackmun apparently felt that these actions were worth noting as
a backdrop to his analysis.
Justice Blackmun found persuasive the reasoning of the court of
appeals, which had held that the statute allowed a state to take allotted
land by paying compensation to the allottee in an inverse
condemnation. 79 The court had reasoned that once land has been taken
"'it serves little purpose to interpret the statute to refuse to permit an
inverse condemnation suit to be maintained on the grounds that the state
should have filed an eminent domain action prior to the taking."' 80
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun agreed with the court of appeals'
observation that "'it seems a contradiction to deny Indian beneficial
owners a cause of action for damages under the guise of protecting their
rights."' 8 1  Thus, although Justice Blackmun rejected the Indian
litigant's interpretation of the statute, apparently he did so out of a
concern for providing a remedy for an Indian allottee whose land was
taken, regardless of the precise way in which the allottee was deprived of
property rights. 82
77. Clarke, 445 U.S. at 259.
78. Id. at 259-60. In 1961, the subdivision in which the land was located was incorporated as a
city, which was annexed in 1975 by Anchorage, which apparently assumed responsibility for
maintenance of the road. Id.
79. Id. at 261.
80. Id. (quoting United States v. Clarke, 590 F.2d 765,767 (1979)).
81. Id. (quoting United States v. Clarke, 590 F.2d 765,767 (1979)).
82. Clarke, 445 U.S. at 261. Tabbytite and the United States had argued that the statute did not
allow inverse condemnation, which Justice Blackmun attributed to a concern that, in an inverse
condemnation case, the interest would be valued at the time of entry rather than at the date when
formal condemnation proceedings were instituted, at which time the interest might have appreciated in
value. Id. at 260, 262. Justice Blackmun dismissed this concern as probably "more form than
substance," because interest during the intervening period would make up much of the difference and
some of the difference might be attributable to the improvement in question. Id. at 262. See also supra
note 76.
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f. United States v. Mottaz
In 1986, in United States v. Mottaz,8 3 the Court addressed the
applicability of a statute of limitations to a claim relating to interests in
Indian allotments.8 4 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Blackmun
held that the plaintiffs claim was barred by the twelve-year statute of
limitations of the Quiet Title Act, a federal statute which governs suits to
adjudicate claims to real property in which the United States claims an
interest.85
The plaintiff, Florence Mottaz, inherited fractional interests in three
plots of land, held in trust by the United States, which had been allotted
to her ancestors.8 6 In 1954, two of the allotments were sold by the
United States to the United States Forest Service without her consent.8 7
In 1981, Mottaz filed suit against the United States in federal district
court, alleging that the sales made without her consent were illegal sales
and the transfers were void.88
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun began with the
proposition that when the United States waives its sovereign immunity
and consents to be sued, as it had in the Quiet Title Act, the terms of the
waiver determine the extent of the relevant court's jurisdiction.8 9 When
the legislation containing the waiver includes a statute of limitations, the
waiver of sovereign immunity is conditioned upon compliance with the
limitations provision. 90 Justice Blackmun concluded that Mottaz's suit
fell within the scope of the Quiet Title Act because she was seeking a
declaration that she, rather than the United States, held valid title to her
interests in the allotments.91 The Quiet Title Act provided that actions
must be commenced within twelve years of the date upon which they
83. 476 U.S. 834 (1986).
84. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 836 (1986).
85. Id. at 836, 841-42 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a)).
86. Id. at 836.
87. Id. at 837. In 1954, Mottaz had been notified by the Department of the Interior by mail that
two of the allotments in which she held an interest were being sold at the request of other holders of
fractional interests, and that she would be deemed to have consented to the sale unless a reply was
received from her within ten days. Id. Mottaz did not reply and the land was sold to the Forest
Service. Id. In 1981, when Mottaz sought a list of her interests from the B.I.A., the B.I.A.'s reply
noted that she had once held interests in other allotments which had been sold without the consent of
all heirs. Id.
88. Id. at 838. Mottaz sought damages equal to the fair market value of each parcel of land that
was sold. Id. She also alleged that the United States breached its fiduciary duty to her and was
negligent in selling her lands; that she had been deprived of property without due process of law; and
that her property had been taken for public use without the payment of just compensation. Id.
89. Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 841.
90. Id. (citing Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273,287 (1983)).
91. Id. at 841-42.
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accrued, and that actions were deemed to have accrued when the plaintiff
"knew or should have known of the claim of the United States. 92 The
limitations provision barred Mottaz's claim, Justice Blackmun concluded,
because she should have known by at least 1967, when a list of her
interests provided to her by the B.I.A. did not include any of the
allotments at issue, that the United States no longer recognized her
claims and instead claimed interests itself.93 Justice Blackmun also
rejected Mottaz's arguments that her claims were covered by two other
federal statutes.94
The holding in Mottaz thus denied Florence Mottaz the opportunity
to recover interests in Indian trust allotments which had been sold
without her consent. Justice Blackmun noted in conclusion that
"[flederal law rightly provides Indians with a range of special
protections. But even for Indian plaintiffs, '[a] waiver of sovereign
immunity 'cannot be lightly implied but must be unequivocally
expressed." 95  Allowing Mottaz's claim to proceed was characterized
as a potential threat to the interests of the United States: "The
limitations provision of the Quiet Title Act reflects a clear congressional
judgment that the national public interest requires barring stale
challenges to the United States' claim to real property, whatever the
merits of those challenges."96 Thus, while recognizing the existence and
appropriateness of special legal protections for Indians, Justice
Blackmun found such legal protections, like the trust responsibility and
canons of construction, to be inapplicable in the face of a presumed
threat to the national public interest.
92. Id. at 843 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f)).
93. Id. at 843-44. The district court had expressly found that the plaintiff knew of the sale in
1954. Id. at 843.
94. Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 844, 848. Mottaz argued that her suit was a claim under the Dawes Act
to which the general federal six-year statute of limitations did not apply. Id. at 844. The Dawes Act
granted district courts jurisdiction over suits involving the right to allotments. Id. at 844-45. Justice
Blackmun concluded that the plaintiff could not use the Dawes Act for a quiet title action against the
government because the Act waived the government's sovereign immunity only for cases seeking the
original issuance of an allotment. Id. at 845-46. Permitting suits against the United States under the
Dawes Act would circumvent the Quiet Title Act, which Congress intended to provide the exclusive
means for challenging the United States' title to real property, and could seriously disrupt ongoing
federal programs by requiring the United States to give up possession of the disputed lands. Id. at 846-
47. In addition, Mottaz had claimed at several times during the litigation that the Tucker Act
established federal jurisdiction over her claim, but had subsequently agreed with the government that a
Tucker Act claim would be barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Id. at 848. The Court held
that Mottaz's claim was not within the scope of the Tucker Act. Id. at 850.
95. Id. at 851 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535,538 (1980); United States v. King,
395 U.S. 1,4 (1969)).
96. Id. at 851.
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2. Contributions to the Development of Indian Law
Justice Blackmun's opinions in these cases, most of which were
decided during Justice Blackmun's first decade of writing Indian law
opinions, related to several important Indian law principles. Mattz was
important to the continued existence of reservations and tribal
governments because it reaffirmed the principle that opening a
reservation to settlement does not itself terminate the reservation. The
reservation remains Indian country, in which state authority has
historically been limited. Justice Blackmun's opinion in Mattz also
showed the interest in Indian history which came to characterize many of
his opinions. Ruiz was important for Indians who lived near a
reservation and still maintained close reservation ties, whom the Court
found to be entitled to receive B.I.A. benefits. Ruiz prompted the B.I.A.
to deal specifically with such Indians in its regulations. Affiliated Ute
Citizens and Mottaz demonstrated that waivers of federal sovereign
immunity will be construed very narrowly in suits by Indian allottees
against the United States, despite the existence of the federal trust
responsibility and special canons of construction for interpreting federal
action toward Indians. Hollowbreast, in which Justice Blackmun wrote a
brief concurring opinion but joined in the Court's judgment and
opinion, upheld the extensive authority of Congress to alter allotment
plans before such plans are executed and reaffirmed the principle that
allotment statutes are to be construed to reserve congressional power to
alter allotment plans unless a contrary congressional intent is clearly
expressed. Finally, Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Clarke
demonstrated his concern with providing a remedy for an Indian allottee
whose property rights had been infringed, regardless of the form in
which the infringement took place, while a majority of the Court was
more concerned about whether the infringement was in the form
prescribed by the relevant statute.
B. INDIAN LAND CLAIMS
1. Analysis of the Opinions
a. Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks
Justice Blackmun's first opinion in an Indian land claims case was a
brief concurring opinion, which Chief Justice Burger joined, in 1977 in
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Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks. 97 In Weeks, the Court
considered the claim of descendants of a group of Delaware Indians,
known as the "Kansas Delawares," that their exclusion by Congress
from the distribution of funds to Delaware Indians pursuant to an award
by the Indian Claims Commission denied them equal protection of the
law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 98
The claimants' ancestors had elected, under the terms of an 1866 treaty,
to remain in Kansas and dissolve their relationship with the tribe when
the rest of the tribe moved from the tribe's Kansas reservation to
Oklahoma. 99 The funds at issue had been awarded to the tribe in
compensation for the breach of an 1854 treaty by the United States.100
Congress appropriated funds to pay the award but excluded the Kansas
Delawares from participation in the distribution of the funds.lOl
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court analyzed the history of the
Delaware Indians and the legislation providing for the funds. 102 He first
dismissed the contention that the case presented a nonjusticiable political
question because of Congress's pervasive authority over tribal property,
noting that Congress's power over Indian affairs was plenary but not
absolute.l 03 Given the broad congressional power in this area, the proper
standard of review of Congress's action was whether the omission of the
Kansas Delawares from the distribution of the funds was "'tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the
97. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
98. Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 75 (1977). The Indian Claims
Commission was established in 1946 to hear Indian claims against the federal government. See
COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 160. For a description of the Commission, see CLINTON ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 721-24; COHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 160-63; GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10,
at 311-18. See also Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 Am. U. L.
REV. 753 (1992) (providing a detailed analysis of the work of the Indian Claims Commission and the
Court of Claims, to which outstanding claims were transferred after the Commission's dissolution in
1978).
99. Weeks, 430 U.S. at 78. The Delawares electing to remain in Kansas were to receive a
proportion of the money held in trust for the tribe by the United States and could not participate in
future tribal councils or share in tribal property. Id.
100. Id. at 79.
101. Id. at 79-80. The Kansas Delawares sued the United States, the Secretary of the Interior,
and the Cherokee Delawares and Absentee Delawares, who were included in the distribution of the
funds. Id. at 82.
102. Id. at 75-82.
103. Id. at 83-84. For an extensive discussion of federal power in Indian affairs, see Nell Jessup
Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195
(1984). For a discussion of the doctrine of Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs as a legal
legacy of colonialism, see Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. R EV. 77, 110-25 (1993). See also infra notes 190-93 and
accompanying text.
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Indians."' 10 4 Justice Brennan held that this standard was met and
therefore Congress's action would not be disturbed by the Court. 05
Justice Blackmun concurred in the result and in those parts of
Justice Brennan's opinion describing the history of the Delaware Indians
and the deference due to Congress, but he did not find the Court's
justifications for the exclusion of the claimants very persuasive. He felt
that the arguments on each side were not very strong, and concluded that
the Court "must acknowledge that there necessarily is a large measure of
arbitrariness in distributing an award for a century-old wrong."10 6
However, given the difficulty in determining how to distribute benefits
like the funds at issue, and Congress's need to have a "large measure of
flexibility in allocating Indian awards," Justice Blackmun could not
conclude that the exclusion of the Kansas Delawares was unreasonable
and a violation of due process.107
Justice Blackmun's opinion demonstrated an appreciation of the
difficulties faced by Congress in dealing with past government
misconduct toward the Indians. It also indicated his support of the view
that while the Court has the power to review congressional actions in
Indian affairs, Congress is entitled to considerable leeway in
decisionmaking with respect to Indian affairs because of Congress's
plenary power in the area. 108
b. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe
In the 1979 case of Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,109 the Court
construed a statute providing that
[i]n all trials about the right of property in which an Indian
may be a party on one side, and a white person on the other,
the burden of proof shall rest upon the white person, whenever
the Indian shall make out a presumption of title in himself
from the fact of previous possession or ownership.110
The Omaha Indian Tribe claimed that a tract of land in Iowa on the
east bank of the Missouri River was part of its reservation, the remainder
104. Weeks, 430 U.S. at 85. Justice Brennan used the standard of review set out in Justice
Blackmun's opinion in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974), discussed infra at notes 182-202
and accompanying text.
105. Weeks, 430 U.S. at 85.
106. Id. at 90-91 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 91.
108. The rational basis standard applied by the Court was in fact adopted from Justice
Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Morton v. Mancari. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
109. 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
110. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653,658 (1979) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 194).
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of which was on the Nebraska side of the river. I The State of Iowa and
several private Iowa landowners argued that, because of movements in
the course of the Missouri River which had led to the disputed land
being on the Iowa side of the river, the land belonged to the private
landowners and was no longer part of the reservation.1 12
The State of Iowa and the landowners asserted that the statutory
provision did not apply when an Indian tribe rather than an individual
Indian was the litigant, because the statute referred to "an Indian." 113
The Court, in an opinion by Justice White, rejected this assertion on the
basis of the history of the provision and the fact that limiting the
provision to lands held by individual Indians would make the provision
insignificant, given that at the time of the enactment of predecessor
provisions, Indian land ownership was primarily tribal.114
The State and the private landowners also argued that the provision
did not apply where the adverse claimant was an artificial entity, like a
corporation, rather than an individual, because the provision referred to
"a white person."115 The Court rejected this contention,116 but also
concluded that the provision did not cover states, which are usually
excluded from the term "person."11 7 Consequently, the provision
applied to the private landowners, whether corporations or individuals,
but not to the State. 118 The Court also held that federal law applied to
the substantive aspects of the case because Indian rights to property were
involved,119 but that state law should be incorporated as the federal rule
of decision.120
111. Id. at 656-59.
112. Id. at 657. The eastern boundary of the reservation had originally been fixed as the center
of the main channel of the Missouri River. Id. at 658. An 1867 survey of the reservation included the
land in dispute as part of the reservation. Id. at 659. The river had changed course several times
following the survey, but since 1927 the river had been west of the 1867 position, leaving the disputed
land on the Iowa side of the river, separated by the river from the rest of the reservation. Id.
113. Id. at 664.
114. Id. at 664-66. Justice White also relied on one of the Indian law canons of construction in
reaching this conclusion: "'statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes ... are to be
liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians."' Id. at 666 (quoting
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373. 392 (1976)).
115. Wilson, 442 U.S. at 666.
116. Id. The Court relied on the principle that "person," for purposes of statutory construction,
normally includes corporations and similar organizations and on the fact that "it would make little
sense to construe the provision so that individuals ... could escape its reach merely by incorporating
and carrying on business as usual." Id. Two of the private landowners were corporations and nine
were individuals. Id. at 679 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 667.
118. Id. at 678.
119. Id. at 670-71. The United States still held the reservation lands, to which the tribe had held
aboriginal title, in trust for the tribe. Id. at 670.
120. Wilson, 442 U.S. at 673. The Court reached this conclusion after examining three issues:
"whether there is need for a nationally uniform body of law to apply in situations comparable to this,
whether application of state law would frustrate federal policy or functions, and the impact a federal
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Justice Blackmun joined the Court's opinion, but also wrote a
concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger joined, to address the
application of the provision to the individual landowners, an issue which
was not expressly discussed by the majority opinion. He noted that there
was no evidence in the record as to the race of the individual claimants,
and the Court chose to ignore the adjective "white" when holding that
the corporate claimants were covered by the reference to "white
person." 121 Justice Blackmun concluded that the Court was implicitly
holding that the term "white person" in the provision referred to any
non-Indian, not just a Caucasian; he would have "preferred to make this
holding explicit."122 He noted that construing the provision to apply to
disputes between Indians and Caucasians but not to disputes between
Indians and black or Asian individuals would create a racial classification
raising serious constitutional questions. 123
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion showed his concern with
equal protection issues. 124 His concurrence in the majority opinion
showed that, like the majority, he was willing to construe the statutory
provision broadly enough to cover artificial entities as well as
individuals. At the same time, neither Justice Blackmun nor the majority
was willing to construe the provision broadly enough to cover states,
despite the canon of construction that requires that statutes passed for the
benefit of Indian tribes be liberally construed, with doubtful expressions
being resolved in their favor. 125
c. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians
In 1980, Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court in
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,126 one of the Court's most
important decisions on Indian land claims. 127 In Sioux Nation, the Court
reviewed the Court of Claims' affirmance of a decision of the Indian
Claims Commission that an 1877 congressional statute which had the
rule might have on existing relaionships under state law." Id. at 672-73.
121. Id. at 680 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. This was the subject of his opinion for the Court in 1974 in Morton v. Mancari. See infra
notes 182-202 and accompanying text (discussing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)).
125. The majority opinion in fact cited this canon in support of the conclusion that the statutory
provision applied even when the tribe was the litigant. See supra note 114 and accompanying text
(discussing the reliance on Indian law canons in reaching the conclusion of the majority). See also
infra notes 558-61 and accompanying text (discussing the use of Indian law canons in statutory
construction).
126. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
127. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). The case has been the
subject of a number of books and articles. See, e.g., EDwARD LAZARUS, B LACK HILLS, WHIrrE JUSTICE
(1991); Nell Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth Amendment Takings of Indian Land: An
Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule, 61 OR. L. REv. 245 (1982).
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effect of abrogating the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, effected a taking of
the Black Hills of South Dakota from the Sioux, and that, under the Fifth
Amendment, the Sioux were entitled to just compensation for the
taking.128 The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Claims.' 29
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun first reviewed the
"good faith effort" test used by the Court of Claims in reaching its
conclusion. The Court of Claims had recognized two roles that Congress
might play in taking tribal land: it could act as trustee for the benefit of
the Indians and exercise its plenary power to manage tribal assets by
replacing tribal land with other assets, or it could exercise its power of
eminent domain and take tribal property within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment.130 In an earlier case, the Court of Claims had established a
test for distinguishing between these two roles: "'[w]here Congress
makes a good faith effort to give the Indians the full value of the land
and thus merely transmutes the property from land to money, there is no
taking."131 The Court held that this test was the correct one, but
rejected the United States' argument that congressional good faith should
be presumed.132 Justice Blackmun noted that although tribal lands are
subject to Congress's power to manage tribal affairs, that power is subject
to limitations inherent in guardianship.133 Instead of presuming good
faith, Justice Blackmun explained, courts must make a "thoroughgoing
and impartial view of the historical record" in determining whether a
specific congressional action was taken in pursuance of Congress's power
to manage tribal lands.134 Justice Blackmun reviewed the factual
findings made by the Court of Claims in application of the good faith
128. The Sioux Nation originally filed a petition in the Court of Claims in 1923, which the court
dismissed in 1942. 448 U.S. at 384. After Congress passed the Indian Claims Commission Act in 1946,
the tribe resubmitted its claim to the newly created Indian Claims Commission, which concluded in
1974 that the tribe was entitled to just compensation for the loss of the Black Hills. Id. at 384-85.
Upon appeal by the United States, the Court of Claims held that the Black Hills claim was barred on
the grounds of res judicata by its 1942 decision. Id. at 387. A 1978 congressional statute provided for
Court of Claims review of the merits of the Commission's 1978 judgment, without regard to res
judicata and collateral estoppel defenses. Id. at 389. In 1979, the Court of Claims affirmed the
Commission's 1974 decision, holding that the Sioux were entitled to an award of $17.1 million, plus
interest at the rate of 5% from 1877. Id. at 390; see id. at 384-90 (providing a detailed discussion of
this tortured legal history). Justice Blackmun's first task in his Sioux Nation opinion was to determine
whether the 1978 statute violated the doctrine of separation of powers, a question which he answered
in the negative. Id. at 391-407. For a description of the Indian Claims Commission, see supra note 98.
All cases which were pending in the Indian Claims Commission when it was dissolved in 1978 were
transferred to the Court of Claims. See GErcHs ET AL., supra note 10, at 311.
129. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 424.
130. Id. at 408.
131. Id. at 409 (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States,
390 F.2d 686, 691 (1968)). The good faith effort test has been the subject of scholarly criticism. See,
e.g., Newton, supra note 127.
132. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 414-15.
133. Id. at 415.
134. Id. at 416.
1995]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
effort test, and concluded that both the legal analysis and the findings of
the Court of Claims fully supported its conclusion that the 1877 Act
effected a taking of the Black Hills for which the Sioux Nation was
entitled to just compensation. 135
Justice Blackmun's opinion included a ten-page description of the
history of the Sioux Nation's dealings with the United States which
showed a profound appreciation of the plight of the Sioux Nation in the
face of increasing United States demands for Sioux land. He recognized
that the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 was considered by some historians
to be a complete victory for the Sioux136 and their "great chief," Red
Cloud, who had led the Sioux in a series of battles in which they had
"fought to protect the integrity of earlier-recognized treaty lands from
the incursion of white settlers."1 37 Justice Blackmun described the
tranquility that resulted from the treaty, 138 in which the United States
pledged that the Black Hills and the rest of the Sioux reservation would
be "'set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation"' of
the Sioux, 13 9 and the shattering of that tranquility following rumors of
the discovery of gold in the Black Hills and George Armstrong Custer's
"florid descriptions" of the natural resources of the area. 140 By 1875,
President Grant had decided that the United States Army would make no
further efforts to resist the occupation of the Black Hills by trespassing
settlers and prospectors, thus, as Justice Blackmun recognized,
abandoning the United States' treaty obligations to the Sioux Nation.141
In 1876, the United States presented Sioux leaders with an agreement in
which the Sioux relinquished their rights to the Black Hills and other
lands in exchange for subsistence rations.142 The agreement was signed
by only 10% of the adult male Sioux population, who were
"'[d]efeated, disarmed, dismounted, ... [and] at the mercy of a superior
power,' rather than by the 75% required by the terms of the Fort
Laramie Treaty of 1868 to cede any Sioux lands. 143 Justice Blackmun's
135. Id. at 423.
136. Id. at 376 n.4. Justice Blackmun quoted the 1904 statement of one commentator that the
treaty was "'the only instance in the history of the United States where the government has gone to
war and afterwards negotiated a peace conceding everything demanded by the enemy and exacting
nothing in return."' Id. (quoting D. ROBINSON, A HISTORY OF THE DAKoTA OR Sioux ItIANS 387 (1904)).
137. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 374. See also JAMEs C. OLSON, RED CLOUD AND THE SIOUX PROBLEM
(1965) (providing one account of Red Cloud's career).
138. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 376.
139. Id. at 374 (quoting Fort Laramie Treaty of April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635,636).
140. Id. at 376-77.
141. Id. at 377-78.
142. Id. at 381. Earlier negotiations had broken down when Sioux leaders, who were aware of
the mineral value of the land, refused to sell it for less than $70 million, a price far in excess of the $6
million which the federal government was offering. Id. at 379.
143. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 381-82 & 382 n.13 (quoting D. ROBINSON, A HISTORY OF THE
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understanding of the history of the Black Hills is summed up by his
referring to white settlers' entry into the area as an "invasion." 144
Justice Blackmun also addressed the argument made by Justice
Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion that the factual findings of the
Indian Claims Commission, the Court of Claims, and the Court majority
were based on a "revisionist" view of history.145 He noted that the
dissent
fail[ed] to identify which materials quoted herein or relied
upon by the Commission and the Court of Claims fit that
description . . . .The dissenting opinion does not identify a
single author, nonrevisionist, neorevisionist, or otherwise, who
takes the view of the history of the cession of the Black Hills
which the dissent prefers to adopt, largely, one assumes, as an
article of faith.146
Justice Blackmun's approach in Sioux Nation saved the Sioux claims
from the harsh effects of the Court's 1903 decision in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock.147 Lone Wolf established that Congress has "'a paramount
power over the property of the Indians, by reason of its exercise of
guardianship over their interests, and that such authority might be
implied, even though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty with the
Indians."' 148 The application of the Lone Wolf doctrine would have
been fatal to the Sioux Nation's claim. Justice Blackmun distinguished
Lone Wolf on several grounds.1 49 He also noted that a more recent case,
DAKOTA OR SIOUX INDIANs 442 (1904)). Justice Blackmun also quoted a passage from another history
of the Black Hills region, which was expressed in "chauvinistic terms":
"[Wihat more could they ask or desire, than that a living be provided for themselves,
their wives, their children, and all their relations, including squaw men, indirectly, thus
leaving them free to lead their wild, careless, unrestrained life, exempt from all the
burdens and responsibilities of civilized existence? In view of the fact that there are
thousands who are obliged to earn their bread and butter by the sweat of their brows, and
that they have hard work to keep the wolf from the door, they should be satisfied."
Id. at 382 n.13 (quoting A. TALLENT, THE BLACK HILs 133-34 (reprint 1975) (1899 ed)).
144. Id. at 383.
145. Justice Rehnquist's opinion relied on works by historians other than those on whom Justice
Blackmun relied. For example, he quoted a passage from one historian's 1965 description of the
Plains Indians as "'fine physical specimens ... [who] ... lived only for the day, recognized no rights
of property, robbed or killed anyone if they thought they could get away with it, inflicted cruelty
without a qualm, and endured torture without flinching."' Id. at 436-37 (quoting S. MOiSON, THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 539-40 (1965)) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
maintained that "in a court opinion, as a historical and not a legal matter, both settler and Indian are
entitled to the benefit of the Biblical abjuration: 'Judge not, that ye be not judged."' Id. at 437.
146. Id. at 422 n.32.
147. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
148. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) quoted in Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 408.
Lone Wolf established the power of Congress to abrogate treaties with the Indians. 187 U.S. 553. See
COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 64. For a detailed analysis of congressional power over Indians
and their property, see also Newton, supra note 103.
149. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 412-15.
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Shoshone Tribe v. United States,150 recognized Congress's paramount
power over Indian property but held that "'[t]he power does not extend
so far as to enable the Government to give the tribal lands to others, or to
appropriate them to its own purposes, without rendering, or assuming an
obligation to render, just compensation.""51 The good faith effort test
adopted in Sioux Nation brought together the lines of cases exemplified
by Lone Wolf and Shoshone Tribe.152
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Sioux Nation thus established the test
to be used in determining whether a compensable taking of Indian
property had occurred. The test was adopted, however, without regard to
the fact that when non-Indian property is at issue, physical invasion of
the property alone amounts to a compensable taking.153 Justice
Blackmun admitted that the Black Hills had in fact been "taken" from
the tribe "in a way that wholly deprived them of their property rights to
the land,"154 but the adoption of the good faith effort test showed that
this fact alone did not establish the tribe's right to compensation.
Nevertheless, the approach taken by Justice Blackmun in Sioux Nation
did recognize the federal government's*guardianship responsibilities as a
limitation on congressional action and prevented Lone Wolf from
defeating the tribe's claim.
d. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc.
In 1986, in South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc.,155 Justice
Blackmun dissented from the Court's judgment with respect to a suit by
the Catawba Indian Tribe seeking to recover possession of a tract of land
in South Carolina and trespass damages for the period of dispossession.
The tract had been conveyed to South Carolina in 1840,156 in apparent
violation of the federal Nonintercourse Act, prohibiting conveyances of
tribal land without the consent of the United States.157 South Carolina
150. 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
151. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476,252 (1937) quoted in Sioux Nation, 448 U.S.
at 408.
152. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 407.
153. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 10, at 712. Professor Nell Jessup Newton has suggested that
whether or not the tribe consented to the taking, rather than the good faith effort test, should be the
test. See Newton, supra note 127.
154. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 409 n.26.
155. 476 U.S. 498 (1986).
156. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498,501 (1986).
157. The majority opinion quoted the relevant portion of the Act: "'No purchase, grant, lease, or
other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians,
shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into
pursuant to the Constitution."'. Id. at 500 n.3 (quoting Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, s. 4, 1 Stat. 138
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177)).
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argued that a 1959 federal statute, the Catawba Indian Tribe Division of
Assets Act (Catawba Act), made the South Carolina statute of limitations
applicable to the claim. 158 The Catawba Act was enacted with the
support of the tribe, which had received assurances from the B.I.A. that
any tribal claims against South Carolina would not be jeopardized by the
Act. 159 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, held that South
Carolina's statute of limitations, which appeared to bar the tribe's claim to
the land, applied to the claim. 160
In his dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall and O'Connor
joined, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority's interpretation of the
Catawba Act could not be reconciled with the Act's language under the
Court's traditional approach to interpreting statutes regulating Indian
affairs.161 He began his discussion with a statement about the role of
history in Indian law: "Too often we neglect the past. Even more than
other domains of law, 'the intricacies and peculiarities of Indian law
deman[d] an appreciation of history."1 62 His detailed description of
the history of the Catawbas' dealings with Great Britain, the United States,
and South Carolina revealed an appreciation for the vulnerability of the
Catawbas in the face of repeated encroachments on tribal lands and a
recognition of the fraudulent and abusive practices by which Catawba
lands had been taken.163 Faced with the continuing encroachments of
colonists in the eighteenth century, the Catawbas were driven to agree to
land cessions, until they were left with "'a mere token of the[ir] once
large domain."' 164 By the 1830's, despite federal prohibitions, nearly
all of the tribe's remaining land had been leased to non-Indians, who
paid rent "'in old horses, old cows or bed quilts and clothes, at prices
that the whites set on the articles taken.'165 Finally, in 1840, after the
158. Id. at 500. The relevant terms of the Act provided that
"the tribe and its members shall not be entitled to any of the special services performed
by the United States for Indians because of their status as Indians, all statutes of the
United States that affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall be inapplicable to
them, and the laws of the several States shall apply to them in the same manner they
apply to other persons or citizens within their jurisdiction."
Id. at 505 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 935). For further discussion of termination acts, see supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
159. Id. at 504.
160. Id. at 500. The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of the
issue of whether the state statute of limitations barred the tribe's claim. Id. at 511. On remand, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the statute barred the claim. Catawba Indian Tribe v.
South Carolina, 865 F.2d 1444 (4th Cir. 1989). See also infra note 179.
161. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 511 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 511 (quoting Frankfurter, Foreword to A Jurisprudential Symposium in Memory of
Felix S. Cohen, 9 RUTGERs L. REV. 355,356 (1954)).
163. Id. at 512-15.
164. Id. at 512 (quoting J. BROWN, THE CATAWBA INDtANs 8 (1966)).
165. Id. at 514 (quoting REPORT To THE GOVERNOR OF Soutm CAROUNA ON TEi C ATAWBA INDIANS 4
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tribe was reduced to starvation, tribal representatives and the state signed
a "treaty" under which the tribe relinquished all tribal land in exchange
for promises-which were never fulfilled-of a cash payment and a new
reservation.166
After this review of Catawba history, Justice Blackmun began his
analysis of the issue facing the Court by examining whether, in light of
"the firmly established rule . . . that ambiguities in statutes regulating
Indian affairs are to be construed in the Indians' favor,"167 the Catawba
Act exempted the Catawbas' claim from the general principle established
in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation 68 that the application of
state statutes of limitations to tribal land claims generally would violate
federal policy.169 The "firmly established rule," Justice Blackmun
explained, "reflects an altogether proper reluctance by the judiciary to
assume that Congress has chosen further to disadvantage a people whom
our Nation long ago reduced to a state of dependency . . . [and] is
particularly appropriate when the statute in question was passed
primarily for the benefit of the Indians," 170 as was the Catawba Act. In
keeping with this rule, absent a clear intent of Congress to the contrary, it
must be assumed that Congress did not intend to belie its concern for the
Indians with a "'backhanded' abrogation or limitation of their
rights."171 Justice Blackmun examined the two provisions of the
Catawba Act on which the majority relied as showing the intent of
Congress to subject the Catawbas' land claim to the South Carolina
statute of limitations, and concluded that neither provision clearly
showed such an intent.172 He also rejected the majority's reasoning that
(1854)).
166. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 514-15.
167. Id. at 520.
168. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
169. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 US. at 519.
170. Id. at 520.
171. Id. at 520-21 (citing Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968)).
172. Id. at 521. The first provision rendered inapplicable to the tribe "'all special services
performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as Indians,' and 'all statutes of the
United States that affect Indians because of their status as Indians."' Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 935).
Justice Blackmun construed this provision as simply rendering "federal Indian 'services' and 'statutes'
inapplicable to the Catawbas;" it did not "expressly abrogate or place procedural conditions on any
pre-existing claims the Catawbas may have had, and the broad federal policy against application of
state statutes of limitations to Indian land claims is neither a 'service' nor a 'statute."' Id.
Furthermore, even if the provision had lifted statutory restrictions on the alienation of Catawba land, it
did not lift federal common law restrictions on alienation. Id. at 522-23. The second provision
provided that state laws would "'apply to [the Catawbas] in the same manner as they apply to other
persons or citizens."' Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 935). Justice Blackmun interpreted this provision as
putting the Catawbas "on the same footing as non-Indians with regard to the application of state law,"
but this was "far different from subjecting their unique federal claims to a state statute of
limitations .... [Tihe decision whether to apply a state limitations period to a federal claim depends on
whether such application is contrary to federal policy. And nothing in . . . [the Catawba Act]
unambiguously directs that, as a matter of federal policy, the Catawbas' unsettled tribal claims should




the Catawba Act represented "an explicit redefinition of the relationship
between the Federal Government and the Catawbas,' terminating 'special
federal protection' for the Tribe and its members." 173 Justice Blackmun
argued that the effect of an explicit redefinition of the federal-tribal
relationship must be limited to its explicit terms, and the Act itself said
nothing about either the claim or the statute of limitations. 174 He
admonished the Court for straining to implement an assimilationist
policy which Congress had rejected.175
Finally, Justice Blackmun voiced his view that the majority's
decision "breaks faith once again with the Tribe, and it does so in a way
the statute does not require,"176 and commented upon the effect that the
assimilation of the tribe might have on attitudes toward the tribe's claim
to land:
When an Indian tribe has been assimilated and dispersed ...
the Tribe's claim to that land may seem ethereal, and the
manner of the Tribe's dispossession may seem of no more than
historical interest. But the demands of justice do not cease
simply because a wronged people grow less distinctive, or
because the rights of innocent third parties must be taken into
account in fashioning a remedy. Today's decision seriously
handicaps the Catawbas' effort to obtain even partial redress for
the illegal expropriation of lands twice pledged to them, and it
does so by attributing to Congress, in effect, an unarticulated
intent to trick the Indians a century after the property changed
hands. From any perspective, there is little to be proud of
here. 177
In concluding his opinion, Justice Blackmun noted his agreement
with Justice Black's 1960 statement that "'[g]reat nations, like great men,
should keep their word."'178
Like his opinion in Sioux Nation, Justice Blackmun's opinion in
Catawba Indian Tribe showed his interest in, and understanding of, the
history of the tribe and its vulnerabiity in its dealings with government
173. Id. at 526.
174. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 526-27 (quoting Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollow-
breast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976)). See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text (discussing
Hollowbreast).
175. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 527.
176. Id. at 528.
177. Id. at 528-29. Justice Blackmun noted that at the time of the decision, no one spoke the
Catawba language and there were no longer any full-blooded Catawbas. Id. The Catawba
Reservation closely resembled other rural South Carolina neighborhoods. Id. at 528.
178. Id. at 529 (quoting FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)) (dissenting
opinion).
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officials. The opinion also showed his understanding of the role that the
Indian law canons of construction were supposed to play in interpreting
the statutory provisions. Justice Blackmun's approach would have saved
the tribe from the loss of its claim. 179 Finally, he showed his recognition
of the injustice to the tribe stemming from the majority's decision.
2. Contributions to the Development of Indian Law
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinions in Weeks and Wilson were
both very brief and did little in and of themselves to add to an
understanding of Justice Blackmun's views on Indian law. In Weeks,
Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority's conclusion that
congressional action in Indian affairs was subject to review under the
standard formulated by Justice Blackmun himself in Morton v.
Mancari.180 In Wilson, Justice Blackmun joined the majority's
conclusion that a statutory provision designed to assist tribes in land
claim cases covered artificial entities like corporations but did not apply
to states, despite the liberal construction canon.
In Sioux Nation, however, Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court
established the test to be used in determining when a compensable taking
of tribal land had occurred. In adopting a good faith effort test, Justice
Blackmun and the majority rejected the government's argument that
congressional good faith should be presumed where tribal land had been
taken, but required that more than a physical invasion of property had
occurred for a compensable taking of tribal land to exist.
In Sioux Nation, six Justices joined Justice Blackmun's opinion, and
a seventh Justice concurred in the result and in part of the opinion. 18l
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Catawba Indian Tribe, on the other hand,
received the support of only two of his fellow Justices. In Catawba
Indian Tribe, Justice Blackmun was unable to persuade a majority of the
Court that the history of the Catawba Tribe and its land claim, the
ambiguity canon, and the language of the Catawba Act compelled the
conclusion that the state statute of limitations did not apply to the tribe's
claim. Consequently, his approach in Catawba Indian Tribe did not
179. The district court had held that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 511.
On remand, the court of appeals agreed with this conclusion. See supra note 160 and accompanying
text. In 1993, Congress enacted the Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina Land Claims Settlement
Act, which restored the federal trust relationship with the tribe, repealed the Catawba Act and
provided for a cash settlement of remaining claims. Pub. L. No. 103-116, 107 Stat. 1120 (1993).
180. See infra notes 182-202 and accompanying text (discussing the standard of review
formulated by Justice Blackmun in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)).
181. Justice White concurred in part of the opinion and in the judgment. 448 U.S. 424 (White, J.,
concurring in part). Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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influence the development of Indian law in the land claims area in the
way that his Sioux Nation opinion did.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: EQUAL PROTECTION, FREEDOM OF
RELIGION, AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
1. Analysis of the Opinions
a. Morton v. Mancari
In Morton v. Mancari,182 decided in 1974, Justice Blackmun's
opinion for the Court analyzed a B.I.A. employment preference for
Indians. After the Commissioner of Indian Affairs decided to grant a
preference for B.I.A. jobs to qualified Indians in situations where an
Indian and a non-Indian were competing for a promotion, non-Indian
employees of the B.I.A. brought a class action challenging the
preference. 1 83  They argued that the provision of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) providing for an Indian employment
preference was implicitly repealed by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 (1972 Act) and that the Indian preference
violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 184
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun first addressed the
argument that Indian hiring preferences were repealed by the 1972 Act.
He reviewed the history of the hiring preferences, which dated back to
the 1830's, and the purposes of the preferences: "to give Indians a
greater participation in their own self-government; to further the
Government's trust obligation toward the Indian tribes; and to reduce the
negative effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect
Indian tribal life."185 The legislative history of the 1972 Act was silent
as to the Indian preferences.1 86 The Court concluded that Congress had
not intended to repeal the Indian preference.187 Justice Blackmun relied
on the fact that the 1972 Act was an extension of the Civil Rights Act of
182. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
183. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1974).
184. Id. at 539. The District Court for the District of New Mexico held that the preference was
repealed by the 1972 Act and did not pass on the constitutionality of the preference. Id. at 540. The
district court relied on section 11 of the 1972 Act, which proscribed discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in most federal employment. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution prohibits the states from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as imposing a similar
equal protection limitation on the federal government. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 653.
185. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 541-42 (footnotes omitted).
186. Id. at 547.
187. Id.
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1964, which had specifically exempted from its coverage certain Indian
private employment preferences,lS8 and the fact that Congress had
enacted two new Indian preference laws three months after it passed the
1972 Act.189
Having explained why the Indian preference at issue was not
repealed by the 1972 Act, Justice Blackmun turned to the constitutional
issue-whether the preference constituted invidious racial discrimination
violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice
Blackmun explained that the constitutional issue had to be viewed in the
context of two basic principles of Indian law: "the unique legal status of
Indian tribes under federal law and .. .the plenary power of Congress,
based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a 'guardian-ward'
status, to legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes."190
Congress's plenary power "is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from
the Constitution itself. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 provides Congress
with the power to 'regulate commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes,' and
thus, to this extent, singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate
legislation."191 The federal government's power to deal with the tribes
also stems from the treaty-making power granted to the president by the
Constitution. 192 The special relationship between the tribes and the
United States stemmed from the federal government's exercise of its
constitutional powers and the resulting effect on the tribes:
'[T]he United States overcame the Indians and took possession
of their lands, sometimes by force, leaving them an uneducated,
helpless and dependent people, needing protection against the
selfishness of others and their own improvidence. Of necessity
188. Id. at 548. The 1964 Civil Rights Act exempted the preferential employment of Indians by
Indian tribes or by "any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation." Id. at 546. Congress
did not modify the private employment preferences in the 1964 Act when it enacted the 1972 Act, and,
as Justice Blackmun explained, lilt would be anomalous to conclude that Congress intended to
eliminate the longstanding statutory preferences in BIA employment, as being racially discriminatory,
at the very same time it was reaffirming the right of tribal and reservation-related private employers to
provide Indian preference." Id. at 548.
189. Id. The new laws gave Indians preference in government training programs for teachers of
Indian children. Justice Blackmun explained that "[it is improbable, to say the least, that the same
Congress which affirmatively approved and enacted these additional and similar Indian preferences
was, at the same time, condemning the BIA preferences as racially discriminatory." Id. at 548-49.
Justice Blackmun also relied on the fact that for many years, the Indian preferences had been
regarded as exceptions to executive orders forbidding discrimination in government employment, and
on the "'cardinal rule ... that repeals by implication are not favored."' Id. at 549 (quoting Posadas v.
National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497,503 (1936)).
190. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 535. For a general discussion of the plenary power doctrine, see
CoHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 217-20. See also Newton, supra note 103; Clinton, supra note 103
(discussing the plenary power of Congress).
191. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551-52.
192. Id. at 552 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2).
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the United States assumed the duty of furnishing that
protection, and with it the authority to do all that was required
to perform that obligation and to prepare the Indians to take
their place as independent, qualified members of the modem
body politic .. .. ' 193
The constitutional validity of the hiring preference had to be
determined, Justice Blackmun explained, in "this historical and legal
context." 194 The Indian preference adopted in 1934 was the result of
Congress's determination that fulfillment of its trust responsibility
required turning over to the Indians greater control over their own
destinies.195  The "overly paternalistic" approach that the federal
government had used until that time "had proved both exploitative and
destructive of Indian interests." 196 The hiring preference was an
important part of the IRA, which was aimed at bringing about the
necessary institutional changes 197
Furthermore, as characterized by Justice Blackmun, the Indian
preference was not even a "racial preference." It was simply:
an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the
cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more
responsive to the needs of its constituent groups. . . . The
preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete
racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal
entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a
unique fashion. . . . It applies only to members of 'federally
recognized' tribes .... In this sense, the preference is political
rather than racial in nature. 198
The preference was "tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's
obligation toward the Indians," and therefore did not violate the Due
Process Clause. 199
193. Id. (quoting Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705,715 (1943)).
194. Id. at 553.
195. Id.
196. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553.
197. Id. For a general description of the IRA, see CLINTON ET AL., supra note 10, at 152-55;
COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 147-51. See also RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & J AMES YOUNGBLOOD
HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND PoLmcAL LIBERTY 96-111 (1980).
198. 417 U.S. at 553 & 554 n.24. The BIA. eligibility criteria provided that "[tlo be eligible for
preference in appointment, promotion, and training, an individual must be one-fourth or more degree
Indian blood and be a member of a Federally-recognized tribe." Id. at 554 n.24. A federally-
recognized tribe is one which the federal government has recognized as existing, so that the federal
government will carry on political relations with it. The B.I.A. has an established procedures whereby
tribes can seek federal recognition, or "acknowledgement." See 25 C.F.R pt. 83 (1994).
199. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555.
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In Mancari, Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court provided a
rationale upholding the Indian preference provision at issue against
strong attacks based on both statutory and constitutional grounds.
Perhaps most importantly, Justice Blackmun defeated a constitutional
attack by emphasizing the political nature of the preference-it was
available only to individuals who were members of federally recognized
tribes-and downplaying a clearly important racial component to the
preference: only individuals with one-fourth or more degree Indian
blood were eligible. 200 This approach preserved not only the preference
provision, but also special treatment for Indians in general, based on
their unique legal status. As Justice Blackmun noted, if the Court had
treated the preference as invidious racial discrimination, all of the Title
of the United States Code dealing with Indians "would [have been]
effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government
toward the Indians would [have been] jeopardized." 20 1 Moreover,
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Mancari established the "tied rationally"
standard for reviewing congressional action, which the Court has utilized
in subsequent cases.202
b. Bowen v. Roy
In 1986, on the same day that the Court decided United States v.
Mottaz, 20 3 it also decided Bowen v. Roy.204 In Roy, the Court addressed a
Free Exercise Clause challenge to the compelled use of Social Security
numbers in the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and food stamp programs.205 Federal legislation provided that the states
must require each applicant for or recipient of aid to furnish his Social
Security number to the appropriate state agency as a condition of
eligibility for benefits, and that the state agencies must use such Social
Security numbers in the administration of the benefit programs. 20 6 The
200. Id. at 553 n.24. The racial nature of the preference is also reflected in the fact that tribal
membership is required, given that tribal membership is generally limited to individuals with a
prescribed quantum of tribal and/or Indian blood. See generally CoHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at
20-23. For additional discussion of the nature of tribal membership, see Dussias, supra note 7, at 84-
86.
201. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552. Title 25 of the United States Code is entitled "Indians." 25 U.S.C.
(1983 & Supp. 1992).
202. See, e.g., supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the application of this standard
in Weeks).
203. 476 U.S. 834 (1986). Monaz is discussed supra at notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
204. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). Both cases were decided on June 11, 1986.
205. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695 (1986). The Free Exercise Clause provides that
"Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise ... [of religion]." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
206. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699.
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plaintiffs were denied benefits with respect to their daughter after they
had refused to furnish a Social Security number for her on the grounds
that doing so would violate their Native American religious beliefs. 20 7
They raised a constitutional challenge to both the requirement that a
Social Security number be provided and the requirement that the Social
Security number be used by the state.20 8
In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction against the state's use of the
Social Security number which had been assigned, without their consent,
to their daughter. 209 The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
the Chief Justice explained, protects individuals from certain kinds of
government compulsion, but does not require the government to
conduct its internal procedures in a way that comports with the plaintiffs'
religious beliefs. 210 Chief Justice Burger also would have held that
failing to grant the plaintiffs an exemption from the Social Security
number requirement did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the
requirement was neutral and uniformly applied, and was a "reasonable
means of promoting a legitimate public interest," namely, the prevention
of fraud in benefit programs. 211 Only Justices Powell and Rehnquist
joined in this part of the Chief Justice's opinion.212
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion focused on the plaintiffs'
objection to the requirement that they supply a Social Security number,
which he described as based on "their sincere religious conviction." 213
He described as "plausible" their argument that "the Government's
207. Id. at 695. Stephen J. Roy, the child's father, was descended from the Abenaki Tribe. He
believed that
control over one's life is essential to spiritual purity and indispensable to 'becoming a
holy person.' . . . In order to prepare his daughter for greater spiritual power ... Roy
testified to his belief that he must keep her person and spirit unique and that the
uniqueness of the Social Security number as an identifier, coupled with the other uses of
the number over which she has no control, will serve to 'rob the spirit' of his daughter
and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power.
Id. at 696.
208. Id. at 699. The district court had permanently restrained the Secretary of Health and
Human Services from using or disseminating the child's Social Security number and enjoined, until the
child's sixteenth birthday, the denial of benefits based on the refusal to provide a number for the child.
Id. at 698.
209. Id. at 701. Although the parties had originally agreed that the child did not have a Social
Security number, it became apparent on the last day of the trial that a number had been assigned to
her. The child's father testified that he believed that her spirit had not yet been damaged because no
known use of the number had yet been made. Id. at 696-97.
210. Id. at 699-701. All of the Justices except Justice White, who filed a dissenting opinion,
joined the Chief Justice's opinion with respect to the plaintiffs' claim as to the use of the Social
Security number. Id. at 694.
211. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 708-09.
212. Id. at 695.
213. Id. at 712 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
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threat to put the social security number into active use if they apply for
benefits for their daughter requires them to choose between the child's
physical sustenance and the dictates of their faith." 214 Nevertheless, he
agreed with the majority that the plaintiffs were not entitled to an
injunction against the use of the Social Security number.215
With respect to the plaintiffs' challenge to the requirement that they
provide their daughter's Social Security number, Justice Blackmun
argued that it was not clear on the record whether a justiciable
controversy still remained because it was not apparent whether the
plaintiffs had a religious objection to that requirement. In addition, even
if the plaintiffs did have an independent religious objection, the case
might have been made moot by the majority's denial of an injunction
against use of the number already assigned, either because the plaintiffs
might be unwilling to apply for benefits without assurances that the
number would not be used or because the government, "in a welcome
display of reasonableness," might decide not to require the plaintiffs to
provide their daughter's Social Security number since it already had a
number for her.216 Justice Blackmun was skeptical about whether the
government would in fact be flexible, noting that "[i]t is worth recalling
that the Government's response to appellees' refusal to supply a social
security number for their daughter was not to assign her a number
unilaterally, or to offer to do so, but rather to cut off benefits for their
child." 2
17
Although the proceedings on remand might render unnecessary a
discussion of the requirement that the plaintiffs provide their daughter's
Social Security number, Justice Blackmun decided to address the
issue. 2 18 He agreed with Justice O'Connor, who filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, that the approach developed in
the Court's previous Free Exercise Clause cases should be applied. 219
214. Id. at 713.
215. Id. He believed that the argument "stretche[d] the Free Exercise Clause too far." Id.
216. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 713-15.
217. Id. at 715 n.l. Justice O'Connor also wrote an opinion, in which she noted that the
government still refused to concede that it should now provide benefits with respect to the plaintiffs'
daughter even though it possessed her Social Security number. Id. at 725 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
218. Id. at 715. He explained his decision to address the issue as follows: "I nonetheless address
[the issue], partly because the rest of the Court has seen fit -to do so, and partly because I think it is not
the kind of difficult constitutional question that we should refrain from deciding except when
absolutely necessary." Id.
219. Id. at 715-17 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), Thomas v. Review Board of
Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972)). In her opinion, Justice O'Connor objected to the new standard used by Chief Justice Burger
to test the validity of the requirement. She instead
would apply ... [the Court's] ... long line of precedents to hold that the Government
must accomodate a legitimate free exercise claim unless pursuing an especially
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Under that approach, "the Government must accomodate a legitimate
free exercise claim unless pursuing an especially important interest by
narrowly tailored means." 22 0 Justice Blackmun concluded that the
government could not deny assistance to the child solely because her
parents' religious convictions prevented them from supplying the
government with her Social Security number.22 1
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roy showed his willingness to grant
constitutional protection to the exercise of Native American religious
practices, despite the fact that such practices may differ from more
mainstream religious practices. Although he did not conclude that the
requirement that states use Social Security numbers violated the Free
Exercise Clause, he did recognize that requiring the plaintiffs to provide
their daughter's Social Security number in order to receive benefits
would violate the Free Exercise Clause under the analysis developed by
the Court in previous cases. He thus was willing to protect the plaintiffs
against compulsion to engage in conduct contrary to their Native
American religious beliefs in order to receive benefits for their daughter.
c. Employment Division v. Smith
The 1990 case of Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith222 involved two individuals who were fired
from their jobs at a drug rehabilitation organization because of their
sacramental use of the hallucinogenic drug peyote at a ceremony of the
Native American Church. 223  They brought a First Amendment
challenge to the determination of the Employment Division of the
Department of Human Resources of Oregon that they were ineligible for
unemployment benefits because they had been fired for work-related
misconduct .224 The plaintiffs argued that the Free Exercise Clause of the
important interest by narrowly tailored means .... Only an especially important
governmental interest pursued by narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a
sacrifice of First Amendment freedoms as the price for an equal share of the rights,
benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.
Id. at 727-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Applying this standard to the
facts of the case, Justice O'Connor found that the government had shown that the prevention of
welfare fraud is a compelling governmental interest, but had failed to show "that granting a religious
exemption to those who legitimately object to providing a Social Security number will do any harm to
its compelling interest in preventing welfare fraud." Id. at 732. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined
Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id. at 724.
220. Id. at 727 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
221. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 716 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
222. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a discussion of the history of religious peyote use and Smith, see
Comment, Ann E. Beeson, Dances with Justice: Peyotism in the Courts: An Anthropological Critique,
41 EMORY LJ. 1121 (1992).
223. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874
(1990).
224. ld. at R73-
1995]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
First Amendment did not permit Oregon to deny benefits to individuals
who were fired for religiously inspired peyote use.225
The majority, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, declined to apply the
Court's previously developed compelling governmental interest test,
under which "governmental interests that substantially burden a
religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest," to analyze the plaintiffs' challenge to a generally applicable
law .226 The Court concluded that Oregon could, consistent with the Free
Exercise Clause, deny the plaintiffs' claim for unemployment benefits
even though their dismissal was based on sacramental peyote use. It
should be left to the political process, Justice Scalia maintained, to
determine whether religious belief should be protected by an exception
from generally applicable laws. 227  He admitted that "leaving
accomodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage
those religious practices that are not widely engaged in," but described
this reality as an "unavoidable consequence of democratic
government ."228
Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which opinion Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in
part. 229 She objected to the majority's suggestion that accomodation of
minority religions must be left to the political process, and noted that
"the First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of
those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and may
be viewed with hostility." 230 Justice O'Connor maintained that the
compelling governmental interest test applied to the challenge to the
Oregon statute, but reached the same result as the majority by her
application of the test. 231
Justice Blackmun joined in the parts of Justice O'Connor's opinion
in which she concluded that the Court's compelling governmental
interest test was applicable, but disagreed with her conclusion that the test
225. Id. at 876. The plaintiffs relied on earlier cases in which the Court had held that states could
not condition the availability of unemployment insurance to an individual on the individual's
willingness to refrain from conduct required by his religion. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963), Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)).
226. Id. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,402-03) (1963)). Justice Scalia sought to
distinguish the cases relied on by the plaintiffs by arguing that the religious conduct in question in those
cases was not prohibited by law, while Oregon law did prohibit the religious use of peyote. Id. at 872.
See also supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text (discussing the Free Exercise Clause).
227. Id. at 890.
228. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
229. Id. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 902.
231. Id. at 903-07.
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had been met in his dissenting opinion.232 Justice Blackmun criticized
the majority for mischaracterizing precedents, discarding leading Free
Exercise cases, and effectuating "a wholesale overturning of settled law
concerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution." 233  Justice
Blackmun complained that the majority's mischaracterization of the
Court's precedents led to its treating freedom from religious persecution
as a luxury, rather than as an essential element of liberty, as it was
regarded by the Founders.234
Justice Blackmun's opinion first questioned the "wisdom or
propriety" of the Court deciding the constitutionality of the criminal
prohibition on which the dismissals were based, where the state had not
sought to enforce the prohibition. 235 He noted that it was surprising that
"this Court which so often prides itself about principles of judicial
restraint and reduction of federal control over matters of state law would
stretch its jurisdiction to the limit in order to reach, in this abstract
setting, the constitutionality of Oregon's criminal prohibition of peyote
use ."236
After noting his misgivings about the Court deciding the
constitutional issue, Justice Blackmun began his application of the
compelling governmental interest test by defining the state interest
involved. He argued that the state interest which must be weighed
against the plaintiffs' interest in the free exercise of their religion was not
the state's broad interest in fighting the war on drugs, but rather its
narrow interest in refusing to except religious use of peyote from its
criminal prohibition. 237 Oregon had not shown any concrete interest in
enforcing its drug laws against religious users of peyote and had never
sought to prosecute the plaintiffs. The state's asserted interest amounted
only to "the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition," an
interest which was insufficient to abrogate constitutional rights. 238
Furthermore, although the state asserted an interest in protecting the
health and safety of its citizens from illegal drug use, it had offered no
evidence that the religious use of peyote had ever harmed anyone. 239
The ritual context in which the plaintiffs, under the supervision of the
232. Id. at 909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
233. Smith, 494 U.S. at 908.
234. Id. at 908-09.
235. Id. at 909 n.2. He noted further that the state had not relied on the prohibition in defending
the denial of unemployment benefits before the state courts, and the state courts could, on remand,
either invalidate the prohibition on state constitutional grounds or conclude that it was irrelevant to the
state's interest in administering its unemployment benefits program. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 909-10.
238. Smith, 494 U.S. at 911.
239. Id. at 911-12.
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Native American Church, used peyote was analogous to the sacramental
use of wine by the Roman Catholic Church, and was far removed from
recreational use of illegal drugs.240 The lack of danger posed by
religious use of peyote was demonstrated by the fact that the federal
government and twenty-three states excepted religious use of peyote
from their drug laws.241 Moreover, because there was practically no
illegal trafficking in peyote, the state's interest in abolishing drug
trafficking was not implicated. 242
Finally, Justice Blackmun demonstrated his interest in and
understanding of the rituals of the Native American Church in his
detailed discussion of the role of peyote in the church. He noted that the
courts did not need to "turn a blind eye to the severe impact of a State's
restrictions on the adherents of a minority religion." 243 The plaintiffs
sincerely believed that the peyote plant embodied their deity, 244 and
viewed eating it as an act of worship and communion. 245 Denying
plaintiffs the use of the plant would prevent them from enacting "the
essential ritual of their religion." 246  This "potentially devastating
impact" of the Oregon prohibition on the plaintiffs' religion must be
viewed, Justice Blackmun argued, in light of Congress's enactment of the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act in response to religious
persecution of Native Americans. 247 He likened Oregon's attitude to the
240. Id. at 913, 913 n.6. Justice Blacknun noted that eating peyote was an unpleasant experi-
ence, as it frequently induced nausea or indigestion, thus discouraging casual or recreational use. Id.
at 914 n.7.
241. Id. at 912 & n.5.
242. Id. at 916.
243. Smith, 494 U.S. at 919.
244. This is analogous to the belief of the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches in
transubstantiation. Under this doctrine, the bread and wine used in the sacrament of the eucharist are
viewed as being miraculously converted into, rather than merely symbolizing, the body and blood of
Christ. TIoMTHY WARE, THE ORTHoDox CiluRsc 290 (rev. 1969); TOM COYLE, Tis Is OuR MAss 90 (N.
Am. ed. rev. 1989).
245. Smith, 494 U.S. at 918.
246. Id. at 919. Justice Blackmun based his description of peyote and its significance on such
sources as the Brief of the Association of American Indian Affairs et al. as Amicus Curiae, a book
entitled PEYOTE REUO~ION, by 0. Stewart, and PEOPLE OF DARKNEss, a mystery novel by Tony Hillerman.
Id. at 919-20. He also relied on additional books and articles focusing on Native American use of
peyote, as well as more general books on drug use. See, e.g., id. at 913-14.
247. Id. at 920. The Act provided that "'[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect
and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise
the traditional religions .... including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred
objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites."' Id. at 920 (quoting
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 92 Stat. 469, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982 ed.)). Congress
enacted the American Indian Religious Freedom Act in 1978. SJ. Res. 102, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Pub.
L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978). The reactions of the Supreme Court and other courts to the Act
have shown the Act's effectiveness to be limited. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 751. For
additional information on the Act and on efforts to strengthen it, see Michael J. Simpson,
Accomodating Indian Religions: The Proposed 1993 Amendment to the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act, 54 MONT. L. REV. 19 (1993).
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plaintiffs' sacramental peyote use to "the repressive federal policies
pursued more than a century ago," which were based on the belief that
Native American religious practices were unhealthy and morally
degrading. 248  Unless the Court scrupulously applied its free exercise
analysis to Native Americans' religious claims, "both the First
Amendment and the stated policy of Congress will offer to Native
Americans merely an unfulfilled and hollow promise."249
Justice Blackmun concluded that Oregon's interest in enforcing its
drug laws against religious use of peyote was not sufficiently compelling
to outweigh the plaintiffs' right to the free exercise of their religion, and
that therefore the interests underlying Oregon's drug laws could not
justify the denial of unemployment benefits to the plaintiffs. Such a
denial was inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause. 250
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Smith, like his opinion in Roy,
demonstrated his willingness to respect and protect Native American
religions. His detailed description of the use of peyote in the Native
American Church showed an interest in understanding Native American
religious practices as fully as possible. He also showed his concern that
the promise of religious freedom embodied in the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act be fulfilled, and insisted that the Court "must
scrupulously apply its free exercise analysis to the religious claims of
Native Americans, however unorthodox they may be" 251 -an approach
which the majority of the Court was unwilling to take.
Following the Court's decision in Smith, in response to widespread
criticism of the decision by many religious and other organizations,
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.252
The Act plainly stated Congress's disagreement with the majority's
approach in Smith,253 and adopted the compelling governmental interest
test as the appropriate standard for evaluating Free Exercise Clause
248. Smith, 494 U.S. at 920 n.10.
249. Id. at 921.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). One commentator has noted that both legal
scholars and various religious groups have criticized Smith: "Legal scholars have been largely
consistent in condemning the Smith result .... Many diverse religions ... have rallied together to
fight what they see as a fundamental assault on their constitutional right to freedom of religion."
Robert F. Drinan, SJ. and Jennifer I. Huffman, Religious Freedom and the Oregon v. Smith and
Hialeah Cases, 35 J. CHURCH & STATE 19,25 (1993).
253. The congressional findings section of the Act stated that, in Smith, "the Supreme Court
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed
by laws neutral toward religion," even though "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious
exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise." Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, § 2(a)(4).
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challenges.254 Congress thus vindicated the approach taken by Justice
Blackmun in both Roy and Smith.
d. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak
In 1991, in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle
Village,255 the Court considered whether the Eleventh Amendment
barred a suit by Alaska Native villages against an Alaska state official
challenging on federal equal protection grounds the implementation of a
state revenue-sharing statute.256 The Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment barred suits by Indian tribes against states without state
consent, 257 even though the language of the Amendment did not
mention Indian tribes and thus did not literally bar such sUits.25 8
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court rejected in turn the villages'
arguments that the traditional principles of sovereign immunity did not
apply to suits by sovereigns like Indian tribes and that, even if they did,
the states consented to suits by tribes when they adopted the
Constitution. 259 The Court also rejected the argument that, even if the
Eleventh Amendment did bar suits by tribes against states without their
254. The congressional findings section of the Act noted that "the compelling interest test as set
forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing prior governmental interests." Id. § 2(a)(5). The Act provided that the
government "may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person-l) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." Id. § 3(b).
"Government" was defined to include "a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or
other person acting under color of law) of the United States, a State, or a subdivision of a State." Id. §
5(1).
255. 111 S.Ct. 2578 (1991).
256. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2580 (1991).
The statute, enacted in 1980, provided annual $25,000 payments to each "Native village government"
located in a community without a state-chartered municipal corporation. After the state attorney
general indicated that, in his view, funding Native village governments "would violate the equal
protection clause of [the state] constitution.... the Commisioner of the Department of Community and
Regional Affairs enlarged the program to cover all unincorporated communities[.]" Because of the
expansion of the program, funding never reached the full $25,000 which each Native village
government was initially allocated. In 1985, the state legislature replaced the 1980 statute with one
that matched the program as expanded by the Commissioner, and the plaintiffs filed suit to seek an
order requiring the Commissioner to pay them the amounts originally allocated. The district court
dismissed the suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed. 111 S. Ct. at 2580. For a detailed description of the federal government's special treatment
of Alaska Natives, see CoHaF's HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 739-70.
257. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2581-83.
258. Id. at 2581. The Eleventh Amendment read as follows: "'The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."'
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI). Justice Scalia maintained that, despite the narrowness of the
language of the Amendment, it has come to stand for the principle that "a State will ... not be subject
to suit in federal court unless it consented to suit, either expressly or in the "'plan of the convention."'
259. Id. at 2581-83.
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consent, section 1362 of title 28 of the United States Code, granting the
federal district courts jurisdiction over all civil actions by tribes arising
under the United States Constitution, laws, or treaties, abrogated that
bar. 260  In the majority's view, the statute did not evidence the
"unmistakably clear" intent of Congress to abrogate the bar which had
been required by earlier Eleventh Amendment cases. 261 Finally, the
Court remanded the case for consideration of the villages' argument,
which was not addressed by the court of appeals, that even if the
Eleventh Amendment barred their claim for damages, it did not bar their
claim for injunctive relief.262
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissented
from the Court's holding that "our Eleventh Amendment precludes
Native American tribes from seeking to vindicate in federal court rights
they regard as secured to them by the United States Constitution." 263 In
Justice Blackmun's view, the Eleventh Amendment was not implicated by
a suit in which litigants, like the villages, sought to vindicate federal
rights against a state, but rather only applied in state/citizen and
state/alien diversity suits. At any rate, the Court should not, Justice
Blackmun argued, have extended the state sovereign immunity doctrine
to bar suits by tribes, which were not barred from suing states by the
language of the Eleventh Amendment.264
The bulk of Justice Blackmun's opinion addressed the argument
that even if at one time the states had immunity against tribal suits, that
immunity was abrogated in 1966 when Congress enacted section 1362
of title 28 of the United States Code. Justice Blackmun rejected the
majority's "clear-statement rule" as designed to keep disfavored suits
out of federal court, rather than being a justifiable basis for discerning
260. Id. at 2583-84.
261. Id. at 2585. "'The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought
by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior,
wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."'
Id. at 2583 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1362). Congress may abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity "'only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."' Id. at
2585 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989)). The Blatchford Court held that the
statute did not show "unmistakably clear" intent, and further held that the statute did not even meet the
"minimal clarity" standard for abrogation which existed at the time that the statute was enacted. Id. at
2585-86.
262. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2586.
263. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
264. Id. Justice Blackmun renewed the objections to the majority's interpretation of the reach of
the Eleventh Amendment which he had established in earlier cases, in which he argued that "'[t]here
simply is no constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity, and no constitutionally mandated
policy of excluding suits against States from federal court."' Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 259 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting), in which Justice Blackmun, along with
Justices Marshall and Stevens, joined in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion).
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the intent of Congress.265 Furthermore, he felt that, because of the
fundamental principles of Indian law, the rule was particularly
inappropriate where Indian tribes were litigants. 266 Justice Blackmun
argued that even if the rule were at times an appropriate tool for
discerning congressional intent to alter the "balance of power" between
the federal government and the states by expanding federal court
jurisdiction, the rationale for the rule could not extend to matters
concerning federal regulation of Indian affairs.267 In Indian affairs, the
"balance of power" had always weighed heavily in favor of the federal
government and against the states, with Congress recognized as having
constitutionally-based plenary power, and state law being generally
inapplicable. 268 Because the relevant "balance of power" was between
the federal government and the tribes, rather than between the federal
government and the states, the "clear-statement rule" had no place in
interpreting statutes pertaining to Indian tribes.269
Having dismissed the "clear-statement rule" as inapplicable, Justice
Blackmun employed the "traditional tools of statutory interpretation"
and concluded that Congress intended section 1362 to authorize tribal
claims for damages against states. 270 In particular, Justice Blackmun
relied on the history of section 1362 to determine Congress's intent.
Prior to the enactment of section 1362, the tribes were largely dependent
on the federal government, which was unhindered by the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity, for enforcement of their rights against states.
Section 1362 was enacted in 1966 as part of the national self-
determination policy for tribes, and was aimed at relieving the tribes of
reliance on the federal government for the protection of federal rights in
federal court, in recognition of the fact that the federal government may
lack the resources or the political will needed to adequately fulfill its
longstanding responsibility to vindicate Native American rights.271 In
265. Id. at 2587.
266. Id.
267. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2587.
268. Id. Justice Blackmun cited his own 1974 opinion for the Court in Morton v. Mancari.
Mancari is discussed supra at notes 182-202 and accompanying text.
269. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2588. In discussing state authority in Indian affairs, Justice
Blackmun relied on Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832), as well as more recent cases. Id. at
2587.
270. Id. at 2588.
271. Id. at 2588-89. Justice Blackmun noted that the federal government's responsibility for
defending Native American rights dates to the founding of the United States, as reflected in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831), and that the legislative history of section 1362 indicated
"Congress' intention that the tribes bring litigation 'involving issues identical to those' that would have
been raised by the United States acting as trustee for the tribes." Id. at 2589 (quoting HR. REP. No.
2040, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966)). Justice Blackmun further argued that the Court had previously
explained that "'Congress contemplated that section 1362 would be used particularly in situations in
which the United States suffered from a conflict of interest or was otherwise unable or unwilling to
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light of this concern, the "most reasoned interpretation" of section
1362, Justice Blackmun explained, was that it was a congressional
authorization to bring those suits-including suits for monetary
remedies-that were necessary to vindicate fully the tribes' federal
rights.272
Finally, Justice Blackmun looked to the canons of construction for
guidance. Contrary to the majority's reliance on the clear-statement rule,
since the "earliest years of our Nation's history" the Court had been
guided by the principle that statutes passed for the benefit of Indian
tribes were "'to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being
resolved in favor of the Indians."' 273 This "time-honored principle of
construction" stemmed from the trust relationship between the tribes
and the federal government "that is inherent in the constitutional
plan." 274 Justice Blackmun concluded that in light of this canon of
construction, "it requires no linguistic contortion to read section 1362's
grant of federal jurisdiction over 'all civil actions' to encompass all
tribal litigation that the United States could have brought as the tribes'
guardian." 275 He concluded that Alaska had no immunity against suits
by the villages.276
In his opinion in Blatchford, Justice Blackmun recognized the
unique position that the tribes occupy within the federal system,
explaining that rules of construction that the Court might normally
apply may have no application where Indian tribes are concerned.
Instead, Justice Blackmun noted, the Court has recognized special canons
of construction to be used in construing statutes relating to Indian
affairs. Finally, the opinion showed Justice Blackmun's interest in
establishing the right of tribes to vindicate their own rights, which the
federal government might be reluctant to do.
bring suit as trustee for the Indians."' Id. at 2588 (quoting Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463
U.S. 545, 560 n.10 (1983)). For a description of the self-determination policy, see CLINTON ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 158-64; COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 180-206; GmxIEs ET AL., supra note 10,
at 251-59.
272. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2589. Justice Blackmun also noted that the House Report on section
1362 indicated Congress's intention to provide "'the means whereby the tribes are assured of the same
judicial determination whether the action is brought by the Government or by their own attorneys."'
Id. (quoting H. R. REP. No. 2040, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1966)).
273. Id. (quoting Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,392 (1976)). See also supra note 25.
274. Id. at 2590 (citing U.S. CoNsT. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3; sec. 2, cl. 3).
275. Id.
276. Id. (agreeing with the judgment of the court of appeals). Justice Blackmun also concluded
that the villages were "tribe[s] or band[s]" for the purposes of section 1362. Id. The majority did not
express a view on this issue. Id. at 2586 n.5.
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2. Contributions to the Development of Indian Law
Justice Blackmun's opinions in this area involved three different
constitutional issues: equal protection under the Fifth Amendment, free
exercise of religion under the First Amendment, and state sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Each opinion demonstrated
respect for Native American rights, and an apparent desire to vindicate
those rights under the Constitution, as in Roy and Smith, and protect
them from constitutionally-based attacks, as in Mancari and Blatchford.
In Mancari, Justice Blackmun's opinion contributed an analysis of a
B.I.A. promotion preference Which saved the preference from being
struck down as racial discrimination in violation of the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. He did
so by emphasizing the unique legal status of Indian tribes and the
political, as opposed to racial, aspects of the preference. His opinion
established the "tied rationally" standard which has been used in
subsequent cases. Moreover, his analysis not only saved the preference
from invalidation, but also saved the entire "Indians" Title of the United
States Code from being vulnerable to an equal protection attack.
Justice Blackmun's efforts to preserve tribal rights in the face of a
constitutional attack were less successful in Blatchford. Only Justices
Marshall and Stevens were willing to join Justice Blackmun in
maintaining that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits by tribes
against states, and that, even if the states had at one time enjoyed
immunity against tribal suits, that immunity was abrogated by federal
statute. A majority of the Justices accepted Justice Scalia's argument that
tribal suits against states were barred by the Eleventh Amendment,
despite the fact that the Eleventh Amendment made no mention of
Indian tribes.
Similarly, Justice Blackmun's conclusions with respect to Native
American free exercise claims were not accepted by a majority of the
Court in either Roy or Smith. In Roy, Justice Blackmun agreed with the
Court's judgment that a statutory requirement that states use Social
Security numbers to administer government benefit programs did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause, but maintained that, under the
compelling governmental interest test developed in earlier free exercise
cases, the government could not deny a child benefits because her
parents' Native American religious convictions prevented them from
providing the government with a Social Security number for her.
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In the years between Roy and Smith, the Court decided Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association ,277 in which the Court,
relying on Roy, concluded that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit
the federal government from constructing a road through a portion of a
national forest which was sacred to three California tribes.278 Justice
Blackmun, along with Justice Marshall, joined in Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion, which distinguished Roy and would have applied the
compelling governmental interest test, 279 thus demonstrating his
continuing support of Native American freedom of religion.
In Smith, Justice Blackmun maintained, as he had in Roy, that the
compelling governmental interest test applied to the plaintiffs' free
exercise claim. Moreover, he concluded that the compelling
governmental interest test did not allow the state to deny unemployment
benefits for dismissals based on the plaintiffs' participation in sacraments
of the Native American Church. He thus sought to uphold the plaintiffs'
constitutionally guaranteed right to the free exercise of their religion,
albeit unsuccessfully. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in
Justice Blackmun's opinion. Although Justice O'Connor agreed that the
compelling governmental interest test applied to the plaintiffs' claim, she
reached the same result as the majority upon applying the test. The view
of Justice Blackmun and these other three Justices that the compelling
governmental interest test applied to claims like those of the plaintiffs in
Smith was, however, adopted by Congress in the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993. Thus, although Justice Blackmun's approach
and conclusions with respect to Indian free exercise claims were not
vindicated by the Court in Roy, Lyng, and Smith, his approach was
ultimately vindicated by Congress.
D. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS
1. Analysis of the Opinions
a. United States v. John
In 1978, Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court in
United States v. John ,280 a case dealing with criminal jurisdiction and the
definition of an important term in Indian law-"Indian country." The
federal Major Crimes Act provided that Indians who commit certain
277. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
278. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 439 (1988).
279. Id. at 458-477 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also joined the opinion. Id. at 458:
280. 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
1995]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
specified crimes "'within the Indian country, shall be subject to the
same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any of [such]
offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States."' 281
John, a Choctaw Indian, was indicted by a federal grand jury in
Mississippi for assault with intent to kill, one of the crimes specified in
the Major Crimes Act. He was convicted in federal district court of the
lesser included offense of simple assault, 282 and was subsequently
convicted in state court of aggravated assault for the same conduct which
was the basis of the federal prosecution. 283
In John, the Court addressed the issue of whether the land on which
the crime occurred was "Indian country," and, if so, whether the
existence of federal jurisdiction precluded the exercise of state
jurisdiction. 284 Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court began with a
lengthy sketch -occupying over half of the opinion-of the history of
the Choctaws and their dealings with the United States. This discussion is
reminiscent of Justice Blackmun's detailed history of the Yurok Indians
in 1973 in Mattz v. Arnett, which also addressed the Indian country status
of Indian lands and the issue of jurisdiction over those lands. 285 Once
again, the discussion indicated a genuine interest in, and sensitivity to, the
plight of the tribe in its dealings with the United States. Justice
Blackmun discussed the motivations behind government actions rather
than simply the events that took place. For example, Justice Blackmun
noted that Andrew Jackson was one of the two chief negotiators of the
1820 Treaty at Doak's Stand under which land ceded by the Choctaws in
Mississippi was to be the site of a new state capital, to be named
Jackson.286 He described the incompetence and corruption that
characterized the federal attempts to satisfy the obligations of the United
States to the Choctaws under the 1830 Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek,
under which most of the Choctaws were to remove to lands west of the
Mississippi River, the failure of which attempts "proved an
embarrassment and an intractable problem for the Federal Government
281. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 637 n.2 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1153). For a discussion of
the Major Crimes Act, see COHEN'S HANDaooK, supra note 7, at 34-38 & 300-04; Robert N. Clinton,
Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REy.
503,536-45 (1976).
282. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overturned his conviction, on the grounds that the
district court was without jurisdiction because the lands on which the offense took place were not
"Indian country." John, 437 U.S. at 635-37.
283. Id. at 637.
284. Id. at 635.
285. Matz is discussed supra at notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
286. John, 437 U.S. at 640. For a more detailed description of the Choctaws' dealings with the
-United States, see ARTHUR H. D ERosER, J a., THE R EMovAL oF TH CHocrAw I NDLANS (1970). For a
description of Andrew Jackson's role in dealing with the southeastern tribes, including the Choctaws,
see ANTHONY F.C. WALLACE, THE LONG Brrmi Tp.L: ANDRVw JACKSON AND THE INDIANS (1993).
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for at least a century."28 7 Justice Blackmun explored the motivations of
the federal agent in charge of recording the land claims of Choctaws
who remained in Mississippi, explaining that the agent was either anxious
to conceal the number of Choctaws who remained in Mississippi or
"disinterested in his job and generally dissolute." 288 Finally, he
expressed skepticism over whether federal efforts to deal with the land
claims recording problems were based on concern for preserving the
claims for the benefit of the Choctaws, or for preserving the claims
themselves .289
Following the historical sketch, Justice Blackmun turned to the
jurisdictional issue presented by the case. The relevant federal statute
defined "Indian country" to include "'all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent."' 290 In 1944,
the Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior proclaimed all
lands in Mississippi purchased by the federal government and put in
trust for the benefit of the Mississippi Choctaws to be a reservation. 291
This established that the lands in question were indeed a reservation. 292
The Major Crimes Act thus provided a proper basis for federal
prosecution of the crime for which John was convicted.293 The Court
further held that the Major Crimes Act preempted any existing state
jurisdiction, 294 and therefore Mississippi had no power to prosecute John
for the same offense. 295 Justice Blackmun rejected the state's argument
that the Mississippi Choctaws had been fully assimilated and the federal
government had abandoned its supervisory authority over them, such
that the exercise of any special federal power over them would be
"anomalous and arbitrary." 296 He explained that the federal power to
deal with the Choctaws was not destroyed by the fact that they were a
remnant of a larger group of Indians which had left Mississippi, nor by
the fact that federal supervision of the Mississippi Choctaws had not been
continuous .297
287. John, 437 U.S. at 642-43.
288. Id. at 642 n.9.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 648 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1151).
291. Id. at 646.
292. John, 437 U.S. at 649.
293. Id. at 654.
294. Id. at 651 (explaining that this was a necessary premise of at least one of the Court's earlier
decisions, Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962)).
295. Id. at 654.
296. Id. at 652.
297. John, 437 U.S. at 653. The state's claim that special federal power over Indians who had
been completely assimilated and not subject to federal supervision is related to the equal protection
argument raised in Mancari and rejected by Justice Blackmun in his opinion for the Court. Mancari is
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In John, Justice Blackmun once again showed his interest in the
historical treatment of a tribe by the federal government. Given the
simple way in which he resolved the case, by explaining that the
definition of Indian country included all land within the boundaries of a
reservation and the Choctaw land in Mississippi had been declared to be
a reservation, it is difficult to see why such a long historical exposition,
complete with criticism of the conduct of the federal government and
skepticism about the motivation behind government actions, was
necessary. It seems to indicate, once again, an appreciation for the
historical context in which Indian law has developed, and an underlying
sympathy for the Choctaws in their dealings with the federal
government.
b. Hagen v. Utah
In 1994, in Hagen v. Utah,298 Justice Blackmun wrote his last Indian
law opinion. In Hagen, the Court addressed the issue of whether the
Uintah Indian Reservation in Utah was diminished by Congress when it
was opened to settlers pursuant to two federal statutes passed in 1902 and
1905. If the reservation had been diminished, then the town of Myton,
located on opened lands within the reservation's historical boundaries,
was not "Indian country," and the state court had properly exercised
criminal jurisdiction over Hagen, an Indian who had been convicted of
committing a crime in Myton. 299 The Utah Supreme Court had
concluded that the reservation had been diminished, while the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals had decided in an earlier case that the
reservation had not been diminished. 300 The Court, in an opinion by
Justice O'Connor, concluded that the reservation had been diminished
and that the state court therefore properly exercised criminal jurisdiction
over Hagen. 30 1 Justice Blackmun dissented in an opinion joined by
Justice Souter.
Justice Blackmun began his opinion by quoting a phrase which he
had also used in his 1986 opinion in Catawba Indian Tribe: "'Great
nations, like great men, should keep their word." 302 In reviewing the
discussed supra at notes 182-202 and accompanying text. The state had explicitly raised an equal
protection argument in its brief, but it was not addressed by Justice Blackmun. COHEN'S HANDBOOK,
supra note 7, at 655 n.26.
298. 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994).
299. Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. at 960. See also supra notes 28-44 and accompanying text
(discussing Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973)).
300. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 964. The earlier court of appeals case was Ute Indian Tribe v. State of
Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986).
301. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 970-71.
302. Id. at 971 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99,
142 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting)). Catawba Indian Tribe is discussed supra at notes 155-79 and
accompanying text.
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federal government's action with respect to the reservation, he relied on
two rules of construction: "[W]e must find clear and unequivocal
evidence of congressional intent to reduce reservation boundaries, and
ambiguities must be construed broadly in favor of the Indians."303 The
canons are particularly important in the diminishment context, Justice
Blackmun noted, because the allotment statutes were often ambiguous
with regard to their effect on reservation boundaries. 304 He was unable
to find a clear expression of congressional intent to diminish the
reservation in either the statutory language or the surrounding
circumstances .305
Justice Blackmun faulted the majority opinion for relying "almost
exclusively on the fact that the Act of May 27, 1902 . . . 'restored [the
unallotted lands] to the public domain' to conclude that the [reservation]
had been diminished." 306 Such an ambiguous phrase could not "carry
the weight of evincing a clear congressional purpose." 307 Restoration of
lands to the public domain established only that the lands were opened
to non-Indian access and settlement, which was "'completely consistent
with continued reservation status."' 308 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun
argued, nothing in the negotations with the Ute Tribe over the
relinquishment of reservation land unequivocally revealed "'a widely
held, contemporaneous understanding,"' that the reservation boundaries
would be diminished. 309 In fact, the only evidence of the negotiations
which was unequivocally clear was that the Indians overwhelmingly
opposed all-otment. 310
Moreover, Justice Blackmun explained, even if the public domain
language in the 1902 Act had been express diminishment language, he
still would have concluded that the reservation was not diminished,
because that provision did not remain operative in the subsequent Act of
1905 which actually opened the reservation to settlement. The language
of the 1905 Act, speaking only of opening the unallotted lands on the
reservation for settlement and entry, was indistinguishable from the
language which the Court had previously concluded, in cases like Mattz
v. Arnett, could not be interpreted to mean that a reservation was to be
303. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 971. Justice Blackmun noted that the majority "purport[ed] to apply
these canons in principle . . . but ignore[d] them in practice." Id. at 972. See also supra note 25
(discussing the canons of construction).
304. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 972.
305. Id. at 971.
306. Id. at 974 (alteration in original) (quoting Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 974 (quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 497 (1973)). Mattz is discussed supra at
notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
309. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 975 (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S.463,471 (1984)).
310. Id. at 976.
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terminated. 311 Furthermore, the 1905 Act did not preserve the 1902
Act's public domain provision: "the plain language of the 1905 Act,
which actually opened the reservation, did not restore the unallotted
lands to the public domain, but simply opened the lands for
settlement." 312 Public domain language was struck from earlier versions
of the bill which became the 1905 Act. Justice Blackmun maintained
that although it was not clear precisely why this was done, the Court was
compelled to construe any doubts about Congress' intent to the Indians'
benefit. 313
Justice Blackmun concluded his opinion by noting that Congress
had designated the reservation for the Ute Indians' permanent settlement
and exclusive occupation one hundred and thirty years before, and that
the 1905 opening of the reservation was a substantial breach of
Congress' promise. Nevertheless, the opening alone did not extinguish
the tribe's jurisdiction over the reservation, and nothing in the language,
legislative history, or surrounding circumstances of the 1905 Act
established a clear congressional purpose to diminish the reservation. He'
noted in closing his appreciation of the fact that "jurisdiction often may
not be neatly parsed among the States and Indian tribes, but this is the
inevitable burden of the path this Nation has chosen." 314
Justice Blackmun's last Indian law opinion thus showed his
continuing respect for tribal sovereignty. He applied the canons of
construction developed for construing legislation related to Indians in an
attempt-albeit an unsuccessful one-to protect the reservation from
diminishment. He also showed his continuing recognition of Congress's
failure to keep its promises to Indian tribes.
2. Contributions to the Development of Indian Law
John is important for establishing that federal jurisdiction under the
Major Crimes Act preempts state jurisdiction. Justice Blackmun's
311. Id. at 977 (citing Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504).
312. Id. Justice Blackmun conceded that the 1905 Act did not expressly repeal the public domain
language, and that repeals by implication are disfavored. Id. at 978. He noted, however, that the
standard principles of statutory interpretation did not have their usual force in Indian law cases. Id.
(citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985)).
313. Id. at 979-80. Justice Blackmun also noted that although contemporary demographics and
the historical exercise of jurisdiction might be used to support a finding of diminishment where
congressional intent was already clear, they could not be controlling where Congress's purpose was
ambiguous. Id. at 980. At any rate, the record showed substantial jurisdictional contradictions and
confusion. Id. at 981. The majority opinion had noted that the current population of the opened lands
was approximately 85% non-Indian and maintained that the state had exercised criminal jurisdiction
over the area for an extended period of time. Id. at 970. The majority argued that this information did
not controvert its conclusion that Congress intended the reservation to be diminished. Id.
314. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 981.
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opinion for the Court rejected the state's efforts to extend its jurisdiction
over an Indian reservation. This is consistent with the traditionally
limited jurisdiction of states over Indians on Indian reservations.315
The lasting significance of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Hagen, on
the other hand, is limited by the fact that it was a dissenting opinion.
Nevertheless, it demonstrated his commitment to the principles that
reservations should not be treated as having been diminished in the
absence of clear congressional intent to do so, and that state criminal
jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country is limited.316
In addition to examining Justice Blackmun's opinions in John and
Hagen, it is interesting to note Justice Blackmun's stance in other
important criminal jurisdiction cases. In United States v. Wheeler,317
decided three months before John, Justice Blackmun joined the majority
of the Court in reaffirming tribal criminal jurisdiction over tribal
members. 318 In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,319 however, also
decided shortly before John, Justice Blackmun joined the majority in
divesting tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 320 Finally, in
1990, in Duro v. Reina,321 Justice Blackmun joined the majority in
extending Oliphant to divest tribes of criminal jurisdiction over Indians
who are not members of the tribe asserting jurisdiction. 322 Justice
Blackmun later explained Oliphant as having been decided "in light of
the Federal Constitution's extraordinary protections against intrusions on
personal liberty." 323 Justice Blackmun was apparently willing to be less
solicitous of tribal rights where criminal jurisdiction was at issue because
of the importance of the Constitution's personal liberty guarantees, which
he apparently believed were threatened by the exercise of tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians and nonmember Indians.
315. For a general discussion of state jurisdiction on Indian reservations, see CoHEN's HANDBOOK,
supra note 7, at 349-80.
316. For a general discussion of state criminal jurisdiction over Indian defendants in Indian
country, see CoHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 349-52 & 361-72.
317. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
318. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-26 (1978) (finding that such jurisdiction was
part of retained tribal sovereignty).
319. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
320. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978). See also infra notes 421-22
and accompanying text (discussing criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
321. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
322. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990). For a discussion of Wheeler, Oliphant, and Duro,
see Dussias, supra note 7, at 21-37. Congress reinstated tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians by statute in 1990. See id. at 36 n.155 and accompanying text.
323. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,453
(1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Brendale is discussed infra at notes
401-40 and accompanying text.
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E. CIVIL JURISDICTION ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS
1. Analysis of the Opinion
a. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C.
In 1984, in Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation
v. Wold Engineering, P.C.,324 the Court considered the issue of state
jurisdiction over an action brought by the Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Fort Berthold Reservation, a North Dakota tribe, in North Dakota state
court against a non-Indian for negligence and breach of contract in
constructing a water-supply system on the reservation. At the time that
the tribe filed suit, its tribal court did not have jurisdiction under tribal
law over a claim by an Indian against a non-Indian, unless the parties
had agreed to such jurisdiction.325 The non-Indian defendant contested
state court jurisdiction. 326 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that
the state had no jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising on Indian
reservations, absent a vote by tribal members to approve such
jurisdiction. 327
The defendant argued before the Court that federal law precluded
state court jurisdiction over the claim and that, regardless of federal law,
the state supreme court had held that the state courts lacked jurisdiction
as a matter of state law. 328 In his opinion for the Court, in analyzing the
defendant's argument, Justice Blackmun explained that a state assertion
of authority over a reservation could be foreclosed because "it would
'undermine the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and
324. 467 U.S. 138 (1984).
325. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 467
U.S. 138, 141-42 (1984). Pursuant to the terms of a 1953 federal statute, commonly known as Public
Law 280, and a North Dakota statute adopted in response to Public Law 280, North Dakota state court
jurisdiction extended over civil causes of action arising on an Indian reservation upon acceptance of
such jurisdiction by the Indians of a given reservation in the manner provided in the North Dakota
statute. Id. at 143-44. The tribe had not consented to state court jurisdiction. Id. at 145. Public Law
280 was enacted as Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953), and is
codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988), 25 U.S.C. § 1321-25 (1988), and 28 U.S.C. § 1360
(1988). The North Dakota statute cited by the Court is N.D. CErrr. CODE sec. 27-19-01 (1974). For a
discussion of Public Law 280, see CoHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 362-72. See also Carole E.
Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 29 UCLA L.
REv. 535 (1975).
326. Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S. at 140.
327. Id. at 146 (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engine-
ering, P.C., 321 N.W.2d 510,512 (N.D. 1982)).
328. Id. at 147.
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be ruled by them,"' 329 or because it would be incompatible with federal
law.330 Neither of these barriers applied in the present case, Justice
Blackmun concluded. First of all, the exercise of state court jurisdiction
would not interfere with tribal self-government in this case. 331 Justice
Blackmun noted that the Court had "repeatedly . . . approved the
exercise of jurisdiction by state courts over claims by Indians against
non-Indians even when those claims arose in Indian country." 332 Justice
Blackmun distinguished cases in which "a State allow[ed] an Indian to
enter its courts on equal terms with other persons to seek relief against a
non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian country," in which
tribal self-government was not impeded, from cases in which a non-
Indian sought to sue an Indian in state court on a reservation-based
claim. 333  The exercise of state jurisdiction was "particularly
compatible" with tribal self-government where, as in this case, the tribe
itself was bringing suit and the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the
claim.334
Moreover, the exercise of state court jurisdiction was not preempted
by any federal law. The exercise of state jurisdiction over the tribe's
claim would not be inconsistent with either the Enabling Act pursuant to
which North Dakota became a state, or with Public Law 280, a federal
statute which allowed states to assume jurisdiction over causes of action
arising on Indian reservations. 335 The language of the Enabling Act was
ambiguous, and Justice Blackmun noted that "it is a settled principle of
statutory construction that statutes passed for the benefit of dependent
Indian tribes are to be liberally construed, with doubtful expressions
being resolved in favor of the Indians," and that "[i]t would be contrary
to this principle to resolve any ambiguity ... in favor of a construction
under which North Dakota could not provide a judicial forum for an
Indian to obtain relief against a non-Indian." 336
329. Id. (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980), and
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,220 (1959)).
330. Id. (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980)). For a
discussion of the preemption of state law on Indian reservations, see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 7,
at 270-79.
331. Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S. at 148.
332. Id.
333. Id. Justice Blackmun cited Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), in which a non-Indian
sued an Indian on a reservation-based debt, and Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976), which
concerned an adoption proceeding involving only reservation residents, in both of which the Court
denied state court jurisdiction, as implicating very different interests from the present case. Id.
334. Id. at 149. Following the decision of the state supreme court, the Tribal Business Council
amended the tribal code to provide for tribal court jurisdiction over all civil causes of action arising on
the reservation. Id. at 142 n.1.
335. Id. at 149. See also supra note 325 (discussing the North Dakota state court jurisdiction).
336. Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S. at 149-50.
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After concluding that no federal law or policy foreclosed the
exercise of state court jurisdiction over the tribe's claim, Justice
Blackmun considered the argument that the state court lacked
jurisdiction as a matter of state law. Justice Blackmun reviewed the
North Dakota Supreme Court's opinion and concluded that the court's
holding that the state courts lacked jurisdiction might have been based
on a misinterpretation of federal law.337 In light of this conclusion, the
Court remanded the case to afford the state supreme court the
opportunity to reinterpret state law on the basis of the Court's discussion
of federal law. 338
In Three Affiliated Tribes, the Court upheld state court civil
jurisdiction over a reservation-based cause of action, a decision which
could be seen as contrary to the traditional limitation on state jurisdiction
on Indian reservations. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court,
however, emphasized that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the
dispute as a matter of tribal law, and that the tribe itself was turning to the
state court for redress. He noted that the exercise of state court
jurisdiction over claims between Indians or claims by Indians against
non-Indians would "intrude[] impermissibly on tribal self-
governance,"339 and distinguished such cases from the case at bar. Thus
Justice Blackmun's opinion provided the tribe with a forum in which to
seek relief, while maintaining respect for tribal self-government and the
tribal court system.
2. Contributions to the Development of Indian Law
Three Affiliated Tribes is important for providing the plaintiff tribe
with access to state court where its own tribal court could not hear the
case, while still maintaining deference to tribal self-government. Like
John, it reaffirmed the principle that state court jurisdiction on
reservations is very limited.
Although Three Affiliated Tribes is Justice Blackmun's only Indian
law opinion which directly addresses civil court jurisdiction, his response
to other civil court jurisdiction cases before the Court provides further
insight into his views in this area. In 1985, in National Farmers Union
337. Id. at 153.
338. Id. at 159. Following the state supreme court's ruling, on remand, that state law required the
tribe to waive its sovereign immunity before it could make use of state court, the Court held that state
law was preempted and North Dakota could not condition access to state court in such a manner.
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877
(1986).
339. Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S. at 148.
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Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,340 Justice Blackmun joined the Court
majority in its holding that a non-Indian defendant objecting to tribal
court jurisdiction over a reservation-based cause of action brought by an
Indian must exhaust tribal court remedies before challenging the tribal
court's exercise of jurisdiction in federal court.341 Similarly, in 1987, in
Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,342 Justice Blackmun joined the Court
in extending the National Farmers Union exhaustion rule to cases in
which federal court jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. 343
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Iowa Mutual stated that tribal
courts presumptively have civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-
Indians on their reservation, 344 a statement which was consistent with the
limitation on state court jurisdiction when a non-Indian was suing an
Indian which Justice Blackmun recognized in Three Affiliated Tribes.
Justice Blackmun thus apparently viewed tribal courts as having the main
role in adjudicating reservation-based causes of action, even where non-
Indian defendants are involved, although state courts can, in keeping
with federal law and policy, exercise jurisdiction over cases brought by
Indians and tribes against non-Indians. As demonstrated by the
outcomes in the civil court jurisdiction cases discussed above, Justice
Blackmun's views in the civil court jurisdiction area have been accepted
by a majority of the Court.
F. REGULATORY AUTHORITY ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS
1. Analysis of the Opinions
a. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game
In the 1977 case Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game,345
the third in a series of cases dealing with the fishing rights of the
Puyallup Tribe and its members, the Court considered the jurisdiction of
the state of Washington over the Puyallup Tribe and individual tribal
members with respect to fishing rights, and whether the tribe's treaty with
the United States gave it the exclusive right to take steelhead trout
340. 471 U.S. 845 (1985). For a discussion of National Farmers Union, see Dussias, supra note 7,
at 49-52, and Allison M. Dussias, Note, Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Civil Disputes Involving Non-
Indians: An Assessment of National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians and a
Proposal for Reform, 20 U. MICH. L. REF. 217 (1986).
341. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845. 856-57 (1985).
342. 480 U.S. 9 (1987). For a discussion of Iowa Mutual, see Dussias, supra note 7, at 52-54.
343. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1987).
344. Id. at 18.
345. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
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passing through the Puyallup Reservation on the Puyallup River. 346 The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, held that the state courts could
not exercise jurisdiction over the tribe absent a waiver of tribal sovereign
immunity, but that the state courts could adjudicate the fishing rights of
individual tribal members over whom they had obtained personal
jurisdiction. 347 Furthermore, the Court rejected the tribe's arguments that
the 1854 Treaty of Medicine Creek and earlier Court cases allowed tribal
members to fish free of state interference on the reservation and held
that the state's regulatory jurisdiction, for conservation purposes,
extended to on-reservation fishing by tribal members.3 48 Justice Stevens'
opinion noted that although the treaty set apart the reservation for the
tribe's "exclusive use," most of the land of the reservation had been
alienated, so that neither the tribe nor its members "continue[d] to hold
the Puyallup River fishing grounds for their 'exclusive use."'
3 4 9
Furthermore, Justice Stevens maintained that if tribal members were
allowed on-reservation fishing rights unrestricted by state regulations,
they would be able to interdict the entire migrating trout run, and
frustrate the rights of non-Indians off the reservation.3 50
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion consisted of only three
sentences. He joined in the Court's opinion, thus demonstrating his
acceptance of the extension of state conservation regulations to on-
reservation fishing by tribal members. He expressed doubt, however, as
to the "continuing vitality" of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity
and noted that the doctrine "may well merit re-examination in an
appropriate case." 3 5 1  The opinion did not suggest any reasons for
Justice Blackmun's doubts about the doctrine, so it is unhelpful in
346. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977). The Court examined Puyallup
Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) [Puyallup I], a case in which the Court held that
the Treaty of Medicine Creek did not foreclose reasonable state regulation, for conservation purposes,
of off-reservation fishing by tribal members. Id. at 167 n.1. Furthermore, the Court examined
Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) [Puyallup III, in which the Court held that
the treaty precluded a complete ban on net fishing for steelhead trout by tribal members, and
remanded the case for apportionment of the catchable fish. Id.
347. Id. at 172-73.
348. Id. at 176.
349. Id. at 174 (citing Article II of the Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132). The Puyallups
had alienated all but 22 acres of the reservation, and the 22 acres did not abut on the Puyallup River.
Id. at 174. Justice Stevens relied on the loss of exclusive use of reservation land as the basis for
divesting a tribe of regulatory jurisdiction in his opinion in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, discussed infra at notes 401-40 and accompanying text. Id. The
majority's interpretation of the treaty language is analyzed and criticized in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Brennan, in which Justice Marshall joined. Id. at 179-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
350. Id. at 176. The Treaty of Medicine Creek secured the right of taking fish to the Indians in
common with other citizens. Id. at 177 n.16.
351. Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 178-79. The majority had relied on United States v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940), as the basis for sovereign immunity. Id. at 172-73.
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elucidating his precise views on tribal sovereign immunity at the time
that Puyallup Tribe was decided.
b. Montana v. United States
In 1981, in Montana v. United States,352 the Court considered
whether the Crow Tribe had authority to regulate hunting and fishing on
the reservation by nonmembers of the tribe on land owned by
nonmembers. A resolution passed by the Crow Tribal Council
prohibited all hunting and fishing by nonmembers within the boundaries
of the reservation. 353 In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court agreed
with the court of appeals that the tribe may prohibit nonmembers from
hunting or fishing on land owned by the tribe or held by the United
States in trust for the tribe and, if the tribe permits nonmembers to hunt
or fish on such lands, it may charge them a fee or establish limits on
their hunting and fishing. 354 On the basis of an examination of the
treaties between the tribe and the United States and the principle of tribal
sovereignty, the Court held that neither of these potential sources of
regulatory authority allowed the tribe to regulate nonmember hunting
and fishing on nonmember land.355 The Court also rejected the tribe's
argument that the tribe, rather than the state of Montana, had title to the
bed of the Big Horn River.356 The Court relied on the general principle
that the federal government holds riverbeds in trust for future states.
357
Under this principle, conveyance by the United States of land adjacent to
a navigable river will not be held to convey an interest in the riverbed, in
the absence of "'some international duty or public exigency,"' neither
of which was present in this case .358
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court limited tribal sovereignty by
stating that "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with
the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation" 359 and that "the inherent sovereign powers of
352. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). For further discussion of Montana, see Dussias, supra note 7, at 58-62.
353. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,549 (1981).
354. Id. at 557.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 556-57. The tribe had sought to rely on title to the riverbed as a basis for regulatory
authority over nonmembers on nonmember land. Id. at 550.
357. Id. at 551.
358. Montana, 450 U.S. at 552-56. The Crow treaties did not, the Court held, overcome the
presumption that riverbeds are held in trust by the United States for future states. Id. at 553.
359. Id. at 564. Justice Stewart maintained that regulation of nonmember hunting and fishing on
nonmember land did not bear a close relationship to self-government or internal relations, and thus
adoption of the resolution at issue was not authorized by general principles of retained inherent tribal
sovereignty. Id. at 564-65.
1995]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the
tribe." 3 60 The Court did, however, acknowledge two circumstances in
which tribes retained inherent authority over nonmembers on
nonmember lands:
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may
also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.361
The Court concluded that neither of these circumstances was
present. 362
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissented from the majority's holding that Montana held title to the bed
of the Big Horn River. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun reviewed the
evidence of the intention of the United States, and the understanding of
the tribe, with respect to the river. Beginning his inquiry by examining
the intent of the United States, Justice Blackmun noted preliminarily that
with respect to Indian treaties, "'the United States, as the party with the
presumptively superior negotiating skills and superior knowledge of the
language in which the treaty is recorded, has a responsibility to avoid
taking advantage of the other side."' 36 3 At the time that the United
States negotiated treaties with the tribe, it wanted both to provide for the
tribe by converting it from a nomadic, hunting tribe to an agricultural
people, and to obtain from the tribe a cession of all territory not within
the reservation being established. Retention by the United States of title
to the riverbed for the future state of Montana would have been
inconsistent with both of these purposes. 364 With regard to the purpose
of providing for the tribe, it was clear that the first treaty with the tribe,
the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851, was prompted by the federal
government's concern over the depletion of game, timber, and forage
360. Id. at 565. Justice Stewart described Oliphant as relying on this principle. See supra notes
319-20 and accompanying text.
361. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
.362. Id. at 566.
363. Id. at 570 (quoting Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443 U.S. 658,675 (1979)).
364. Id. at 571.
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caused by increasing numbers of settlers.365 This concern apparently
was conveyed to the tribe in a statement by the treaty commissioner:
'The ears of your Great Father are always open to the
complaints of his Red Children. He has heard and is aware that
your buffalo and game are driven off and your grass and
timber consumed by the opening of roads and the passing of
emigrants through your countries. For these losses he desires
to compensate you.' 366
Given the government's recognition that the buffalo and game on
which the tribe depended were disappearing, Justice Blackmun found it
"inconceivable that the United States intended . . . to deprive the Crow
of 'potential control over a source of food on their reservation.'
367
Furthermore, because the establishment of the Crow Reservation had
been necessitated by the same "public purpose" that had led to the
creation of the Choctaw and Cherokee Reservations discussed in
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, in which the Court had concluded that the
United States intended to convey a riverbed to the tribes, Justice
Blackmun determined that the same conclusion should have been
reached with respect to the Crow Reservation and the Big Horn River.368
Justice Blackmun concluded that the United States intended to grant the
tribe the portion of the riverbed totally encompassed by the Crow
Reservation. 369
In the second part of his opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that
even if the United States had intended to retain title to the riverbed for
the benefit of the future state of Montana, it "defie[d] common sense"
to suggest that the tribe would have so understood the terms of the
treaties that it entered into with the United States. 370 The Court had
recently reaffirmed the principle 'that the terms of an Indian treaty
''must be construed 'in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the Indians."' 37 1 The statements made to the Crow
Indians by federal negotiators and the language of the treaties
themselves could not have led the tribe to believe that the United States
365. Id.
366. Montana, 450 U.S. at 571 n.5 (quoting an account published in the SANr Louis REPuBUCAN
on October 26, 1851).
367. Id. at 572-73 (quoting United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated on
other grounds, 433 U.S. 676 (1977)).
368. Id. at 573-76.
369. Id. at 577.
370. Id.
371. Montana, 450 U.S. at 569 (quoting Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,676
(1979). See also supra note 25 (discussing the canons of construction).
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intended to retain ownership of the riverbed. 372  Instead, "[t]he
conclusion is inescapable that the Crow Indians understood that they
retained the ownership of at least those rivers within the metes and
bounds of the reservation granted them." 373 This conclusion was
supported by statements made during treaty negotiations by Chief
Blackfoot: "'The Crows used to own all this Country including all the
rivers of the West .... The Great Spirit made these mountains and rivers
for us .... 374
Justice Blackmun did, however, agree with "the Court's resolution
of the question of the power of the Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing
and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of the
Tribe." 375  He expressed his agreement in a footnote, noting that
"nothing in the Court's disposition of that issue is inconsistent with the
conclusion that the bed of the Big Horn River belongs to the Crow
Indians." 376 He explained that there was no suggestion that any of the
alienated reservation land included portions of the riverbed. 377 He also
distinguished the situation on the Crow Reservation from the situation in
Puyallup Tribe, in which the tribe had alienated all of the reservation
land abutting the river.378 However, Justice Blackmun did not explain
how the tribe's ownership of the riverbed would affect its claim of
regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers. The tribe had in part based its
assertions of regulatory jurisdiction on its claimed ownership of the
riverbed. Most of the hunting and fishing which the tribe sought to
regulate took place in the waters of and on the surface of the river, and
the parties and the lower courts had assumed that ownership of the
riverbed would largely determine the authority to regulate such
activities. 379 Justice Blackmun's dissent from the Court's holding that
Montana had title to the riverbed, coupled with his statement of
agreement with the Court's resolution of the issue of tribal regulatory
authority over "reservation land" owned by nonmembers, would be
consistent with recognition of tribal regulatory authority over
nonmember hunting and fishing on the Big Horn River itself, but not on
nonmember land.
372. Montana, 450 U.S. at 577-78.
373. Id. at 578-79.
374. Id. at 579 n.15 (quoting Proceedings of.the Great Peace Commission of 1867-1868 88
(Institute for the Development of Indian Law (1975)) & 3 App. 136).
375. Id. at 581 n.18.
376. Id.
377. Montana, 450 U.S at 581 n.18.
378. Id. Puyallup Tribe is discussed supra at notes 345-51 and accompanying text.
379. Montana, 450 U.S. at 551 n.l.
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The majority opinion in Montana is important for its statements
with respect to tribal sovereignty in general, as well as for the limitations
it imposed on tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers on
nonmember lands. Justice Blackmun's opinion stated that he agreed with
the Court's resolution of the question of tribal authority to regulate non-
Indian hunting and fishing on nonmember land, although it is not clear
whether he used the term "resolution" to encompass the Court's analysis
of the issue or only its ultimate conclusion. In later opinions he
expressed serious objections to the majority's approach in Montana.380
His analysis of the ownership of the riverbed shows that, unlike the
majority, he was unwilling to ignore the canon of construction that
treaties must be construed in the sense that the Indians would naturally
have understood them. He was also more willing than the majority to
fully consider the historical context in which the treaties were made, and,
in particular, the attitudes of tribal leaders. His opinion did not, however,
state explicitly what he thought to be the extent of the tribe's regulatory
authority over nonmember hunting and fishing on the Big Horn River
itself, and thus did not make clear his precise views on the extent of tribal
regulatory authority over nonmembers at the time that Montana was
decided.
c. Rice v. Rehner
In 1983, in Rice v. Rehner,381 the Court considered whether
California could require a federally licensed Indian trader who operated
a general store on the Pala Reservation to obtain a state liquor license in
order to sell liquor for off-premises consumption. 382 Rehner, the trader
in question, was a member of the Pala Tribe. 383 Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, concluded that Congress had delegated
authority to regulate the use and distribution of alcoholic beverages to
both the states and the tribes, 384 and that California therefore could
require Indian traders to obtain state liquor licenses. She based her
decision on the lack of a tradition of tribal "sovereign immunity or
380. See infra notes 424, 458 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of inherent tribal
jurisdiction).
381. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
382. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 715 (1983). Since 1790, the federal government had
regulated trade with the Indians and required traders to obtain a federal license. Id. at 735
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The current federal statutory provision gives the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs sole power to appoint Indian traders and to promulgate rules and regulations with respect to
trading. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 261 (1983)).
383. Id. at 716 n.2.
384. Id. at 715.
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inherent authority in favor of liquor regulation by Indians," 385 the
"historical tradition of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over the
use and distribution of alcoholic beverages in Indian country," 386 and
the language of a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1161, which she interpreted
as "legalizing Indian liquor transactions as long as those transactions
conformed both with tribal ordinances and state law." 387 Justice
O'Connor described the Court's increasing emphasis on federal
preemption of state law rather than inherent tribal sovereignty as a bar to
state jurisdiction. Under this approach, the preemption analysis "is
informed by historical notions of tribal sovereignty, rather than
determined by them." 388 Downplaying the significance of tribal
sovereignty, she stated that "[t]here can be no doubt that Congress has
divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate in this area" and
that the Court "may accord little if any weight to any asserted interest in
tribal sovereignty in this case." 389 Because of the lack of a tradition of
tribal self-government in this area, Justice O'Connor argued, there was
not even a requirement of an express congressional indication that the
state had authority to regulate liquor licensing and distribution.390
385. Id. at 722. If Justice O'Connor had found that such a tradition existed, under her approach
California could not have applied state law unless Congress had expressly provided that state law
would apply. Id. at 720.
386. Id. at 724. Justice O'Connor relied on the fact that several states were required by
Congress to prohibit the sale of liquor to Indians as a condition of entry into the union and the fact that
several states had "long prohibited liquor transactions with Indians" pursuant to state police power as
establishing a tradition of concurrent state jurisdiction. Id. at 723. Because of this tradition, Justice
O'Connor argued, the usual "assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of
Indians on a reservation" was unwarranted with respect to liquor regulation. Id. at 723 (quoting
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
387. Rice, 463 U.S. at 728.
"Liquor transactions in Indian country are not subject to prohibition under federal law
provided those transactions are 'in conformity both with the laws of the State in which
such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having
jurisdiction over such area of Indian country ......
Id. at 716 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1161). A tribal ordinance of the Pala Tribe permitted the sale of liquor
on the Pala Reservation as long as the sales conformed to state law. Id. at 715-16. Justice O'Connor
examined the legislative history of the federal statute and concluded that the statute authorized rather
than preempted state regulation of liquor transactions on Indian reservations. Id. at 726-29.
388. Id. at 718 (emphasis added).
389. Id. at 724-25. Justice O'Connor explained that "the tribes have long ago been divested of
any inherent self-government over liquor regulation by both the explicit command of Congress and
"'as a necessary implication of their dependent status."' Id. at 726 (quoting Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980)). For a discussion of
the dependent status of Indian tribes as a basis for divesting tribes of sovereignty, see Dussias, supra
note 7, at 28-29. See also supra note 359 and accompanying text (discussing areas of inherent tribal
sovereignty).
390. Rice, 463 U.S. at 731. Justice O'Connor also maintained that congressional intent for the
states to exercise such authority was, in fact, "clear from the face of the statute and its legislative
history." Id. at 733.
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Justice Blackmun dissented in an opinion joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall. 39 1 He reviewed the comprehensive federal
scheme for regulating Indian traders and earlier Court cases striking
down state taxes on Indian traders and their sales on the grounds that the
taxes were preempted by the federal regulatory scheme. 392 Justice
Blackmun argued that the majority relied too heavily on the fact that the
tribes historically had not exercised regulatory authority over liquor
sales. Given the "once-prevalent view of Indians as a dependent people
in need of constant federal protection and supervision" and the fact that
liquor sales to Indians or in Indian country were prohibited by federal
law until 1953, it was not surprising that tribal authority had not been
exercised over liquor sales.3 93 The pre-1953 federal prohibition on
liquor sales also made the majority's reliance on its perception of
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over reservation liquor sales
"disingenuous at best."39 4 Although the states had enforced federal
prohibitions on liquor sales in the past, the majority had cited no source
which indicated that the states had authority to impose their own
regulations. 395 Finally, Justice Blackmun's view of 18 U.S.C. § 1161
differed from the majority's. He interpreted the statute, in keeping with
earlier Court cases, as allowing tribes to regulate the introduction of
liquor, as long as state law was not violated, and as thus permitting the
application of state liquor law standards, such as bans on sales to minors,
on reservations. 396 The question before the Court, however, did not
involve state liquor law standards but rather the question of whether the
statute granted states the authority to require a state license as a condition
for doing business, as to which both the statute and its legislative history
were silent. 397 The Court had frequently recognized that state laws
generally are not applicable to Indians on reservations unless Congress
expressly provided that state laws should apply. In the absence of any
indication that Congress intended to confer liquor licensing authority on
the states, Justice Blackmun would have held that the California law
requiring Indian traders to obtain state liquor licenses was preempted by
391. Id. at 735 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
392. Id. at 735-38. California's requirement of approval by state authorities imposed additional
burdens on Indian traders, thus frustrating "'the evident congressional purpose of ensuring that no
burden shall be imposed upon Indian traders... except as authorized by Acts of Congress or by valid
regulations."' Id. at 738 (quoting Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685,
691 (1965)).
393. Id. at 738-40. Justice Blackmun noted that in prior preemption cases, "the Court's analysis
has never turned on whether the particular area being regulated is one traditionally within the tribe's
control." Id. at 739.
394. Id. at 740.
395. Rice, 463 U.S. at 740.
396. Id. at 741.
397. Id. at 741-42.
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federal law-a conclusion which, he noted, was supported by the
Department of the Interior, the courts of appeals which had addressed
the issue, and the leading Indian law treatise. 398 Justice Blackmun
concluded his opinion by stating that the majority "obviously argue[d]
to a result that it strongly feels is desirable and good ... [b]ut that ... is
activism in which this Court should not indulge." 399
Justice Blackmun's approach in Rice showed that he viewed the
preemption of state law more broadly, and state authority on reservations
more narrowly, than did the majority. Justice Blackmun relied on the
principle, established in earlier Court cases, that state laws were generally
not applicable to Indians on reservations unless Congress expressly
provided that state laws should apply, while Justice O'Connor's opinion
for the majority limited this principle to areas in which there was a
tradition of tribal sovereign immunity or self-governance. 400 Justice
Blackmun did not, however, go so far as to explicitly base preemption of
state law on tribal sovereignty itself. Rather, he focused on federal
policy and on the comprehensiveness of the federal regulatory scheme.
d. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation
In 1989, the Court decided Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,40 1 one of its most important
decisions on the extent of tribal authority. In Brendale, the Court
addressed the issue of whether the Yakima Indian Nation or Yakima
County had the authority to zone fee lands owned by nonmembers of
the tribe on the tribe's Washington reservation. 402 The Court's efforts to
resolve the issue resulted in three opinions and two pluralities, and
engendered considerable uncertainty about the extent of tribal
regulatory authority over reservation land owned by nonmembers.403
On the basis of an analysis of the Yakimas' 1855 treaty with the United
States, a restrictive view of inherent tribal sovereignty, and the Court's
398. Id. at 743-44 n.7. The federal provision "'incorporates state liquor laws as a standard of
measurement to define what conduct is lawful or unlawful under federal law . . . . [RIeservation
Indians need not obtain a state liquor license to sell lawfully."' Id. at 744 (quoting F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 308 (1982 ed.)).
399. Id. at 744.
400. Id. at 719-20.
401. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
402. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,414
(1989).
403. Professor Frank Pommersheim has noted that the three opinions "seemingly obscured rather
than clarified the issue at hand." Frank Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relationships: Hope for the
Future?, 36 S.D. L. REv. 239, 256 (1991). For a more detailed discussion of the three opinions in
Brendale, see Dussias, supra note 7, at 62-69.
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opinion in Montana v. United States, Justice White, in an opinion joined
by Justices Scalia and Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, concluded
that the tribe had not established zoning authority over nonmember land
on any part of the reservation 404 Justice Blackmun, in an opinion joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concluded that the tribe had authority
to zone nonmember land everywhere on the reservation. 405 Justice
Stevens, in an opinion joined by Justice O'Connor, developed an
approach to the issue, based on land ownership patterns on the
reservation, which straddled the gap between the other two groups of
Justices. The litigants, the district court, and the court of appeals had
treated the reservation as being divided into two areas: a "closed area,"
which was predominantly forested trust land, and an "open area," in
which almost half of the land was fee land. 406 Justice Stevens concluded
that the tribe could zone nonmember land in the closed area, 40 7 because
it had preserved the power to define the "essential character" of the
closed area by maintaining the power to exclude nonmembers from
most of that area.408 Justice Stevens also concluded, however, that the
tribe lacked authority to zone nonmember land in the open area,
because, given the large percentage of nonmember-owned fee land
within that area, the tribe no longer had the ability to determine the
essential character of the area. 409 On the basis of these three opinions,
the Court recognized tribal zoning authority over nonmember land in
the closed area of the reservation, but rejected such authority in the open
area.
Justice Blackmun began his opinion with the general comment that
the opinions of Justices White and Stevens were based on two different
approaches to tribal sovereignty, "each of which is inconsistent with this
Court's past decisions and undermines the Federal Government's
longstanding commitment to the promotion of tribal autonomy." 410 He
dissented from the Court's judgment as to the open area, embodied in
Justice White's opinion, because it was "wrong ... as a matter of law and
fashions a patently unworkable legal rule." 411 Justice Stevens' opinion,
404. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 422-23. Justice White concluded that it was clear that the tribe had no
zoning authority over nonmember land in the open area, but would have remanded the case with
respect to the closed area to determine whether the county's zoning proceedings, which had not been
concluded, would adequately recognize tribal interests. Id.
405. Id. at 448-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He concurred in the
judgment as to the closed area, and dissented as to the open area. Id. at 448.
406. Id. at 415-16.
407. Id. at 444.
408. Id. at 441.
409. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 446-47.
410. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
411. Id. at 449.
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on the other hand, which announced the Court's judgment as to the
closed area, reached the right result but for the wrong reason.412 He
discussed each of the opinions in turn.
Justice Blackmun's criticism of Justice White's opinion centered on
Justice White's interpretation of Montana v. United States.413 In Justice
Blackmun's view, the Court's ruling in Montana was that "an Indian
Tribe did not have the inherent authority to prohibit non-Indian hunting
and fishing on fee lands located on a reservation and owned by a non-
Indian, where the Tribe did not assert that any right or interest was
infringed or affected by the non-Indian conduct."414 Justice White's
opinion treated Montana as "establishing a general rule, modified only
by two narrow exceptions, that Indian tribes have no authority over the
activities of non-Indians on their reservations absent express
congressional delegation." 4 15 Montana did not need to be read to
require the "absurd result" reached by Justice White's application of the
Montana rule: "adjoining reservation lands would be subject to
inconsistent and potentially incompatible zoning policies, and ... [tribes
would be] strip[ped] . . . of the power to protect the integrity of trust
lands over which they enjoy unquestioned and exclusive authority." 4 16
Instead, Justice Blackmun argued, Montana must be read in the context
of the Court's other relevant decisions. In that context, it was evident that
Montana must be read to recognize inherent tribal authority over non-
Indian activities on reservations "where those activities, as they do in the
case of land use, implicate a significant tribal interest." 417 Justice Black-
mun explained his view of Montana by first reviewing the history of the
treatment of inherent tribal sovereignty before and after Montana -a
"crucial step" in the process of interpreting the case which Justice White
neglected. 4 18  Long before the original colonies declared their
independence from England, the European nations recognized the
sovereignty of the tribes. The Court's earliest jurisprudence recognized
that tribal sovereignty survived the incorporation of the tribes within the
United States. In the 1830's, in two cases known as the Cherokee Cases,
the Court, in opinions by Chief Justice Marshall, held that the
"dependent status" of the tribes divested them only of those aspects of
sovereignty that were inherently inconsistent with the superior authority
of the United States, particularly the authority to engage in relations with
412. Id.
413. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Montana is discussed supra at notes 352-80 and accompanying text.
414. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added).
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 449-50.
418. Id. at 451.
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foreign nations and the power to alienate land to non-Indians. 419 In the
century and a half between the Cherokee Cases and Montana, the Court's
approach to inherent tribal sovereignty remained essentially constant,
with the Court only once finding that incorporation within the United
States divested the tribes of an aspect of sovereignty in addition to those
aspects held to have been divested in the Cherokee Cases.420 In Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,421 the Court held that inherent criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians was inconsistent with the dependent status
of the tribes. This holding was reached, however, in light of both the
"nearly universal understanding" that tribes did not possess criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians unless permitted by treaty, and the
Constitution's "extraordinary protections against intrusions on personal
liberty."422 Subsequent to Oliphant and Montana, the Court's decisions
"clearly recognize[d] that tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on
reservation lands is consistent with the dependent status of the tribes. '"423
Having outlined the history of inherent tribal sovereignty before
and after Montana, Justice Blackmun turned to an analysis of Montana
itself. First, Justice Blackmun argued that with respect to Montana's
''general principle," creating a presumption against tribal civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians, "the Court simply missed its usual way,"
as the opinion contained language inconsistent with prior Court
decisions determining the scope of inherent tribal jurisdiction. 4 24
Second, Justice Blackmun argued that despite the reversed presumption
in Montana's "general principle," the language of the opinion expressly
preserved substantial tribal authority over non-Indian activity, and
"reasonably may be read, and .. .should be read, to recognize that
tribes may regulate the on-reservation conduct of non-Indians whenever
a significant tribal interest is threatened or directly affected." 425
419. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 451. The Cherokee Cases were Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). For a discussion of the
Cherokee Cases, see Dussias, supra note 7, at 6-17.
420. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 451-53.
421. 435 US. 191 (1978).
422. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 453. The holding in Oliphant has been extensively criticized, in part
for its highly questionable history of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. See, e.g., Dussias,
supra note 7, at 25-32, 37-43. Justice Blackmun voted with the majority to strip tribes of criminal
jursdiction over non-Indians in Oliphant. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Justice Marshall and Chief Justice
Burger dissented. Id. at 212.
423. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 455. Justice Blackmun relied on Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-53 (1980), Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455
U.S. 130, 141 (1982), and Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987). 492 U.S. at 453-
54. He also criticized Justice White's narrow reading of Iowa Mutual. 492 U.S. at 454 n.5. See also
supra notes 342-44 and accompanying text (discussing Iowa Mutual).
424. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 455.
425. Id. at 456-57.
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Construed in this way, Montana "fits with relative ease into the
constellation of this Court's sovereignty jurisprudence." 426
Under Justice Blackmun's reading of Montana, once a valid tribal
regulatory interest is established, "the nature of land ownership does not
diminish the tribe's inherent power to regulate in the area." 427 This
approach is consistent with cases in which the Court recognized that
tribal sovereignty is in large part geographically determined, and held
that tribal jurisdiction did not vary between trust lands and fee lands.
The power to zone is central to "'the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe,"' within the language of Montana, particularly in
light of Indians' "unique historical and cultural connection to the
land."428 Furthermore, a finding of inherent zoning authority would
not be inconsistent with the holding of Montana, which "stands for no
more than that tribes may not assert their civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers on fee lands absent a showing that ...the non-Indians'
'conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.'" 429 In this
case, the threat to the tribe stemmed "from the loss of the general ...
advantages of comprehensive land management." 430 Finally, Justice
Blackmun concluded his analysis of Montana and of Justice White's
opinion with the following statement:
[U]nder all of this Court's inherent sovereignty decisions,
including Montana, tribes retain the power to zone non-Indian
fee lands on the reservation. Justice White's opinion presents
not a single thread of logic for the proposition that such
zoning power is inconsistent with the overriding interest of the
National Government, and therefore necessarily divested, or
that such zoning power is not fundamental to the political and
economic security of the tribe, and therefore reserved to the
tribe by the plain language of Montana.431
Justice Blackmun objected to Justice Stevens' treatment of inherent
tribal sovereignty even more strongly than he had criticized Justice
White's treatment of sovereignty. Justice Blackmun noted that while
Justice White misread the Court's decisions with respect to inherent tribal
sovereignty, Justice Stevens ignored them altogether, because, by basing
426. Id. at 457.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 458 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
429. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 459 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
430. Id. at 460.
431. Id. at 462.
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tribal zoning authority on the power to exclude non-Indians, he
implicitly concluded that tribes had no inherent authority over non-
Indians. This implicit conclusion flatly contradicted "every relevant
sovereignty case that this court has decided."
432
Justice Blackmun also faulted Justice Stevens' opinion for
conflicting with prior Court decisions rejecting the argument that
reservation areas which, as a result of the Dawes Act, contained
substantial non-Indian-owned land, should be treated differently for
jurisdictional purposes from predominately Indian-owned areas.
433
Similarly, the Court had held in other cases that the Dawes Act did not
diminish the reservation status of non-Indian-owned lands, even where
the part of the reservation where the lands were located had "'lost its
[Indian] identity.'434
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun criticized Justice Stevens' analysis of
congressional intent. First, he criticized Justice Stevens' conjecture that it
was "improbable" that the Congress that enacted the Dawes Act
"'envisioned that the Tribe would retain its interest in regulating the use
of vast ranges of land sold in fee to nonmembers who lack any voice in
setting tribal policy"'-a conjecture unsupported by either the text of
the Dawes Act or its legislative history.435 Moreover, in Justice
Blackmun's view, the intent of the Congress which enacted the Dawes Act
was immaterial. In 1934, the allotment policy embodied in the Dawes
Act was repudiated by the Indian Reorganization Act. The Court should
look to the intent of the Congress that repudiated the Dawes Act, and
"established the Indian policies to which we are heir," in determining
whether Congress intended tribal civil jurisdiction to extend to non-
Indian fee lands in "open" areas of reservations.4 36
Justice Blackmun also criticized Justice Stevens' approach for being
impractical. It would establish a "self-defeating" checkerboard zoning
scheme in open areas of every reservation, and would "require an
intrinsically standardless threshold determination as to when a section of
a reservation contains sufficient non-Indian land holdings to warrant an
'open' classification." 437 Justice Stevens did not provide a benchmark
432. Id. at 462-63.
433. Id. at 463. See also supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the Dawes Act).
434. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 463 (quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,484-85 (1973)). Mattz is
discussed supra at notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
435. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 463-64 (quoting Brendale, 492 U.S. at 437 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
436. Id. at 464 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun also
noted that in 1934, the executive branch interpreted the 1934 Congress as intending that tribal civil
jurisdiction extend over all reservation lands, regardless of land ownership. Id. (citing Powers of
Indian Tribes, 55 I.D. 14, 50 (1934)). See also supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing the
Indian Reorganization Act).
437. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 464.
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for making this determination, and Justice Blackmun could imagine
none .438
Finally, Justice Blackmun objected to the "stereotyped and almost
patronizing view of Indians and reservation life" which he saw reflected
in Justice Stevens' focus on whether the tribe had preserved the essential
character of an area of the reservation. In Justice Blackmun's view, "it
must not be the case that tribes can retain the 'essential character' of
their reservations (necessary to the exercise of zoning authority) ...
only if they forgo economic development and maintain those
reservations according to a single, perhaps quaint, view of what is
characteristically 'Indian' today." 439 Justice Blackmun concluded his
analysis of Justice Stevens' opinion with the statement that the Court's
"past decisions and common sense compel a finding that the Tribe has
zoning authority over all the lands within its reservation." 440
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Brendale showed his willingness to
look at the history of tribal sovereignty as an important basis for
determining the extent of tribal regulatory authority. Furthermore, he
recognized the importance of looking at not only the history of the
Dawes Act, which led to the alienation of Indian land, but also the
subsequent Indian Reorganization Act, which repudiated the Dawes Act
and its allotment policy. His reading of Montana gave much greater
latitude to tribal authority over non-Indians in general and over zoning
of non-Indian land in particular. Justice Blackmun recognized the
importance of the power to control land use, particularly for Indians.
Finally, he understood the dilemma faced by the tribes if their zoning
authority were based on their having continued to live a life which the
Court would regard as stereotypically "Indian." Under Justice Stevens'
approach, economic development on the reservation could well lead to
the loss of zoning authority.
e. South Dakota v. Bourland
In 1993, in South Dakota v. Bourland,441 the Court considered
whether the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe had authority to regulate,
through license requirements, non-Indian hunting and fishing on lands
located within the Cheyenne River Reservation in South Dakota which
438. Id.
439. Id. at 465 (citation omitted).
440. Id. Justice Blackmun also went on to analyze whether tribal zoning authority over non-
Indian fee lands is exclusive or is concurrent with county zoning authority. He concluded that once a
tribe chooses to exercise its zoning power, that power is exclusive, because concurrent zoning power
is unworkable. Id. at 465-68.
441. 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
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the United States had taken from both the tribe and non-Indians for
construction of a dam and reservoir. 442 The federal statute authorizing
the project provided that the taken lands would be open to the general
public for recreational uses. 443 The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Thomas, relied on Montana and Brendale and concluded that, by
opening up the taken lands for public use, Congress had abrogated the
tribe's treaty-based rights to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians
on the taken lands. 444 Moreover, the Court concluded that inherent
tribal 'sovereignty did not provide a basis for tribal regulation of non-
Indians because of the "dependent status" of Indian tribes, as developed
in Montana. After Montana, Justice Thomas stated, "tribal sovereignty
over nonmembers 'cannot survive without express congressional
delegation,' . . . and is therefore not inherent." 445 Because Montana
had noted, however, two basic circumstances in which tribes might
exercise authority over nonmembers on nonmember lands, the case was
remanded to see if either of these circumstances was present. 446
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Souter, dissented in Bourland.
Initially, Justice Blackmun's opinion faulted the majority's analysis for
focusing on the tribe's treaty-based rights to regulate hunting and
fishing, with "barely a nod" acknowledging that such authority might
be an aspect of the inherent sovereignty retained by the tribe.447 The
Court had recognized in previous cases that tribes' inherent sovereignty
extends "'over both their members and their territory,"'448 and that
442. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309,2313-14 (1993).
443. Id. at 2313.
444. Id. at 2316-17.
Montana and Brendale establish that when an Indian tribe conveys ownership of its tribal
lands to non-Indians, it loses any former right of absolute and exclusive use and
occupation of the conveyed lands. The abrogation of this greater right, at least in the
context of the type of area at issue in this case, implies the loss of regulatory jurisdiction
over the use of the land by others.
Id. at 2316 (footnote omitted).
445. Id. at 2320 n.15 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,564 (1981)).
446. Id. at 2319-20. Justice Thomas quoted the statement in Montana that the "'exercise of tribal
power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation."' Id. at 2319 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,564 (1981)).
Justice Thomas described the Montana exceptions as follows:
First, a tribe may license or otherwise regulate activities of nonmembers who enter
'consensual relationships' with the tribe or its members through contracts, leases, or
other commercial dealings .... Second, a 'tribe may . . . retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.'
Id. at 2320 (citation omitted) (second omission in original) (quoting Montana at 565-66). Montana is
discussed supra at notes 352-80 and accompanying text.
447. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2321.
448. Id. (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)) (Blackmun, J.,
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tribes "'still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty
or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent
status.' 449  The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 confirmed tribal
sovereignty over the land at issue "in the most sweeping terms" by
providing that the reservation land would be "'set apart for the absolute
and undisturbed use and occupation of the [Sioux]."' 4 5 0  Because
earlier cases had established that "'treaties should be construed liberally
in favor of the Indians,"' it was appropriate to assume, as the majority
had, that the treaty included the right to regulate hunting and fishing. 451
Justice Blackmun thus analyzed the treaty language as a confirmation of
sovereignty and, implicitly, regulatory authority, rather than as the
source of such sovereignty and authority.
The focus of Justice Blackmun's analysis was whether Congress had
intended to abrogate the tribe's right to regulate non-Indian hunting and
fishing on the taken lands. Previous cases had acknowledged Congress's
power to abrogate treaty rights, but had required "'clear evidence that
Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on
the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve
that conflict by abrogating the treaty."' 452 The majority, however, had
not pointed to even "a scrap of evidence" that Congress actually
considered this conflict, and instead inferred Congress's intent from the
fact that Congress deprived the tribe of its right to exclusive use of the
taken land and did not explicitly reserve tribal regulatory authority over
non-Indian hunting and fishing. 453 The majority's reasoning, i.e., that
the tribe's regulatory authority was dependent on its treaty right to
exclusive use of the land and was lost when Congress abrogated the
tribe's right to exclusive use, was erroneous in two respects. 454 First, the
Court had established in previous cases that treaties must be construed
"'in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the
Indians,"' and it was "implausible" that the tribe would have thought
that every right subsumed in the treaty's broad language would have
been abrogated when the tribe was deprived of the right to exclusive use
of the land. 455 Second, the majority's focus on the treaty, which Justice
Blackmun termed "myopic," ignored the fact that the treaty merely
confirmed pre-existing tribal authority over the reservation, so that even
if the tribe's treaty-based regulatory rights were extinguished when the
dissenting).
449. Id. at 2322 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)).
450. Id. (quoting 15 Stat. 636).
451. Id. (quoting County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985)).
452. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2322 (quoting United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986)).
453. Id.
454. Id. at 2323.




tribe lost the right to exclusive use, the tribe's inherent authority to
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing continued.
456
Justice Blackmun also criticized the majority's reliance on Montana
and Brendale. Those cases involved land conveyed to non-Indians
pursuant to the Dawes Act, the goal of which was the eventual
elimination of Indian reservations. In this case, the land was taken by the
federal government to build a dam, and was also to be open to the public
for recreational purposes. There was no conflict between these uses of
the land and continued tribal regulatory authority over non-Indian
hunting and fishing. Allowing non-Indians to hunt and fish in the
taken lands and depriving the tribe of the power to exclude non-Indians
from the lands did not mean that the non-Indians could hunt and fish
free of tribal regulation. 457 Justice Blackmun also noted in a footnote
his continuing belief, expressed in Brendale, that some of the critical
language in Montana, on which Justice Thomas relied, was "contrary to
150 years of Indian law jurisprudence and is not supported by the cases
on which it relied." 458
Finally, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's reliance on a
sentence in the relevant statute that provided that the compensation paid
for the taken lands "'shall be in final and complete settlement of all
claims, rights, and demands of the tribe."' 459 As Justice Blackmun
explained, this sentence simply established that Congress intended that
no further compensation would be paid for the rights it had taken from
the tribe, without addressing whether one of the rights which it intended
to take was the right to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing. He
noted once again that the intent to abrogate treaty rights must be clear,
and that Congress' failure to mention tribal regulatory rights meant that
they survived, rather than the reverse. 460
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Bourland, like his opinion in
Brendale, showed his continuing disagreement with a majority of the
456. Id.
457. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2323. Justice Blackmun also argued that tribal authority to regulate
non-Indian hunting and fishing was not inconsistent with Congress's authorizing the Army Corps of
Engineers to promulgate regulations for use of the area by the general public. Id. at 2323-24.
458. Id. at 2322 n.2. Justice Blackmun referred to the statement that 'the exercise of tribal
power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive [absent] congressional
delegation."' (quoting 113 S. Ct. at 2319-20). He also cited his discussion of Montana in Brendale.
Id. at 2322 n.2 (citing 492 U.S. 408, 450-56 (1989)). Justice Blackmun's opinion in Brendale is
discussed supra at notes 410-40 and accompanying text.
459. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2324 (quoting id. at 2317). Justice Blackmun described the majority
as turning to this provision "[i]n its search for a statement from Congress abrogating the Tribe's right
to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing," a description which seems to suggest eagerness on the
part of the majority to conclude that tribal rights were abrogated. Id.
460. Id.
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Court over the approach to be taken with respect to tribal regulatory
authority and the proper weight to be given to tribal sovereignty. Justice
Blackmun emphasized that tribal sovereignty standing alone could
provide a basis for regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers,
independent of treaty rights, while the majority regarded modem tribal
sovereignty as more limited. He also required clear evidence of
congressional intent to abrogate a treaty, and maintained, as had previous
Court cases, that treaties must be construed in the way that the Indians
would have understood them, while the majority essentially ignored these
principles. Finally, Justice Blackmun noted that previous Court cases
had recognized that inherent tribal sovereignty extends over both tribal
members and tribal territory, while the majority focused on the
"dependent status" of the tribes and their loss of exclusive use of
reservation land as bases for depriving tribes of regulatory authority over
non-Indians.
2. Contributions to the Development of Indian Law
Aside from his brief concurring opinion in Puyallup Tribe, Justice
Blackmun dissented, at least in part, in each of his regulatory authority
opinions.461 Thus his contribution to Indian law in this area is not based
on any role in changing the law. Rather, his contribution lies in his
willingness to remind the Court of the basic principles of tribal
sovereignty which a majority of the Court has seemed increasingly
unwilling to take seriously.
Two of the regulatory authority cases in which Justice Blackmun
wrote opinions, Puyallup Tribe and Rice, focused on issues of state
regulatory authority.462 While Puyallup Tribe focused on the terms of
the Puyallups' treaty, Rice focused on the federal regulatory scheme and
whether federal law preempted state regulation. In terms of Justice
Blackmun's views on state regulatory authority on Indian reservations,
his opinions in the two cases seem to indicate that, in 1977, he was
willing to recognize state regulatory authority, at least in certain
circumstances, while by 1983, he rejected state regulatory authority in
the absence of an express provision by Congress that state law would
apply. The latter approach was also apparent in his opinion in Brendale,
461. In Montana, Justice Blackmun dissented in part. See supra notes 363-79 and accompanying
text (discussing Justice Blackmun's dissent in Montana). In Brendale, Justice Blackmun concurred in
the judgment as to the closed area of the reservation, while disagreeing with the Court's rationale, and
dissented as to the open area. See supra notes 410-40 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Blackmun's opinion in Brendale).
462. Puyallup Tribe is discussed supra at notes 345-51 and accompanying text. Rice is discussed
supra at notes 381-400 and accompanying text.
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in which, in addition to concluding that the tribe had regulatory
authority over the entire reservation, he concluded that tribal authority,
once exercised, was exclusive of state authority.463
Justice Blackmun's other three opinions in this area-in Montana,
Brendale, and Bourland-focused on tribal regulatory authority over
nonmembers on reservation land no longer owned by the tribe or its
members. In each of these cases, Justice Blackmun dissented from all or
part of the Court's decision.464 His opinions in these cases demonstrated
a commitment to honoring tribal rights and respecting tribal sovereignty
which was absent from the attitude of a majority of the Court. Moreover,
the Court's respect for tribal sovereignty and tribal rights seems to have
declined during the years covered by these opinions. While two other
members of the Court, Justices Brennan and Marshall, joined Justice
Blackmun's opinions in Montana and Brendale (in 1981 and 1989,
respectively) by 1993, when the Court decided Bourland, Justices
Brennan and Marshall were no longer members of the Court, and only
one member of the Court, Justice Souter, joined Justice Blackmun's
opinion .465
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Montana concluded that
the United States intended, and the Crow Nation understood, that the bed
of the Big Horn River belonged to the tribe. He did not address the
significance of this conclusion with respect to tribal regulatory authority,
other than by stating that his conclusion as to the riverbed was not
inconsistent with the Court's disposition of the issue of tribal power to
regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on nonmember land, with
which he agreed.466
Justice Blackmun's opinions in Brendale and Bourland, however,
made clear his views on tribal regulatory authority and expressed a view
of the Court's decision in Montana which was different from the view of
the majority of the Court. Furthermore, in these opinions he objected to
the language of the majority opinion in Montana, despite the fact that he
expressed agreement with most of the majority's decision at the time. In
Brendale, he characterized Montana as ruling that "an Indian tribe did
not have inherent authority to prohibit non-Indian hunting and fishing
463. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 468 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
464. In Montana, Justice Blackmun dissented in part. 450 U.S. at 569. In Brendale, Justice
Blackmun concurred in the Court's judgment in part and dissented in part. 492 U.S. at 448. In
Bourland, Justice Blackmun dissented. 113 S. Ct. at 2321.
465. Justices Brennan and Marshall had also joined Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in
Rice. 463 U.S. at 735. In Puyallup Tribe, on the other hand, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented,
while Justice Blackmun concurred in the Court's opinion. 433 U.S. at 178-79.
466. See supra notes 375-79 and accompanying text (discussing non-Indian hunting and fishing
on nonmember tribal regulation of land).
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on fee lands located on a reservation and owned by a non-Indian, where
the Tribe did not assert that any right or interest was infringed or
affected by the non-Indian conduct," and criticized Justice White's
reading of Montana.467 In both Brendale and Bourland, he noted that
the language of the majority opinion in Montana which stated that "the
'exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation"' was contrary to 150 years of Indian law
jurisprudence *468
In contrast to the majority of the Court in both Brendale and
Bourland, in these cases Justice Blackmun treated inherent tribal
sovereignty as still providing a basis for tribal regulatory authority over
nonmembers on nonmember land. Although this sovereignty might be
confirmed by treaty, it predated any treaty, and did not emanate from a
treaty. Furthermore, although Congress had the power to abrogate treaty
rights, there must be clear evidence of Congress's intent to do so.
Finally, even if a tribe lost its treaty-based regulatory rights, it still
retained inherent regulatory authority. In short, Justice Blackmun's
opinions in this area showed much greater recognition of retained tribal
sovereignty, and tribal regulatory authority stemming from this
sovereignty, than was demonstrated by a majority of the Court. The
practical effect of this recognition was, of course, severely limited by the
refusal of a majority of the Court to follow Justice Blackmun's lead.
G. TAXATION ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS
1. Analysis of the Opinions
a. Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico
In 1989, two months before its decision in Brendale, the Court
decided Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico,469 in which
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion. In Cotton Petroleum, the
Court considered whether New Mexico could impose a severance tax on
the production of oil and gas by non-Indian lessees of wells located on
the Jicarilla Apache Reservation, where the Jicarilla Apache Tribe itself
467. 492 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
468. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 450 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564); Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2322
n.2 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
469. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
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had already imposed a severance tax on the same production470 Noting
that taxes like the one at issue had "been upheld unless expressly or
impliedly prohibited by Congress," 471 the Court held that the state taxes
were not preempted by federal law 472 and did not impose an unlawful
multiple tax burden on interstate commerce by imposing state taxes on
top of tribal taxes without allocation or apportionment. 473
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined, noted at the outset that Justice Stevens' opinion for
the Court had "faithfully recited" the well-established basic principles
defining the boundaries between state regulatory authority and tribal
self-government, but was "less faithful in their application." 474 Justice
Blackmun began his analysis with the principle that preemption is a
matter of congressional intent, so the Court's goal must be to determine
whether the state taxation in question was consistent with federal policy,
as indicated by federal statutes and regulations. 475 The most relevant
statute, the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (1938 Act), was silent on the
issue of state taxation, and the Court had interpreted the Act in a 1985
case, Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe ,476 as not giving the clear congressional
consent to state taxation that was required in the Indian law context. 477
Justice Blackmun also noted that the Blackfeet Tribe Court had cited the
canon of construction "'requiring that statutes be construed liberally in
favor of the Indians." 478 Justice Blackmun faulted the majority for
reading the silence of the 1938 Act differently from the way that the
Court had read it in 1985. 479 Moreover, ev'en if the 1938 Act's silence
were treated as ambiguous, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of
tribal independence, as past cases had established.480
470. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 166 (1989). The Court had
previously held that the tribe had the power to impose its severance tax on production by the non-
Indian lessees in an earlier case. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 445 U.S. 130 (1982).
471. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 173.
472. Id. at 186. The Court described its approach as "a flexible preemption analysis sensitive to
the particular facts and legislation involved." Id. at 176.
473. Id. at 188-89. The Court rejected the argument that the tax was unlawful because the tax
payments made by the lessees far exceeded the value of the services provided to the lessees by the
state. Id. at 189-90.
474. Id. at 193 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
475. Id.
476. 471 U.S. 759 (1985). In this case, Montana sought to tax the tribe's royalty interests under
oil and gas leases on the reservation held by non-Indian lessees. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 194
(discussing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985)).
477. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 195.
478. Id. (quoting 471 U.S. at 767). See also supra note 25 (discussing the canons of
construction).
479. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 196.
480. Id. at 203 n.7.
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Justice Blackmun also rejected the chronology of the legislative
history of the 1938 Act included in the Court's opinion. Prior to 1938,
in Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., the Court had frequently
invalidated state taxes by applying the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity, which invalidated certain taxes on the grounds that such taxes
imposed an indirect economic burden on the federal government or its
instrumentalities. 48 1  In 1938, the Court expressly overruled the
intergovernmental immunity doctrine. 482 Justice Stevens' opinion for the
majority had argued that, after the Court overruled the doctrine, mineral
lessees on Indian reservations were subject to nondiscriminatory state
taxation as long as Congress did not act affirmatively to preempt the
state taxes.483 The majority concluded that Congress had not, either
expressly or impliedly, preempted New Mexico's taxes on Cotton
Petroleum. 484
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's chronology of events as
"misleading." He explained that although the majority was correct that
the 1938 Act was enacted after the Court decided Mountain Producers,
the legislative history of the Act showed that it had assumed its final
form long before the Court's decision was rendered.485 Thus during the
period in which the proposed Act was drafted and was working its way
through the legislative process, the intergovernmental tax immunity
doctrine was still law, and the Act's silence on the taxation issue would
have meant that the states lacked power to tax oil and gas production by
non-Indian lessees. 486 There was no indication in the legislative history
that the change in the law caused by the Court's overruling of the
intergovernmental immunities doctrine was brought to the attention of
the House before it passed the 1938 Act. 487
Justice Blackmun also faulted the majority for failing to give
appropriate weight to the major change in federal Indian policy
481. Id. at 173-74. Justice Blackmun noted the previous application of the doctrine "to invalidate
a state tax on income derived by a non-Indian lessee from the sale of his interest in oil produced on
Indian land" on the grounds that "a tax upon such profits is a direct hamper upon the effort of the
United States to make the best terms that it can for its wards."' 490 U.S. at 174 (quoting Gillespie v.
Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501,506 (1922)).
482. Id. at 175 (citing Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938)).
483. Id. at 163.
484. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186. The majority reached this conclusion by examining
congressional intent against a "backdrop" of the history of tribal sovereignty. Id. at 176. The majority
weighed the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, and rejected the argument of Cotton Petroleum,
a non-Indian lessee, that the New Mexico taxes "unduly interfere with the federal interest in
promoting tribal economic self-sufficiency and are not justified by an adequate state interest." Id. at
177.
485. Id. at 197.




embodied in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.488 The 1938 Act
was drafted and enacted in light of the Indian Reorganization Act, which
was designed to rehabilitate Indian economic life and foster Indian
assertions of autonomy. These goals would be undermined by treating
the 1938 Act as allowing the taxation at issue. 489 Therefore, Justice
Blackmun concluded, "the silence of the 1938 Act is not consistent with
a congressional intent that non-Indian lessees of Indian mineral lands
shall be subject to state taxation for their on-reservation activities. ' '490
Finally, Justice Blackmun argued, even without direct evidence of
congressional intent precluding the state taxation at issue, the conclusion
that such was Congress's intent would be "amply supported by a routine
application of the traditional tools of Indian preemption analysis." 49 1
The majority, while purporting to apply a flexible standard of
preemption analysis, actually adopted an approach under which there
was no preemption unless the states "are entirely excluded from a
sphere of activity and provide no services to the Indians or to the lessees
they seek to tax,"492 thus distorting the standard it purported to apply.
Past Court decisions had established that the exercise of state regulatory
authority on Indian reservations could be impermissible either because it
would interfere with tribal self-government, or because a comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme existed. In this case, both federal and tribal
regulations were extensive, 493 and left no room for the state tax at
issue.494 Justice Blackmun was particularly concerned about the adverse
effects of state taxation on tribal interests, which the majority had
seriously underestimated. As long as the tribe itself continued to tax oil
and gas production, on-reservation taxes would remain higher than off-
reservation taxes within the state, potentially creating an adverse effect on
the willingness of producers to drill new wells on the reservation and on
the competitiveness of the tribe's leases. 495 This was particularly
troubling given the importance of the taxed activity to the tribal
economy: oil and gas production was the tribal economy-a common
pattern among tribes with substantial mineral resources.496 Furthermore,
488. Id. at 196.
489. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 198-99. See also supra note 197 and accompanying text
(discussing the Indian Reorganization Act).
490. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 203.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 204.
493. Id. at 204-06. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (discussing preemption based
on interference with tribal self-governance); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380
U.S. 685, 688-90 (1965) (discussing preemption based on a comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme).
494. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 206.
495. Id. at 208.
496. Id. at 209. For a thorough analysis of the tribal role in mineral development, including a dis
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state taxation would ultimately impose a ceiling on tribal tax revenues,
thus interfering with the tribe's freedom of action in the sphere of tribal
taxation, which was necessary to the protection of Indian interests .497 In
conclusion, Justice Blackmun noted that New Mexico was asserting
"little more than a desire to increase its general revenues at the expense
of tribal economic development," a purpose which was "'insufficient to
justify the burdens imposed by the tax on the comprehensive federal
scheme . . . and on the express federal policy of encouraging Indian
self-sufficiency in [this] area."' 498
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Cotton Petroleum demonstrated his
willingness to look at both interference with tribal self-government and
the comprehensiveness of the federal regulatory scheme as independent
barriers to the state tax at issue, while the majority's "flexible"
preemption analysis seemed to leave broad room for state taxation. He
was also willing to take a careful look at the actual chronology of the
passage of the 1938 Act, to construe the Act in the light of the goals of
the Indian Reorganization Act, and to construe the statute in light of the
canons of construction, all of which the majority failed to do. Finally,
Justice Blackmun's opinion showed his awareness of the possible
practical effects of the state taxation on tribal interests, and how these
adverse effects would interfere with the federal policy of encouraging
tribal self-sufficiency.
b. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation
In 1992, in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation,499 the Court considered whether Yakima
County, Washington had authority to tax land owned in fee by the
Yakima Nation and its members on the Yakima Reservation, located
almost entirely within the county's boundaries. Yakima County imposed
an ad valorem tax on land and an excise tax on sales of land.500 In
1987, the county foreclosed on a number of parcels of reservation land,
owned in fee by the tribe or tribal members, because of delinquent
cussion of Cotton Petroleum, see Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The
Evolution of Tribal Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TuLSA L.J. 541 (1994).
497. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 209-10.
498. Id. at 211 (quoting Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458
U.S. 832, 845 (1982) (text omitted in Justice Blackmun's opinion)). The taxes collected by the state
from Cotton Petroleum were grossly disproportionate to the services provided: $89,384 in services, as
opposed to $2,293,953 in taxes. Id. at 185.
499. 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
500. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S.




taxes.5 0 1 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that the Dawes
Act, as amended, permitted the county to impose the ad valorem tax on
the reservation land in question, but did not allow the excise tax on sales
of the land.502 Justice Scalia began with the proposition that states are
without power to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians unless
Congress has made its intention to authorize such taxation
"'unmistakably clear."'5 03 He interpreted the Dawes Act as authorizing
"'taxation of . . . land"' such as the ad valorem tax5 0 4 but not
evidencing an unmistakably clear intent to authorize an excise tax upon
the sale of land.SOS
Justice Blackmun concurred with the Court's conclusion concerning
the excise tax, but dissented from the Court's holding concerning the ad
valorem tax. He agreed with Justice Scalia's "unmistakably clear" intent
standard, but, after having "wandered the maze of Indian statutes and
case law tracing back 100 years," he was unable to find an
"unmistakably clear" congressional intent allowing the state to impose
the ad valorem tax.506
Justice Blackmun's opinion analyzed, in turn, the three ways in
which the Court erred in finding Congress's "unmistakably clear intent"
to allow state taxation of Indian lands. First, the Court erred by finding
"unmistakably clear" intent in a proviso added to the Dawes Act in
1906 by the Burke Act. By its terms, the proviso, which removed
restrictions on taxation of land, applied only to land for which a fee
patent was issued by the Secretary of the Interior before the end of the
501. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 687.
502. Id. at 694. See also supra note 38 (discussing the Dawes Act).
503. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 688 (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 765
(1985)). Justice Scalia also relied on the Court's decision in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones as
establishing the lack of state power to tax "'absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes
permitting it."' Id. (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)).
504. Id. at 692. Justice Scalia rejected the conclusion of the court of appeals that the imposition
of the ad valorem tax on tribal members required analysis of the tax under the principles developed in
the Court's decision in Brendale. For a discussion of Brendale, see supra notes 401-40 and
accompanying text. He distinguished Brendale as focusing on tribal power rather than state power
and noted that the Court had traditionally followed a per se rule, rather than a balancing approach, in
analyzing state taxation of Indian tribes and their members. Although the per se rule had traditionally
been used to prohibit state taxation, Justice Scalia thought that it "also applies to produce categorical
allowance of state taxation when it has in fact been authorized by Congress." County of Yakima, 112
S. Ct. at 692-93.
505. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 694. Justice Scalia reasoned that although "[ilt does not
exceed the bounds of permissible construction to interpret 'taxation of land' as including taxation of
the proceeds from sale of land .... [t]hat is surely not ... the phrase's unambiguous meaning." Id. at
693. Consequently, in light of the "principle deeply rooted in this Court's jurisprudence . . . [that]
'statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to
their benefit,"' the excise tax could not be sustained. Id. at 693-94 (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet
Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)).
506. Id. at 694 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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normal twenty-five-year trust period, 507 not to all fee-patented land.
Furthermore, the- antecedent clause of the proviso no longer had any
force of law, thus diminishing the proviso's usefulness as an indication of
congressional intent. 50 8  The proviso thus did not provide the
"unmistakably clear" intent of Congress to allow taxation of lands other
than those for which a fee patent was granted prematurely.509
The majority's second error was that it acted "on its own intuition
that it would be 'strange' for land to be alienable and encumberable and
yet not taxable" and inferred "'unmistakably' clear intent of Congress
from an otherwise irrelevant statutory section that itself makes no
mention of taxation of fee lands."510 The majority reasoned that when
section 5 of the Dawes Act made allotted lands for which a fee patent
had been issued alienable and encumberable, it also made them subject
to taxation, on the grounds that it would be strange to remove the
protection against alienation while still providing freedom from
taxation.51 1 The majority admitted that section 5 only implied this
conclusion, which, Justice Blackmun maintained, fell short of meeting
507. Id. at 694-95. The proviso read as follows:
'The Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion ... whenever he shall be satisfied
that any Indian allottee is competent and capable of managing his or her affairs at any
time to cause to be issued to such allottee a patent in fee simple, and thereafter all
restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed.'
Id. at 695 n.1 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 349). The Dawes Act originally provided that title to allotted land
would be held in trust by the United States. See CoHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 131. The trust
period was ordinarily to last for 25 years. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1983). The Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 extended the existing trust periods on Indian lands indefinitely. 25 U.S.C. §. 462 (1983).
508. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 694-95. The principal clause relating to the proviso, as
amended, provided as follows:
At the expiration of the trust period and when the lands have been conveyed to the
Indians by patent in fee ... then each and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be
subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or territory in which they may
reside.
25 U.S.C. § 349 (1983). As Justice Blackmun noted, the majority opinion conceded that, as established
in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), it was implausible, "in light of
Congress's post-allotment era legislation," for the section to extend state jurisdiction "beyond the
section's literal coverage ('each and every allottee') to include subsequent Indian owners (through
grant or devise) of the allotted parcels." 111 S. Ct. at 690.
509. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 695.
510. Id. at 694.
511. Id. at 691.
'[A]t the expiration of said [trust] period the United States will convey [the allotted
lands] by patent to said Indian . .. in fee, discharged of said trust and free of all charge
or incumbrance whatsoever ... .And if any conveyance shall be made of the lands set
apart and allotted as herein provided, or any contract made touching the same, before
the expiration of the time above mentioned, such conveyance or contract shall be
absolutely null and void .... '
Id. at 690 n.3 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 348). The majority relied on the Court's interpretation of section 5
in Goudy v. Meath, 230 U.S. 146 (1906), which held that "state tax laws were '[a]mong the laws to
which [Indian allottees] became subject' under sec[tion] 6 [of the Dawes Act] upon the expiration of
the trust period." Id. at 688 (quoting Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146, 149 (1906)).
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the "unmistakably clear" intent standard.5 1 2  Justice Blackmun
supported his view with a quote from an opinion by Justice Scalia, in
which Scalia expressed the view that it is not reasonable to give effect to
"'mere implications"' to meet a clear intent standard. 513 Furthermore,
Justice Blackmun noted that. what the Court found "strange" was no
substitute for the "unmistakably clear" intent of Congress. He declined
to pass upon "the wisdom of the majority's fiscal theory that if land is
alienable and encumberable, it must be taxable," but commented that
"Congress has made its own agreement with this particular economic
theory less than "'unmistakably clear."' 5 14
Third, Justice Blackmun faulted the majority for mistakenly
assuming that the Court could not give effect to statutes enacted since the
enactment of the provisions on which the majority relied-statutes
reflecting a reversal in federal Indian policy, in favor of preserving tribal
integrity and the tribal land base.5I5 Justice Scalia's opinion announced
that the tribe's policy objections did not belong in the Court, yet this
ignored the Court's own precedents construing Indian legislation in light
of intervening statutes. 516 Under the Court's established preemption
analysis, state law was preempted where it interfered with federal and
tribal policy interests.517 Reviewing the effects of the allotment policy,
repudiated by Congress in 1934, on Indian land holdings in general and
Yakima land holdings in particular, demonstrated the nature of the
federal government's policy interests in promoting tribal self-
government and self-sufficiency.51s Justice Blackmun described the dire
consequences of the allotment policy: "'Allotment and the subsequent
sale or lease of Indian lands accomplished what the 'genocide' of
epidemics, war, and bootlegged alcohol had not been able to do: a
systematic 'ethnocide' brought about by a loss of Indian identity with
the loss of the land."'519  He noted further that as Congress was
512. Id. at 696.
513. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1237 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
514. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 696. Justice Blackmun quoted from Justice Holmes' dissent-
ing opinion in Lochner v. New York: ."This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large
part of the country does not entertain."' Id. (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J. dissenting)).
515. Id. at 694-95.
516. Id. at 696.
517. Id. at 697.
518. Id. Indian landholdings were reduced nationwide by 90 million acres. As a result of the
allotment policy, non-Indians owned more than a quarter million acres of Yakima land, accounting for
more than half of the land originally allotted to individual tribal members. Id.
519. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 697 (quoting H. SCHUSTER, THE YAKIMAS: A CRmCAL
BiBuoGRAPHY 70 (1982)).
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considering repudiating the allotment policy, it was informed by the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs that
'[i]t is difficult to imagine any other system which with equal
effectiveness would pauperize the Indian while impoverishing
him, and sicken and kill his soul while pauperizing him, and
cast him in so ruined a condition into the final status of a
nonward dependent upon the States and the counties.'
520
Justice Blackmun described himself as "mystified" that the Court,
"sifting through the wreckage of the Dawes Act, finds any 'clearly
retained remnant' . . . justifying further erosions-through tax
foreclosure actions as in this case-to the land holdings of the Indian
people."521
Justice Blackmun also criticized the majority for trivializing
concerns about tribal self-determination, described by Justice Scalia as a
"'great exaggeration."' 5 2 2  Justice Blackmun found it difficult to
reconcile self-determination with a state's imposition of taxes upon tribal
members without their consent.5 23 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun
objected to the majority's conclusion that taxes on real property were less
disruptive of tribal integrity than the cigarette sales tax and personal
property taxes which the Court had considered in a previous tax case.
524
Justice Blackmun was unable to agree with the majority that "paying a
few more pennies for cigarettes or a tax on some personal property is
more a threat to tribal integrity and self-determination than foreclosing
upon and seizing tribal lands." 52 5
Finally, Justice Blackmun scoffed at the majority for
"platitudinously" suggesting that if the tribe believed that the Dawes
Act's objectives were obstructed by the state taxes, it should make its
argument to Congress. Poignantly noting the plight of the individuals
whose land had been seized, Justice Blackmun stated "I am less
confident than my colleagues that the 31 Yakima Indian families likely
520. Id. at 698 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 7902 (Readjustment of Indian Affairs (Index)) before
the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (Comm. Print 1984) (Memorandum of
John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs)).
521. Id. at 698.
522. Id. (quoting County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 692).
523. Id.
524. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 698. Justice Blackmun referred to the Court's decision in
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, in which the Court considered Montana's attempt to
impose its cigarette sales tax and personal property taxes, along with vendor licensing fees, on Indians
residing on a reservation. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). Justice Scalia also discussed Moe in his opinion.
County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 689-92. He argued that "[w]hile the in personam jurisdiction over
reservation Indians at issue in Moe would have been significantly disruptive of tribal self-government,
the mere power to assess and collect a tax on certain real estate is not." Id. at 692.
525. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 698.
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to be rendered homeless by today's decision are well-positioned to lobby
for change in the vast corridors of Congress."
526
Justice Blackmun's opinion in County of Yakima found him once
again taking tribal rights and tribal self-government more seriously than
did a majority of the Court. Although the majority purported to require
an unmistakably clear intent by Congress to authorize the taxation at
issue, it seemed in fact to be relying on statutory provisions of
questionable relevance and its own intuition as to Congress's intent.
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun recognized the implications of the
Court's decision for tribal self-determination, the goal of much of recent
federal Indian policy. Finally, he recognized the impact that the Court's
decision could have on the individuals whose land was being taken, and
pointed out the absurdity in the majority's suggestion that the tribe could
simply seek relief from Congress.
2. Contributions to the Development of Indian Law
Justice Blackmun dissented from the Court's holdings in Cotton
Petroleum and County of Yakima allowing state taxation of mineral
production by non-Indian lessees on a reservation and of Indian-owned
reservation land, respectively, while concurring in the part of the Court's
holding in County of Yakima which invalidated state taxation of sales of
Indian-owned reservation land. His opinions in this area, like his tribal
regulatory authority opinions, reflected views on tribal self-government
and self-determination not shared by a majority of the Court. Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Blackmun's opinion in Cotton
Petroleum, while no one joined Justice Blackmun's opinion in County of
Yakima.527
Both of Justice Blackmun's opinions in this area reflected his
concern for respecting federal Indian policy and preventing state
interference with the execution of federal policy. Both sought clear
congressional intent allowing the imposition of the state taxes in
question, and analyzed the application of preemption principles to the
state tax at issue. While Justice Blackmun's Cotton Petroleum opinion
focused on the comprehensiveness of the federal and tribal scheme
regulating leasing of Indian mineral lands, his County of Yakima opinion
emphasized the federal policy interests with which state taxation would
interfere. Finally, both opinions considered the impact of the state
526. Id.
527. The same Justices supported Justice Blackmun's opinions in Montana, Rice, and Brendale.
See supra notes 363, 391, and 405 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions in which Justice
Blackmun was joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan).
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taxation on tribal interests and tribal self-determination to be significant.
In short, both opinions reflected continuing concern for respecting tribal
rights and tribal sovereignty, with which state taxation on the reservation
interfered. Because Justice Blackmun's views in these cases were at odds
with the views of the majority of the Court, however, they did not have a
direct impact on the development of the law in this area.
III. REFLECTIONS ON JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S INDIAN LAW
OPINIONS
Part III of this article attempts to bring some coherence to the
opinions analyzed in Part II-a task which the breadth of the subject
matter covered by Justice Blackmun's Indian law opinions makes
particularly challenging. While Part II focused on Justice Blackmun's
individual opinions and the developments in the substantive areas of
Indian law revealed by those opinions, the goal of Part III is to develop
some overall sense of Justice Blackmun's Indian law jurisprudence by
reflecting on some of the major themes and patterns which seem to
emerge from an analysis of his Indian law opinions.
A. "INHERENT POWERS OF A LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY": THE SURVIVAL
.OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Justice Blackmun's opinions treated tribal sovereignty as more than
a mere historical anomaly or artifact. His opinions on tribal regulatory
authority and state taxing authority in particular made it clear that, in his
view, inherent tribal sovereignty is still the basis for considerable tribal
authority within reservation boundaries.
In Bourland, he began his opinion with the principle that inherent
sovereignty alone might provide the basis for tribal regulatory authority
over nonmembers on land taken by the federal government.5 28 He
explained that "it is a fundamental principle of federal Indian law that
Indian tribes possess 'inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has
never been extinguished."' 529 Moreover, he recognized that tribal
sovereignty has a geographic component and thus is not limited to
authority over tribal members: "the inherent sovereignty of Indian
tribes extends 'over both their members and their territory."'530 By
528. Bourland is discussed supra at notes 441-60 and accompanying text.
529. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2321 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978)
(emphasis omitted by Justice Blackmun)).
530. Id. (quoting Wheeler at 323) (emphasis added by Justice Blackmun)).
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contrast, the Court has moved increasingly in recent years toward
restricting the geographic aspects of tribal sovereignty, acknowledged by
Chief Justice Marshall in the Cherokee Cases in the 1830's, and limiting
tribal sovereignty to authority over tribal members.531
Justice Blackmun's opinions recognized congressional power to
diminish tribal sovereignty, but explained that tribes still retain those
aspects of sovereignty "'not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status."' 5 3 2
Moreover, intent to diminish tribal sovereignty should not be lightly
imputed to Congress, and implicit divestiture of inherent sovereignty
should be found
only "where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be
inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National
Government, as when the tribes seek to engage in foreign
relations, alienate their lands to non-Indians without federal
consent, or prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts which do not
accord the full protections of the Bill of Rights." 533
In Brendale and Bourland, Justice Blackmun opposed the Court's
efforts in those cases and in Montana to use the "dependent status" of
the tribes as a basis for divesting the tribes of civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers. He argued in Br'endale that "Montana must be read to
recognize the inherent authority of tribes to exercise civil jurisdiction
over non-Indian activities on tribal reservations where those activities...
implicate a significant tribal interest."534 In Bourland, he described
language in Montana restricting tribal sovereignty as "contrary to 150
years of Indian law jurisprudence." 535 In short, Justice Blackmun's
opinions on tribal regulatory authority evidenced strong support for
tribal sovereignty, and for tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers
in particular.
531. For a detailed analysis of the geographically-based and membership-based aspects of tribal
sovereignty, and the Court's increasing emphasis on membership-based sovereignty, see Dussias,
supra note 7.
532. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2322 (quoting Wheeler at 323) (emphasis added by Justice
Blackmun). See also Brendale, 492 U.S. at 451-52 ("Time and again we stated that, while Congress
retains the authority to abrogate tribal sovereignty as it sees fit, tribal sovereignty is not implicitly
divested except in those limited circumstances principally involving external powers of sovereignty
where the exercise of tribal authority is necessarily inconsistent with the tribes' dependent status.").
533. Id. (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 477 U.S. 134, 153-
54 (1980)). Justice Blackmun referred to the same language in his opinion in Brendale, 492 U.S. at
450.
534. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 450. Brendale is discussed supra at notes 401-40 and accompanying
text.
535. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2322 n.2.
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Similarly, Justice Blackmun's approach to tribal court civil
jurisdiction demonstrated a continuing recognition of inherent tribal
sovereignty. In his opinion for the Court in Three Affiliated Tribes,
Justice Blackmun recognized the appropriate role to be played by tribal
courts in reservation-based civil disputes by explaining that state courts'
exercise of "jurisdiction over claims by non-Indians against Indians or
over claims between Indians" would "intrude[] impermissibly on tribal
self-governance." 536 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun joined the Court's
holdings in National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, which recognized
that the tribal court is presumptively the proper forum for a reservation-
based civil dispute and required exhaustion of tribal court remedies, thus
further demonstrating his respect for tribal court civil jurisdiction.
537
Furthermore, in his opinion in Brendale, he referred to Iowa Mutual as
evidence of the Court's recognition in previous cases that "tribal civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians is consistent with the dependent status of
the tribes." 538
Justice Blackmun's opinions on taxation also displayed respect for
tribal sovereignty by emphasizing the importance of tribal self-
government and self-determination. Although Cotton Petroleum and
County of Yakima involved state taxes and therefore did not directly
address tribal authority to impose taxes as an aspect of tribal sovereignty,
Justice Blackmun's opinions in these cases both considered the impact of
the state taxes on tribal self-government important in determining
whether the taxes were permissible. 539 Justice Blackmun also referred to
the importance of tribal self-government and self-determination in his
opinions in such cases as Mancari, Blatchford, and Three Affiliated
Tribes.540
Justice Blackmun was not, however, supportive of all aspects of
tribal sovereignty. His recognition of tribal sovereignty did not extend
to tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, despite his recognition
of the geographic component of tribal sovereignty. 54 1 Although his
opinion in John concerned federal and state criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country, he joined the majority of the Court in divesting the tribes
of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and nonmember Indians in
536. Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S. at 148. Three Affiliated Tribes is discussed supra at notes
324-39 and accompanying text.
537. See supra notes 340-44 and accompanying text (providing insight into Justice Blackmun's
views toward cases involving issues of civil court jurisdiction).
538. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 455. See also id. at 454 n.5 (referring to National Farmers Union Ins.
Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)).
539. Cotton Petroleum is discussed supra at notes 469-98 and accompanying text. County of
Yakima is discussed supra at notes 498-526 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 185, 271 and 331, respectively, and accompanying text.
541. See, e.g., supra note 428 and accompanying text.
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Oliphant and Duro.54 2 In his opinion in Brendale, Justice Blackmun
referred to Oliphant as the only case prior to Montana in which the
Court found a "sovereign power to have been relinquished upon
incorporation" in addition to "those few aspects of soyereignty
recognized in the Cherokee Cases as necessarily divested." 543 He
described the Court's holding in Oliphant as follows:
In light of the nearly universal understanding dating from the
origins of this country's dealings with the tribes that they do
not possess criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians except as
permitted by treaty, and in light of the Federal Constitution's
extraordinary protections against intrusions on personal liberty,
we concluded that inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes...
[N]othing in Oliphant negates our historical understanding that
the tribes retain substantial civil jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans.544
He thus accepted restrictions on tribal criminal jurisdiction on the
basis of constitutional concerns which he did not fully describe, but was
careful to distinguish criminal jurisdiction from civil jurisdiction.
In summary, Justice Blackmun's Indian law opinions showed
continuing respect for tribal sovereignty, although that respect did not
extend to tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers. Aside from the
limitations on tribal criminal jurisdiction which he endorsed, his opinions
indicated staunch support for tribal sovereignty.
B. "GREAT NATIONS SHOULD KEEP THEIR WORD": TREATIES,
STATUTES, AND CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION
Another important element of Justice Blackmun's Indian law
jurisprudence was his continuing concern for enforcing treaty
provisions. Justice Blackmun's respect for upholding treaty provisions
and federal promises to Indians was evident in opinions like his
dissenting opinion in Catawba Indian Tribe, in which he maintained that
"'[g]reat nations, like great men, should keep their word,"' 54 5 and
542. See supra notes 319-22 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Blackmun's views on
criminal jurisdictional issues involving non-Indians).
543. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 453.
544. Id. at 453-54 (citations omitted).
545. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 529 (quoting FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S.
99, 142 (1960) (dissenting opinion)). Catawba Indian Tribe is discussed supra at notes 155-79 and
accompanying text.
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faulted the majority for "break[ing] faith once again with the Tribe."546
Similarly, in Hagen, he quoted the same maxim,547 and noted the
"substantial breach of Congress's original promise." 548
Moreover, Justice Blackmun's opinions demonstrated a willingness
to apply the canons of construction which the Court has developed for
construing treaties. These canons require "that treaties be liberally
construed to favor Indians, that ambiguous expressions in treaties must
be resolved in favor of the Indians, and that treaties should be construed
as the Indians would have understood them."549 These canons are based
on the federal government's trust responsibility to the tribes: "Since
Congress is exercising a trust responsibility when dealing with Indians,
courts presume that Congress' intent toward them is benevolent and have
developed canons of construction that treaties and other federal action
should when possible be read as protecting Indian rights and in a
manner favorable to Indians." 550
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun extended these canons to
interpreting statutes, in keeping with the Court's approach in earlier
cases. 551
Justice Blackmun made use of the ambiguity canon in 1986 in his
dissenting opinion in Catawba Indian Tribe, noting that his analysis of
the Catawba Act "must begin with the firmly established rule .. .that
ambiguities in statutes regulating Indian affairs are to be construed in the
Indians' favor." 552 He described the canon as "'eminently sound and
vital."' 553 Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Cotton Petroleum,
Justice Blackmun noted that "our precedents consistently have required
that ambiguities in statutes affecting tribal interests be resolved in favor
of Indian independence." 5 54  In Hagen, he expressed the canon in
several ways: "ambiguities must be construed broadly in favor of the
Indians"; 555 "'legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of the
546. 470 U.S. at 527.
547. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 971. Hagen is discussed supra at notes 298-314 and accompanying
text.
548. 114 S. Ct. at 981.
549. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 222. These canons will be referred to as the "liberal
construction canon," the "ambiguity canon" and the "Indian understanding canon."
550. CoHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 221.
551. See CoHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 222. See also Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 972 n.3 (giving
examples of the use of the canon).
552. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 520.
553. Id. at 526 (quoting Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7
(1976)).
554. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 203 n.7 (relying on Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bur. of
Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 838 (1982)).
555. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 971.
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Indians "';556 and "'[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor
of the [Indians]."'5 5
7
In 1991, in his dissenting opinion in Blatchford, Justice Blackmun
relied on the liberal construction canon, stating that "'statutes passed for
the benefit of dependent Indian tribes ...are to be liberally construed,
doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians."' 5 5 8 He
noted that this canon "dates back to the earliest years of our Nation's
history[] ... [and] ... is rooted in the unique trust relationship between
the tribes and the Federal Government that is inherent in the
constitutional plan." 559 Similarly, in 1984, in his opinion for the Court
in Three Affiliated Tribes, Justice Blackmun construed ambiguous
statutory language in light of the same formulation of this liberal
construction canon.5 60 In 1989, in his dissenting opinion in Cotton
Petroleum, and in 1993, in his dissenting opinion in Bourland, he also
referred to the liberal construction canon.561
Justice Blackmun also employed the Indian understanding canon.
In 1980, Justice Blackmun began his opinion in Montana by noting that
the Court had recently "reaffirmed that the terms of a treaty between the
United States and an Indian tribe must be construed "'in the sense in
which they would naturally be understood by the Indians."' 5 6 2
Applying this canon, he noted that it would "def[y] common sense" to
suggest that the Crow Tribe would have understood the language of the
Fort Laramie Treaties to have meant that the United States was retaining
title to the bed of the Big Horn River in trust for the future State of
Montana. 563 In his dissenting opinion in Catawba Indian Tribe, he
relied primarily on the ambiguity canon, but he also noted that "[iln
cases involving Indian treaties, . . . it has long been the rule ... that the
entire treaty must be interpreted as the Indians would have understood
it."564 Justice Blackmun cited this canon as reflecting the idea that the
Court has consistently tried to avoid semantic hairsplitting in construing
556. Id. (quoting DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,447 (1975)).
557. Id. (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930)).
558. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2589 (quoting Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78,
89 (1918)). This formulation combines the ambiguity canon and the liberal construction canon.
Justice Blackmun also cited the Court's more recent opinion in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,
392 (1976). Blatchford, 1I1 S. Ct. at 2589.
559. Id. at 2589-90 (citations omitted).
560. Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S. at 149. He noted that "it is a settled principle of statutory
construction that statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes are to be liberally
construed, with doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians." Id.
561. See supra notes 478 & 451 and accompanying text.
562. Montana, 450 U.S. at 569 (quoting Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658, 676
(1979)). Montana is discussed supra at notes 352-79 and accompanying text.
563. Montana, 450 U.S. at 577..
564. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 527.
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federal agreements with Indians and statutes ostensibly passed for their
benefit.565 In Bourland, Justice Blackmun's opinion again maintained
that a treaty must be construed in the sense in which the Indians would
have understood it, "'not according to the technical meaning of its
words to learned lawyers."' 566 On this basis, he found it "implausible"
that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe would have thought "every right
subsumed in the Fort Laramie Treaty's sweeping language to be defeated
the moment they lost the right to exclusive use of their land." 567
Moreover, a number of Justice Blackmun's opinions revealed an
appreciation of the position in which the tribes found themselves in the
treaty-making process. In John, he described how the Choctaws
negotiated the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek only after it was made
apparent to them that the federal government would no longer protect
them from hostile actions by Mississippi. 568 In Sioux Nation, he
described the circumstances under which Sioux chiefs were forced to
relinquish rights to the Black Hills of South Dakota.569 In his opinion in
Montana, Justice Blackmun described the depradations which the Crow
Indians had suffered prior to signing the Fort Laramie Treaty of
1868.570 In Catawba Indian Tribe, his dissenting opinion described the
"state of starvation and distress" which drove the Catawbas to sign a
"treaty" with South Carolina. 57 1
Finally, it should be noted that some of Justice Blackmun's opinions
did not apply the canons of construction in cases in which applying one
of the canons would have benefited an Indian litigant. In Justice
Blackmun's first Indian law opinion, Affiliated Ute Tribes, for example,
he rejected the argument that a federal statute should be construed as
providing consent by the United States to be sued,5.72 while Justice
Douglas, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, relied on the canon
that doubtful expressions should be resolved in favor of the Indians in
concluding that the statute provided federal consent to be sued. 573
Similarly, in Mottaz, Justice Blackmun did not apply the liberal
565. Id.
566. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2323 (quoting Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979)).
567. Id.
568. John, 437 U.S. at 640-41. John is discussed supra at notes 280-97 and accompanying text.
569. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 381-82. Sioux Nation is discussed supra at notes 126-54 and
accompanying text.
570. Montana, 450 U.S. at 578.
571. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 514.
572. Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 143.
573. Id. at 161. As Justice Douglas stated, "We owe to the Indians a beneficent interpretation of
remedial legislation designed to right past wrongs .... '[D]oubtful expressions ... are to be resolved
in favor of a weak and defenseless people, who are wards of the nation, and dependent wholly upon
its protection and good faith."' (quoting Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912)).
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construction canon in construing the Quiet Title Act, and concluded that
the Indian plaintiffs claim against the United States was covered by the
Act and was barred by the Act's twelve-year statute of limitations. 574 He
noted that "[f]ederal law rightly provides Indians with a range of special
protections. But even for Indian plaintiffs, '[a] waiver of sovereign
immunity 'cannot be lightly implied but must be unequivocally
expressed.'"' 575  The Indian plaintiffs claim in Mottaz was
subordinated to "the national public interest," which required barring
"stale" claims against the United States. 576 In both of these cases,
applying one of the canons of construction would have benefited the
Indian litigant at the expense of the United States and the presumed
"public interest."
The overall picture presented by Justice Blackmun's Indian law
opinions, however, indicates a recognition of treaties as imposing lasting
obligations on the United States, and an appreciation of the context in
which the tribes submitted to treaties. Moreover, the opinions generally
indicate a willingness to apply the canons of construction to both treaties
and statutes, for the benefit of Indian litigants.
C. "AN APPRECIATION OF HISTORY": THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY
IN INDIAN LAW
Many of Justice Blackmun's opinions made extensive use of
historical sources and demonstrate a sincere interest in the history of the
tribes which seems to go beyond a mere interest in gathering evidence
necessary to resolve the issues before the Court. Justice Blackmun made
his views on the role of history in Indian law explicit in Catawba Indian
Tribe: "'Too often we neglect the past. Even more than other domains
of law, 'the intricacies and peculiarities of Indian law deman[d] an
appreciation of history."' 577
In 1973, in Mattz,578 for example, Justice Blackmun quoted
extensively from historical sources, devoting a large portion of his
opinion to a discussion of the history of the Yurok Indians and the
Klamath River Reservation. Much of this information appears to be of
questionable relevance to the outcome of the case. Similarly, almost half
of Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in John579 was taken up by a
574. Mottaz,476 U.S. at 851.
575. Id. (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535,538 (1980)).
576. Id.
577. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 511 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Foreword to a
Jurisprudential Symposium in Memory of Felix S. Cohen, 9 RuTGERS L. REv. 355, 356 (1954)).
578. Mattz, 412 U.S. 481 (1973). Mattz is discussed supra at notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
579. John, 437 U.S. at 638-46.
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description of the history of the Choctaws and their relations with the
United States.
Two of Justice Blackmun's opinions in land claims cases also drew
extensively from historical sources. In his opinion for the Court in
Sioux Nation, Justice Blackmun devoted ten pages of his fifty-page
opinion to describing the history of the Sioux Nation and its dealings
with the United States, which culminated in the taking of the Black
Hills.580 His description showed his understanding of the United States'
breach of the Fort Laramie Treaty, and the vulnerable position of the
Sioux when white settlers demanded the lands guaranteed to the Sioux
by the United States. This historical picture laid the basis for his holding
that the factual findings supported the Court of Claims' conclusion that
the federal government had not made a good faith effort to give the
Sioux the full value of the land taken from them. Similarly, in Catawba
Indian Tribe,581 Justice Blackmun devoted seven pages of his eighteen-
page dissenting opinion to describing the history of the Catawba Tribe
and its dealings with Great Britain, the United States, and the State of
South Carolina. He described the abusive practices by which land was
obtained from the Catawbas, culminating in South Carolina's taking of
land from the tribe "by treaty"-a "treaty" which, the Catawbas
charged in 1908, state representatives negotiated by "setting out a
whiskey barrel and tin cups and inviting the Indians to help
themselves." 582 This historical discussion informed Justice Blackmun's
analysis of Congress's intent in enacting the federal statute at issue.
Some of Justice Blackmun's opinions on constitutional law issues
also made use of history, although not as extensively as did his land
claims opinions. In Mancari, Justice Blackmun looked at the results of
the Indians' past dealings with the United States-their lands were taken
from them, sometimes by force, leaving them in the position of being
dependent on the United States, which assumed the duty of protecting
them.583 Justice Blackmun evaluated the constitutional validity of the
preference provision at issue in Mancari in this "historical and legal
context." 584 Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Smith, Justice
Blackmun referred to the history of religious persecution of Native
Americans, and the efforts of the federal government to repress
580. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 374-84.
581. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 512-18.
582. Id. at 514 n.2.
583. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552. Mancari is discussed supra at notes 182-202 and accompanying
text.
584. 17 U.S. at 553.
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traditional religious practices, and likened Oregon's conduct to such
efforts .585
It is also interesting to note the sources to which Justice Blackmun
turned for historical information. His opinions demonstrated that he was
not content to rely on a simple textbook-based view of history. Rather,
he also turned to original sources and contemporary accounts of events.
For example, in Mattz he relied on an 1887 book on the California tribes
by a journalist 58 6 and nineteenth century reports of government
agents. 587 In Catawba Indian Tribe, Justice Blackmun relied on a 1908
memorandum by the Catawbas' attorney,588 and on an 1854 report to the
governor of South Carolina by a man who knew the Catawbas and later
became the state's agent to the tribe. 589 In Sioux Nation, Justice
Blackmun's sources were in fact attacked by Justice Rehnquist, who
evidently preferred a traditional textbook-based view of history. Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion noted his belief that it was "quite unfair
to judge by the light of 'revisionist' historians or the mores of another
era actions that were taken under pressure of time more than a century
ago ."590
In summary, history played an important role in a number of
Justice Blackmun's opinions. He relied on history as a basis for some of
his decisions, as well as sometimes displaying what appeared to be an
interest in the history of the tribes and their dealings with the United
States that went beyond a simple interest in gathering evidence to resolve
the issue before the Court. Justice Blackmun's view of history in his
opinions went beyond a dry description of historical events to look at the
effects of those events on Indian tribes and individual Indians.
585. Smith, 494 U.S. at 920 & 921 n.10. Justice Blackmun described some of this repression as
follows:
In 1921, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Burke reminded his staff to punish any
Indian engaged in 'any dance which involves ... the reckless giving away of property..
. frequent or prolonged periods of celebration ...in fact, any disorderly or plainly
excessive performance that promotes superstitious cruelty, licentiousness, idleness,
danger to health, and shiftless indifference to family welfare.' Two years later, he
forbid Indians under the age of 50 from participating in any dances of any kind ....
Id. at 920 n.10. Smith is discussed supra at notes 222-51 and accompanying text.
586. Mattz, 412 U.S. at 486 nn.4-5 & 488 n.7. Mattz is discussed supra at notes 28-44 and
accompanying text.
587. See, e.g., Mattz, 412 U.S. at 486 n.4, 487 n.6 & 489 n.8.
588. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 514-15 n.2.
589. Id. at 514.
590. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 435. Justice Rehnquist relied on a 1965 textbook as his historical
source. See id. at 437 (referring to S. MosusoN. THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 539-40
(1965)).
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D. "THE SURROUNDED": JUSTICES BLACKMUN, BRENNAN AND
MARSHALL
One striking pattern emerging from an analysis of Justice
Blackmun's Indian law opinions is the frequency with which Justice
Blackmun's opinions were joined by Justices William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall prior to their retirement from the Court. 591 Justices
Brennan and Marshall were particularly strong supporters of Justice
Blackmun's dissenting opinions. In 1981, they joined Justice
Blackmun's partially dissenting opinion in Montana.592 Both Justices
also joined Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinions in 1983 in Rice,593 in
1989 in Cotton Petroleum and Brendale,594 and in 1990 in Smith.595
Justices Brennan and Marshall were the only Justices who joined Justice
Blackmun's opinion in each of these cases. Justice Marshall also joined
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinions in 1986 in Catawba Indian
Tribe596 and in 1991, following Justice Brennan's retirement, in
Blatchford.597 Justice Blackmun's opinion in Clarke was his only
dissenting opinion during the years in which Justices Brennan and
Marshall were on the Court not joined by either of the two Justices. 598
A similar picture of solidarity emerges from focusing on the
opinions in which Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court.
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Blackmun's opinions for
the Court in 1972 in Affiliated Ute Citizens599 in 1973 in Mattz, 600 in
1974 in Ruiz and Mancari,60 in 1978 in John,60 2 in 1980 in Sioux
Nation,60 3 in 1984 in Three Affiliated Tribes,604 and in 1986 in Mottaz. 60 5
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinions also regularly showed
agreement with the approach supported by Justices Brennan and
Marshall. In Hollowbreast and Weeks, Justice Blackmun concurred in
591. Justices Brennan and Marshall retired from the Court in 1990 and 1991, respectively. The
reference in the subheading is to D'ARCY McNicKLa, THE SURROUNDED (1936).
592. Montana, 450 U.S. at 569.
593. Rice, 463 U.S. at 735.
594. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 193; Brendale, 492 U.S. at 448. Justice Blackmun concurred
in part and dissented in part in Brendale. Id.
595. Smith, 494 U.S. at 907.
596. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 511. Justice Brennan voted with the majority.
597. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2586.
598. Clarke, 445 U.S. at 259.
599. Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
600. Mattz, 412 U.S. 481 (1972).
601. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
602. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
603. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
604. Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S. 138 (1984).
605. Motaz, 476 U.S. 834 (1986).
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the opinions of the Court, written by Justice Brennan and joined by
Justice Marshall. 606 In Wilson, Justice Blackmun concurred in the
majority opinion, which Justices Brennan and Marshall had joined. 607 In
Roy, Justice Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in part, while
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice O'Connor's concurring and
dissenting opinion, which agreed with the same parts of the majority
opinion and adopted the same test as Justice Blackmun's opinion.608
Only in Puyallup Tribe did Justices Brennan and Marshall take a
contrary position to the one taken by Justice Blackmun in a concurring
opinion .609
The frequency with which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined
Justice Blackmun's opinions, or at least agreed with the approach taken
in his opinion, suggests that Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall
shared largely similar views of Indian law during their common years on
the Court. Thus, for example, Justices Brennan and Marshall, like Justice
Blackmun, were strong supporters of tribal sovereignty. 6 10 In the area of
criminal jurisdiction, however, their views diverged. While Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Blackmun's opinion in John, both
of them dissented from the Court's judgment in Duro, in which Justice
Blackmun joined the majority in divesting tribes of criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians. 6 11 Justice Marshall also dissented from the
Court's judgment in Oliphant, in which Justice Blackmun joined the
majority in divesting tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 6 12
Despite their disagreement over the issue of tribal criminal
jurisdiction, the overall picture that emerges from examining Justice
Blackmun's opinions is that these three Justices were generally in
agreement with each other on the Indian law issues addressed in Justice
Blackmun's opinions, or at least in agreement on the basic approach
which should be taken in dealing with such issues. The departure of
Justices Brennan and Marshall from the Court left Justice Blackmun
606. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 660 (1976); Weeks, 430 U.S. 90 (1977).
607. Wilson, 442 U.S. 655 (1979).
608. Roy, 476 U.S. 694 (1986). See also supra notes 213-21 and accompanying text.
609. In Puyallup Tribe, Justice Blackmun joined the majority's opinion, which upheld state
jurisdiction over individual Indians but not over the tribe, but filed a concurring opinion to question the
continuing vitality of tribal sovereign immunity as established by the Court in an earlier case. 433 U.S.
.at 178-79. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote an opinion which agreed with the
majority's conclusion that the state lacked jurisdiction over the tribe, but disagreed with the majority's
conclusion as to the individual Indians. Id. at 179-85.
610. See supra notes 528-44 and accompanying text (discussing tribal sovereignty).
611. Duro, 495 U.S. 678 (1990).
612. Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Justice Brennan did not take part in Oliphant. See also supra
notes 319-20 and accompanying text (discussing divesting tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians).
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essentially alone as a regular supporter of tribal rights and tribal
sovereignty.
E. "LONE WOLF": JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S GROWING ISOLATION AS A
SUPPORTER OF INDIAN LITIGANTS
Another pattern that emerges from Justice Blackmun's Indian law
opinions is the considerable extent to which he supported the position of
Indian litigants. Of the twenty-four opinions examined in Part II, Justice
Blackmun's position supported an individual Indian or tribal litigant in
seventeen of them.613 In five additional cases- Affiliated Ute Citizens,
Puyallup Tribe, Wilson, Montana, and Roy-Justice Blackmun's opinions
were in part supportive of the position of Indian litigants and in part
adverse to their positions. 614 Only in Clarke and Mottaz were Justice
Blackmun's opinions completely adverse to the position of the Indian
litigant. 6 15 It is therefore instructive to look more closely at Justice
Blackmun's opinions in Clarke and Mottaz.
In Clarke, Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion concluded,
contrary to the position of the individual litigant and the United States,
that the federal statute in question covered inverse condemnation of
allotments, as well as formal condemnation proceedings. His opinion,
however, reflected his concern with ensuring that a remedy was available
to an Indian whose property had been taken, and with not elevating form
over substance.616 His approach in Clarke thus showed a concern for the
preservation of Indian rights. In Mottaz, however, Justice Blackmun's
approach was clearly adverse to Indian interests. His opinion for the
Court concluded that an Indian plaintiffs allotment-related claim against
the United States was barred by the federal Quiet Title Act, which he
viewed as based on "the national public interest . . . [in] barring stale
challenges to the United States' claim to real property." 617 Similarly, in
Affiliated Ute Citizens, Justice Blackmun, while holding that the Indian
litigants were entitled to damages from some of the defendants in the
613. See Mattz, Ruiz, Mancari, Hollowbreast, Weeks, John, Sioux Nation, Rice, Three Affiliated
Tribes, Catawba Indian Tribe, Cotton Petroleum, Brendale, Smith, Blatchford, County of Yakima,
Bourland and Hagen, all discussed supra. In Hollowbreast, Justice Blackmun supported the position of
the tribe over the position of individual tribal members as litigants. See supra notes 61-70 and
accompanying text (discussing Hollowbreast). In Weeks, Justice Blackmun sided with the position of
certain Delaware Indians as against two other groups of Delaware Indians. See supra notes 97-108
and accompanying text (discussing Weeks).
614. See supra at notes 8-27, 345-51, 109-25, 352-79 and 204-21, respectively, and
accompanying text.
615. Clarke and Monaz are discussed supra at notes 71-82 and 83-96, respectively, and
accompanying text.
616. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing Clarke).
617. Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 851.
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case, construed a statute authorizing suits against the United States as
inapplicable to the Indian litigants' claim against the United States, which
was therefore barred by sovereign immunity. 618 Thus in cases involving
suits against the United States, Justice Blackmun did not support the
position of Indian litigants, apparently out of concern for the potential
damage to the "national public interest" resulting from construing
statutes as allowing suits against the United States in these instances.
Similarly, Justice Blackmun elevated what he apparently felt to be a
higher concern above Indian interests in the area of tribal criminal
jurisdiction. He joined in majority opinions limiting tribal criminal
jurisdiction to tribal members, on the basis of his appreciation of the
Constitution's strong concern with personal liberties. 619
Nevertheless, the overall picture that emerges from Justice
Blackmun's Indian law opinions is that he was generally supportive of
the position of Indian litigants. He was particularly supportive of Indian
litigants in cases involving tribal sovereignty, as discussed earlier.
However, it is also interesting to note how the Court's response to the
views expressed in Justice Blackmun's opinions changed during his years
on the Court. During the years 1972-when Justice Blackmun wrote his
first Indian law opinion-through 1979, Justice Blackmun's opinions
were either written as the opinion of the Court or concurred with the
majority of the Court.620 Beginning in 1980, however, when the Court
increasingly began to face difficult issues involving state-tribal
jurisdictional conflicts and Indian religious rights, Justice Blackmun's
opinions were more often at odds with the majority of the Court. In
1980, Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court in Sioux Nation,
but also wrote a dissenting opinion in Clarke. During the years 1981
through 1989, Justice Blackmun wrote only two opinions for the Court,
in Three Affiliated Tribes and Mottaz. The rest of his opinions were
either dissenting opinions-in Rice, Catawba Indian Tribe and Cotton
Petroleum-or opinions in which he accepted only part of the majority's
decision. In Montana, he dissented in part; in Roy, he concurred in part;
in Brendale, he concurred in part of the Court's judgment and dissented
as to the other part. Finally, all of Justice Blackmun's opinions after
1989-in Smith, Blatchford, County of Yakima, Bourland and
Hagen-were dissenting opinions.
618. Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text
(discussing Affiliated Ute Citizens).
619. See supra notes 319-23 and accompanying text (discussing divesting tribes of criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians and nonmember Indians).
620. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens, Mattz, Ruiz,
Mancari and John. He wrote concurring opinions in Hollowbreast, Weeks, Puyallup and Wilson.
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In the opinions in which Justice Blackmun was at odds, in whole or
in part, with the majority of the Court, Justice Blackmun was often joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall, as discussed earlier. The retirement of
these two Justices from the Court, however, meant that Justice Blackmun
lost two strong supporters of many of his Indian law views. In County of
Yakima, decided after the retirement of both Justices Brennan and
Marshall, Justice Blackmun was alone in his dissent. In 1993, in
Bourland, and in 1994, in Hagen, only Justice Souter joined Justice
Blackmun's dissenting opinion.
In summary, a review of Justice Blackmun's Indian law opinions
reveals him as generally a strong supporter of Indian litigants. After
1980, the views expressed in his opinions were increasingly contrary, in
whole or in part, to the views of the majority of the Court. Justices
Brennan and Marshall often supported his dissenting views, and their
retirement from the Court meant that Justice Blackmun was faced with
the prospect of increasing isolation from the rest of the Court in Indian
law cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Blackmun's Indian law opinions spanned a period of over
twenty years and touched on most of the important areas of Indian law.
Grouping his opinions into subject-matter areas provides an opportunity
for assessing his views of, and contributions to the development of,
Indian law in each subject-matter area. Moreover, since his opinions
covered so many important areas, examining them also provides a
capsulized view of the important Indian law issues which faced the Court
while Justice Blackmun served there.
A number of important themes and patterns emerge from
examining Justice Blackmun's Indian law opinions. Many of the
opinions demonstrated Justice Blackmun's continuing recognition of
tribal sovereignty and the governmental authority that flows from that
sovereignty. His opinions often showed respect for tribal sovereignty
and tribal self-determination during years in which a majority of the
Court appeared increasingly willing to impose limitations on tribal
sovereignty. His opinions also maintained that the United States should
"keep its word" and evaluated treaties and federal statutes according to
the canons of construction which the Court developed as reflections of
the federal government's trust responsibility toward Indian tribes. His
opinions often were informed by a thorough examination of Indian
history, in which he appeared to have an interest that extended beyond a
narrow interest in gathering evidence to settle the issue before the Court.
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His depictions of Indian history, including the history of tribal dealings
with the federal and state governments, revealed an understanding of the
vulnerable position in which the tribes often found themselves.
Moreover, his view of Indian history went beyond a dry recitation of
historical events to portray the way in which individual people were
affected by those events and how individual people would be affected by
the Court's decisions.
Justice Blackmun's commitment to recognizing tribal sovereignty
and respecting treaty rights was part of a broader pattern, reflected in his
opinions, of generally supporting the position of Indian litigants before
the Court. In addition to supporting tribal regulatory authority as an
aspect of tribal sovereignty, Justice Blackmun's opinions maintained the
existence of reservations despite termination statutes, upheld treaty-based
land claims, saved Indian hiring preferences from an equal protection
attack, respected Indian religious practices, limited state criminal
jurisdiction on reservations, provided for tribal access to state court while
voicing respect for tribal court jurisdiction, and opposed state taxation
on reservations. In recent years, however, Justice Blackmun's opinions
were increasingly at odds with the views of a majority of the Court.
During their years on the Court, Justices Brennan and Marshall often
supported the views expressed in Justice Blackmun's opinions. Their
departure from the Court left Justice Blackmun essentially alone as a
regular supporter of Indian rights. Justice Blackmun's own retirement
removed from the Court its last remaining regular supporter of Indian
rights. It remains to be seen if another Justice will be willing, and able, to
take up Justice Blackmun's role as the conscience of the Court in Indian
law cases.
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